Evans v The Queen
Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521
Security cameras filmed a masked robber in overalls and sunglasses. At trial the prosecutor made the accused put on a balaclava and overalls in front of the jury. What could that show the jury that they could not already see?
What happened?
In February 2002 an armed man robbed people at Strathfield Municipal Council, wearing overalls, sunglasses and a balaclava covering most of his face. A cap left behind matched the appellant’s DNA, a rare match. Police later found similar items at his house. Convicted in the NSW District Court, he was made to dress in the disguise, walk and speak before the jury, over defence objection. The Court of Criminal Appeal found some errors but dismissed his appeal.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal three to two, set aside the Court of Criminal Appeal’s orders and the convictions, and ordered a new trial.
The majority held the proviso should not have been applied. Heydon and Crennan JJ would have dismissed.
Why did they split?
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gummow and Hayne JJ started with real evidence, meaning physical items shown to the jury. They called this Wigmore’s “autoptic proference”, where the jury acts on what it sees directly. They said relevance requires careful identification of the reasoning process invited by the evidence.
They held that dressing the appellant in the balaclava and overalls was not relevant. The central issue was whether he was the robber, but no one said the disguised person could be identified from it. The comparison with photographs could be made without the dressing-up. It revealed nothing the jury could not already see in the dock. Walking and speaking, though, could bear on identification.
So the dressing-up proffered no relevant evidence and should not have occurred. It may also have hurt his credibility as a witness.
Kirby J disagreed with this reasoning path. He thought the exercise was relevant, but dangerous, unfair and prejudicial. He said the real test was weighing probative value against unfair prejudice, not relevance.
Heydon J, dissenting (except on sunglasses), accepted the prosecution’s argument that these were legitimate identification techniques.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [23]–[28] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [31]–[32] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)
The relevance analysis was necessary to their finding that requiring the appellant to dress as the robber was an error of law. That error formed part of their basis for reconsidering the proviso and allowing the appeal. This is ratio of their joint reasons on that ground; Kirby J did not adopt the irrelevance analysis, so it is not a majority holding that the display was irrelevant.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [102]–[113] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurred in the result but rejected irrelevance as the basis for exclusion. His distinct route treated the demonstration as relevant and required exclusion because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Agreement in the orders therefore did not supply a third vote for the joint reasons on relevance.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J, with Crennan J agreeing
Read judgment: [223]–[226] (PDF p 76) (opens in a new tab), [264]–[265] (PDF p 93) (opens in a new tab), [266] (PDF p 94) (opens in a new tab)
These reasons dissent from the result. Heydon J treated the requests as ways of revealing the accused’s features for comparison, rather than reconstructions, and upheld their admissibility apart from the identified irregularities. He applied the proviso despite the errors and would have dismissed the appeal; Crennan J expressly agreed with his reasons. This route does not establish the majority’s ground for ordering a retrial.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Heydon J; Gummow and Hayne JJ and Kirby J adopting the construction; Crennan J agreeing with Heydon J
Read judgment: [195]–[206] (PDF p 63) (opens in a new tab), [30] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [63]–[64] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [266] (PDF p 94) (opens in a new tab)
The construction that s 53 does not govern in-court demonstrations resolved the appellant’s statutory challenge. Gummow and Hayne JJ used it to reject that challenge to walking and speaking; Kirby J used it before turning to the common law and unfair prejudice. Both adopted Heydon J’s construction, and Crennan J agreed with his reasons. The shared resolution of this statutory ground survives their disagreement about admissibility and the ultimate orders.
Obiter · Kirby J
Read judgment: [64]–[65] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
The obiter here is Kirby J’s description of the statutory gap as awkward and arguably unintended, and his suggestion that legislators must address any unintended result. Those observations were unnecessary to deciding that s 53 did not apply. This classification does not extend to his construction of s 53 or to his reliance on surviving common law rules.
Why does this case matter?
Prosecutors may ask an accused to act before the jury. Courts can assess this by relevance, a statutory demonstration provision, or discretion.
In Evans, High Court judges split on which ground applied.
Check your understanding
Three questions to test yourself.
What do Gummow and Hayne JJ say at [27] about walking and speaking, and why treat it differently?
On what ground did Kirby J part from the joint reasons ([102]-[103], [113])?