Real evidence in the courtroom: exhibits, recordings and the accused’s appearance
Real evidence inside the courtroom: why the jury’s own perception must still be relevant, Evans v The Queen on dressing the accused in the robber’s disguise and on s 53 not governing in-court demonstrations, and recordings at common law under Butera and as documents under the uniform Acts.
Learning outcomes
- Identify when evidence asks the jury to act on its own perception, and what that perception must rationally add to be relevant.
- Apply Evans v The Queen to an in-court display of the accused, distinguishing the joint reasons’ relevance analysis from Kirby J’s unfair prejudice analysis.
- Explain why s 53 does not govern an in-court demonstration.
- Apply Butera at common law and the uniform Acts’ definition of a document to a recording and its transcript.
Most evidence asks a jury to believe a witness. Real evidence asks the jury to look, listen or handle something and draw its own conclusion: the weapon, the clothing found at the accused’s house, the security photographs, the recording of a conversation. That makes it powerful, and it makes one question decisive. The student’s prior question is what the jury’s own perception can rationally add to the issues, because an exhibit or a display that adds nothing is irrelevant however vivid it is, and one that adds something may still be unfairly prejudicial.
Views, demonstrations and experiments ordered under s 53 of the uniform Evidence Acts are dealt with in Real evidence: views, demonstrations and experiments. This article deals with what happens inside the courtroom, under the uniform Acts as applied in Evans v The Queen (a New South Wales case), and with recordings, where the common law of Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) must be read alongside the uniform Acts’ treatment of documents.
What real evidence is
In Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521 Gummow and Hayne JJ described the tender of real evidence as one example of the tribunal of fact being asked to act on what it perceives for itself, rather than on testimony or on inference from it.1 The balaclava and overalls found at the accused’s house, the security-camera photographs of the robbery and a cap found at the scene were all examples. So, they said, is a weapon tendered for comparison with evidence about the wounds, or an injured plaintiff showing the injured part of the body.
Relevance comes first: Evans
The accused in Evans was charged with armed robbery. The robber had worn overalls, a balaclava and sunglasses. During cross-examination the prosecutor had the accused put on a balaclava and overalls found at his house, and sunglasses produced by the prosecutor, walk in front of the jury and say words the robber had used.
Gummow and Hayne JJ held that dressing the accused in those items tendered no relevant evidence. No witness claimed to be able to identify the disguised robber, so seeing the accused in the disguise allowed only a comparison between the items and the photographs, which the jury could make without him wearing them, and revealed nothing about him that the jury could not already see in the dock. They contrasted having him walk and speak: how he walked and spoke might bear on whether he was the man the witnesses described. They added that dressing him like the robber may have depreciated his credibility as a witness.
Kirby J also held that the accused should not have been dressed up, but by a different route: the demonstration was relevant, but it was unfairly prejudicial, because it made him appear before the jury in a garb associated with armed robbery and similar to the robber in the photographs. Heydon and Crennan JJ dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered; the trial had also wrongly excluded alibi evidence.
Not everything done with the exhibits was wrong. Gummow and Hayne JJ, with Kirby J agreeing on this point, held that showing the balaclava and overalls to eyewitnesses and asking whether they were similar to what the robber wore was not unfair: it proved, in two steps, that the accused had access to clothing like the robber’s.
In-court demonstrations are outside s 53
Every member of the Court in Evans accepted that s 53, which lets a judge order a demonstration, experiment or inspection on application, does not govern what happens inside the courtroom. Heydon J gave the reasons, and Gummow and Hayne JJ, Kirby J and Crennan J accepted them. Among them: the section’s preconditions, that the parties have an opportunity to attend and that the judge and jury will be present, would be pointless for an event in court, where, apart from ex parte applications, those conditions are already satisfied. Section 53 is concerned with demonstrations, experiments and inspections conducted outside the courtroom.
Kirby J noted that this leaves in-court demonstrations to the common law, so far as the Act does not provide otherwise, and called the resulting gap in the Act “awkward and arguably unintended”. An in-court demonstration still has to be relevant, and Kirby J treated the general exclusionary provisions — s 135, and s 137 for prosecution evidence in a criminal proceeding — as applying to it.
Recordings: Butera at common law
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 concerned a listening-device recording of a conversation mostly in Punjabi.2 Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ held that a tape is not by itself admissible evidence of what is recorded on it: it is the sounds produced by playing it that are the evidence. If the tape is available, the conversation should be proved by playing it, not by evidence of what an out-of-court listener heard; if it is unavailable and its absence is satisfactorily explained, a listener’s account may be received as secondary evidence. A mechanical or electronic copy may be played if the provenance of the original, the accuracy of the copying and the provenance of the copy are proved.
A transcript of an indistinct recording may be given to the jury as an aid to listening, not as independent evidence of the conversation, and the jury should be told that they cannot use it as a substitute for the tape if they are not satisfied it records what they heard. Translations are different: they were the interpreters’ expert evidence. Because more than 500 pages of the trial were cross-examination on the written translations, admitting them and letting the jury take them into the jury room was justified, though the judge must always weigh fairness to the accused and the risk that a document in the jury room carries undue weight. Dawson J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed; Gaudron J dissented.
Recordings under the uniform Acts
The uniform Acts approach a recording differently. In the Commonwealth Act’s Dictionary, a document includes “anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else”, and a photograph; the New South Wales, Tasmanian and Northern Territory Acts define it to the same effect.34 Under those Acts a recording is therefore a document, and proof of its contents is governed by Part 2.2. Section 48(1)(c) allows the contents of an article or thing on which words are recorded so as to be capable of being reproduced as sound to be proved by tendering a transcript of the words, and s 51 abolishes the common law rules relating to the means of proving the contents of documents. An answer about a recording under those Acts should therefore start with s 48 rather than with Butera. The ACT Act’s Dictionary refers “document” to its Part 2 and notes that the term is also defined in the ACT’s Legislation Act, and the Victorian definition is not set out here, so check the governing Act’s definition first.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify what the jury is asked to perceive for itself: an object, a photograph, a recording, or the accused’s own appearance, movement or voice.
- Ask what that perception can rationally add to a fact in issue, and whether the jury could draw the same comparison without it, as in Evans.
- If the display is relevant, consider unfair prejudice under s 137 for prosecution evidence in a criminal trial, or the s 135 discretion.
- If it happens in the courtroom, do not apply s 53; after Evans that section governs demonstrations, experiments and inspections outside the courtroom.
- For a recording, check that the governing Act’s definition of “document” reaches it, then prove its contents under s 48, including by transcript under s 48(1)(c); outside the uniform scheme, start from Butera.
- Where a transcript or translation goes to the jury, consider what the jury should be told about its status and the risk of it carrying undue weight in the jury room.
Self-check
- Can I explain what makes evidence “real” evidence, with an example from Evans?
- Can I say why dressing the accused was irrelevant according to Gummow and Hayne JJ, and why Kirby J reached the same result differently?
- Do I know why s 53 does not govern an in-court demonstration?
- Can I state what Butera held about a tape, a copy and a transcript?
- Do I know where a recording fits in the governing Act’s definition of a document?
Where the authority sits
Evans construed s 53 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); the linked article on views sets out how far s 53 is common to the uniform scheme. Butera is a common law decision on appeal from Victoria before it adopted the uniform Act. High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Where the governing uniform Act defines a document to include a recording, that definition and Part 2.2 come first. Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia are not stated here; for Western Australia’s transition to the uniform scheme, see Western Australia’s move to uniform evidence law.