Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic)
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180
A police listening device recorded a conversation in Punjabi. Two interpreters wrote out English versions, and the jury took the written versions into the jury room. Were they admissible?
Qualified by legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
In proceedings governed by the uniform Evidence Acts a recording is a document (Dictionary, definition of document, para (c)), s 51 abolishes the principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents, and s 48(1)(c) allows the words recorded on an article or thing capable of reproducing them as sound to be proved by tendering a transcript. In those proceedings the means of proving a recording’s contents is therefore governed by Part 2.2, not by the common law rules stated in Butera.
What happened?
Butera was tried in the Supreme Court of Victoria with four others on a count of conspiring to traffic in heroin, and all were convicted. The Court of Criminal Appeal refused his application for leave to appeal against conviction. At the trial a tape recording of a conversation among some of the alleged co-conspirators had been admitted. It had been made by a listening device installed in a hotel room, and the conversation was mostly in Punjabi, partly in English and partly in Thai or Malay. Parts were muffled or indistinct, and two interpreters listened to the tape repeatedly and produced written English translations. The tape was played to the jury, the interpreters gave oral evidence and verified their translations, and each written translation was admitted as an exhibit and went into the jury room.
The only ground on which special leave was sought was that the trial judge erred in receiving into evidence the written translations, which the ground called “transcripts”. The ground did not challenge the admissibility of the tape, of the conversation it recorded or of the interpreters’ oral evidence. As the joint reasons record, the trial judge, Brooking J, had treated the translations as transcripts and, following his own earlier decision, held that a transcript is admissible whenever the tape is, while the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal had decided the contrary in another case. The joint reasons recorded, as the Court had been informed, that over 500 pages of the trial transcript were taken up in cross-examination of the interpreters on the text of the written translations.
What did the Court decide?
The Court granted special leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. The joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ said the question was important in criminal practice, which was why leave should be granted, and concluded that the appeal should be dismissed. Dawson J gave separate reasons, also granting special leave and dismissing the appeal. Gaudron J dissented and would have allowed the appeal.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
On the tape and any transcript of it, Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ said that a transcript “is a document setting out words which can be heard on playing over the tape” and is “not a copy of the tape, but a written record of what has been heard”. Prima facie, whether the recorded conversation took place should be proved by playing the tape in court if it is available, not by evidence, written or oral, of what a witness heard when the tape was played over out of court.
A tape is not by itself an admissible object, since by itself it cannot prove what is recorded on it. It is admissible because it can be played, and “it is that evidence, aurally received, which is admissible to prove the relevant fact”. If the tape is not available and its absence has been satisfactorily accounted for, the evidence of a witness who heard it played may be received as secondary evidence. A copy tape may be played if the provenance of the original tape, the accuracy of the copying process and the provenance of the copy are satisfactorily proved.
Where an indistinct recording may not yield its full content on a first playing, their Honours said courts receive transcripts not as evidence of the conversation but to assist the perception and understanding of the evidence given by playing the tape. The jury should be told that the transcript is not independent evidence, and that they cannot use it as a substitute for the tape if they are not satisfied that it correctly sets out what they heard.
On the translations, the joint reasons held that the interpreters’ written translations were not transcripts. They were the product of expertise: the interpreters had become ad hoc experts on what was recorded by listening repeatedly, and were experts in the languages, so the translations had to be given as sworn evidence of the translators. Prima facie, that evidence should have been given orally, like other testimonial evidence in a criminal trial. Their Honours said that the practice is not immutable, and that if the jury’s task can be facilitated, there is no absolute bar to admitting a written document, provided the judge bears in mind fairness to the accused and the risk of a document being taken into the jury room.
Here, because the cross-examination ran to over 500 pages on the text of the translations, a departure from the ordinary practice was justified, and the discretion to admit them did not miscarry.
Dawson J reasoned differently. He considered a tape recording to be a document, “the auditory equivalent of a photograph”, with the best evidence rule confined to written documents. A transcript of a tape is, in his Honour’s words, “evidence, albeit secondary evidence, of the contents of the tape and not merely an aide-memoire”, provided it is properly proved by evidence that it faithfully transcribes or translates what is on the tape. He found the translations admissible and no unfairness to the applicant.
Gaudron J, dissenting, reasoned that extraneous evidence of the contents of a tape that is in evidence, audible and intelligible is inadmissible. Where a tape is inaudible or in a foreign language, evidence of the sounds or of their English meaning may be led, but the typed documents were not admissible as exhibits, and their receipt created a risk that the jury would give them probative force in their own right. She was not satisfied that the applicant had not lost a chance of acquittal that was fairly open to him.
Why does this case matter?
Butera is the case to reach for when a problem puts a recording, a written transcript and an interpreter’s translation in front of a jury, because it separates three things that are easy to run together. The joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ and Dawson J’s separate reasons explain transcripts differently, so an answer needs to say whose reasons it is relying on.
Exam and application relevance
Start by classifying what is being tendered: the recording, a transcript of it, or a translation of it. State the rule for that item, and name the Justices whose reasons you are using.
Butera states the common law. In a proceeding governed by a statute dealing with the proof of the contents of documents, such as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), begin with the statutory provisions.
Check your understanding
1. According to Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ, what is the evidence that proves a recorded conversation when the tape is available, and why is the tape itself not that evidence?
2. How did Dawson J’s account of a transcript of a tape differ from that of Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ?
3. Why did the joint reasons say the written translations were not transcripts, and what justified admitting them in this case?