Evans v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 2007

EvidenceReal EvidenceRelevance

Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521

Security cameras filmed a masked robber in overalls and sunglasses. At trial the prosecutor made the accused put on a balaclava and overalls in front of the jury. What could that show the jury that they could not already see?

What happened?

In February 2002 an armed man robbed people of money in the chambers of Strathfield Municipal Council, and security cameras photographed him wearing overalls, sunglasses and a balaclava that covered all of his face except his eyes and mouth ([1], Heydon J at [129]). A baseball cap was left on the floor, and the DNA profile on it matched the appellant’s DNA profile, a profile expected to occur in fewer than one in ten billion individuals ([1], [3]). In December 2003, police found a red balaclava in his bedroom and blue overalls in the laundry of his house ([2]).

At his trial in the District Court of New South Wales, the appellant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of assault with intent to rob ([4]). In cross-examination the prosecutor required him to put on the balaclava and overalls, together with a pair of sunglasses that were not in evidence, to walk up and down in front of the jury and to say words the robber was said to have used ([11]). Defence counsel objected, and the objection was overruled. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the sunglasses should not have been used and that evidence of his practice of working at his brother’s business far from the robbery had been wrongly excluded, but it applied the proviso and dismissed his appeal ([5]-[8]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal by a majority of three to two, set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal, set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial ([52]). Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons, and Kirby J reasoned separately and agreed with the orders ([54]-[55]). Heydon J, with whom Crennan J agreed, would have dismissed the appeal ([265]-[266]).

The majority reasoned that the Court of Criminal Appeal should not have applied the proviso ([10], [51]). The joint reasons said that the alibi evidence had been excluded and so was untested, that the appellant’s defence may have been undermined by having him dress as the robber, and that the Court of Criminal Appeal could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of guilt on that record ([46]-[49], [51]). Kirby J agreed that the proviso should not have been applied ([54], [121]-[127]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Real evidence and relevance. Gummow and Hayne JJ began from the observation that “Items of real evidence are often tendered and received in evidence”, and from Wigmore’s account of the occasions on which the tribunal of fact is asked to act upon what it perceives for itself, which he called “autoptic proference” ([20]). They asked why the appellant should not be dressed like the robber so that the jury could compare him with the descriptions and the photographs ([22]), and answered by the test of relevance, and said that questions of relevance “require careful identification of the process of reasoning that is invited” ([23]).

Dressing the accused. Dressing the appellant in the balaclava and overalls, with or without sunglasses, could not “rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding”, because the central issue was whether he was the robber, no one asserted that the person in the disguise could be identified from it, and the comparison with the security photographs “could be drawn without the appellant being asked to put them on” ([24]-[26]).

It “revealed nothing about the wearer and nothing about the appellant that was not already apparent to the jury observing him in the dock” ([26]). Walking in front of the jury and speaking certain words stood differently: “Observing how the appellant walked and how he spoke certain words might bear upon the jury’s decision whether he was the man the witnesses had described” ([27]). The dressing-up “proffered no relevant evidence for consideration of the jury. It should not have been done” ([28]), and it “may have depreciated his credibility as a witness” ([29]).

Kirby J. Kirby J disagreed with the joint reasons’ route, which he said struck out on a line of reasoning not previously argued or considered ([55]). His view was: “Dangerous, unfair, humiliating and prejudicial, yes. But irrelevant, no” ([102]). He held that it is a mistake to make the relevance test do the work of excluding evidence of this kind, that the proper ground was the balance of probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in failing to hold that any probative value was outweighed by that danger ([103], [113]).

The dissent. Heydon J held, apart from the use of the sunglasses ([175]), that the argument of prosecution counsel was correct: the three events were techniques for highlighting features of the accused that the jury could compare with the evidence about the offender, and they did not involve him demonstrating anything about what happened ([221]-[223]).

Section 53. Gummow and Hayne JJ said that, for the reasons of Heydon J, asking the appellant to walk or to say certain words was not a “demonstration, experiment or inspection” to which s 53 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) applied, and that the section “is engaged in respect of demonstrations, experiments or inspections which are conducted outside the courtroom” ([30]). Kirby J reached the same conclusion with reluctance, describing the resulting gap in the application of the Act to in-court demonstrations as “awkward and arguably unintended”, and said the common law rules governing such demonstrations remain applicable so far as the Act does not otherwise provide ([64]-[65]). Crennan J agreed with Heydon J’s reasons ([266]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [23]–[28] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [31]–[32] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)

The relevance analysis was necessary to their finding that requiring the appellant to dress as the robber was an error of law. That error formed part of their basis for reconsidering the proviso and allowing the appeal. This is ratio of their joint reasons on that ground; Kirby J did not adopt the irrelevance analysis, so it is not a majority holding that the display was irrelevant.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [102]–[113] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J concurred in the result but rejected irrelevance as the basis for exclusion. His distinct route treated the demonstration as relevant and required exclusion because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Agreement in the orders therefore did not supply a third vote for the joint reasons on relevance.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J, with Crennan J agreeing

Read judgment: [223]–[226] (PDF p 76) (opens in a new tab), [264]–[265] (PDF p 93) (opens in a new tab), [266] (PDF p 94) (opens in a new tab)

These reasons dissent from the result. Heydon J treated the requests as ways of revealing the accused’s features for comparison, rather than reconstructions, and upheld their admissibility apart from the identified irregularities. He applied the proviso despite the errors and would have dismissed the appeal; Crennan J expressly agreed with his reasons. This route does not establish the majority’s ground for ordering a retrial.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Heydon J; Gummow and Hayne JJ and Kirby J adopting the construction; Crennan J agreeing with Heydon J

Read judgment: [195]–[206] (PDF p 63) (opens in a new tab), [30] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [63]–[64] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [266] (PDF p 94) (opens in a new tab)

The construction that s 53 does not govern in-court demonstrations resolved the appellant’s statutory challenge. Gummow and Hayne JJ used it to reject that challenge to walking and speaking; Kirby J used it before turning to the common law and unfair prejudice. Both adopted Heydon J’s construction, and Crennan J agreed with his reasons. The shared resolution of this statutory ground survives their disagreement about admissibility and the ultimate orders.

Obiter · Kirby J

Read judgment: [64]–[65] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

The obiter here is Kirby J’s description of the statutory gap as awkward and arguably unintended, and his suggestion that legislators must address any unintended result. Those observations were unnecessary to deciding that s 53 did not apply. This classification does not extend to his construction of s 53 or to his reliance on surviving common law rules.

Why does this case matter?

A problem in which the prosecution asks an accused or a witness to do something in front of the jury can be analysed in more than one way, and the three routes open here are different in kind: whether the display is relevant at all, whether a statutory provision on demonstrations is engaged, and whether discretionary exclusion applies. In Evans the Justices who allowed the appeal did not take the same route, so a student who says only that the High Court held the display inadmissible has not said on what ground.

Exam and application relevance

For an in-court display, identify the fact in issue and explain what the display adds to what the jury could already see. Then distinguish the approach of Gummow and Hayne JJ from that of Kirby J, and consider whether a statutory provision on demonstrations is engaged, bearing in mind where the conduct took place.

Keep the limits in view. The case was decided under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), including Pt 2.3 ([18]). The joint reasons held that showing the items to eyewitnesses was not unfair, because the procedure proved that the appellant had access to items like those the robber wore ([16]). The Justices who addressed the common law rules on demonstrations differed on whether they applied to this display: Kirby J treated it as a demonstration to which they applied ([65], [107]), and Heydon J held that the three events were not demonstrations or reconstructions and that no such rule applied ([226]).

Check your understanding

1. At [24]-[26] Gummow and Hayne JJ identify what the central issue was and why putting on the disguise could not bear on it. What does [27] say about requiring the appellant to walk and speak, and why is that different?

2. Kirby J agreed with the orders but not with the joint reasons’ route. What did he say the proper ground of exclusion was, and why did he say the relevance test should not be made to do that work ([102]-[103], [113])?

3. The joint reasons at [18]-[19] describe where the chief weight of oral argument lay. What was it, and which logically anterior question did they say was determinative?