Proving the contents of a document
How a party proves what a document says under the uniform Acts: the methods in s 48, the two gateways in s 48(4), the abolition of the original document rule by s 51, and the two provisions — s 48(1)(f)(i) and s 48(4)(b) — that the Acts in the scheme do not word the same way.
Learning outcomes
- Name the s 48(1) method a party is using to prove a document’s contents.
- Apply the two separate gateways in s 48(4): unavailability, and contents not in issue.
- Explain why arguments about originals and secondary evidence no longer arise.
- Keep proof of contents separate from relevance and the hearsay rule.
- Read s 48(1)(f)(i) and s 48(4)(b) in the governing Act, because neither is worded the same way throughout the scheme.
A document is not evidence because it exists. Before its contents can be used, a party has to prove them, and the uniform evidence legislation replaced the common law machinery for doing so with a short statutory scheme. The question a student is usually asked is not “is this document admissible” in the abstract but how may this party prove what the document says, and the answer starts at s 48.
This article states the position under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Section 51 and almost all of s 48 are enacted to the same effect, under the same numbers, in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory. Two provisions this article relies on are not worded the same way throughout the scheme: subparagraph 48(1)(f)(i), the public-document printing limb, and s 48(4)(b), the witness route where a document is unavailable. Both divergences are set out below.3 Admissibility still depends on the ordinary rules — relevance, hearsay, and the rest — so proving the contents of a document is a step, not a substitute for them.
The original document rule is gone
At common law a party generally had to produce the original. Section 51 abolishes that: the principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished.2
That is a clean break, and it is the first thing to say in an answer. Arguments about “secondary evidence” and the degrees of it belong to a system the Act displaced.
The methods in s 48
Section 48(1) lets a party adduce evidence of the contents of a document by tendering the document in question, or by any one or more of the listed methods. They include:1
- An admission by another party to the proceeding as to the contents.
- A copy — tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy, produced or purporting to have been produced by a device that reproduces the contents of documents.
- A transcript, where the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded so as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code including shorthand writing.
- A device output, where the information is stored in such a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it — tendering a document produced, or purporting to have been produced, by use of the device.
- A business record, under s 48(1)(e): a document that forms part of the records of or kept by a business, whether or not the business is still in existence, and that is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question.
- A public document, under s 48(1)(f): a document that is or purports to be a copy of it and that is or purports to have been printed by one of the printers or authorities the subparagraphs name.
Two features matter. The list is disjunctive — “any one or more” — so a party need not exhaust one method before using another. And the copy method is framed around the device, not around proof that the copy was compared with the original.
Subparagraph 48(1)(f)(i) carries a printing limb in four of the Acts that the Commonwealth Act does not have — which is not the same as saying the public-document method is wider there. Under s 48(1)(f)(i) of the Commonwealth Act, the copy must purport to have been printed “by the Government Printer or by the government or official printer of a State or Territory”. The New South Wales, Victorian, Tasmanian and Northern Territory Acts add a further limb at the front of the subparagraph: a copy printed “by a person authorised by or on behalf of the government to print the document”. That reaches printing done under government authority by someone who is not a government printer. It is a difference in the wording of subparagraph (i), not a finding that the method as a whole covers more in those four jurisdictions: subparagraph (ii), below, may reach the same printing under the Commonwealth Act. The ACT Act does not carry the added limb; on this point it follows the Commonwealth. Identical numbering gives no warning of any of this, so the subparagraph must be read in the Act that governs.4
Subparagraph (i) is not the only public-document limb, and the difference does not settle admissibility. Subparagraph 48(1)(f)(ii) sits beside it in every Act in the scheme and reaches a copy that purports to have been printed by authority of the government — in every text but the ACT’s, the government or administration — of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or a foreign country, each Act naming its own polity among them. So a copy printed by a person authorised on the government’s behalf may answer (f)(ii) under the Commonwealth or ACT Act even though it falls outside their (f)(i). The difference between the texts is a difference in subparagraph (i); the question in an answer is which subparagraph of s 48(1)(f) the copy answers.4
Where the document is unavailable, or its contents are not in issue
Section 48(4) is the provision students miss. Where the document in question is not available to the party, or the existence and contents of which are not in issue in the proceeding, the party may adduce evidence of its contents by tendering a copy, extract or summary, or by adducing evidence of the contents from a witness.1
Note the two distinct gateways: unavailability is one, and the existence and contents not being in issue is another. They are alternatives, so establishing either is enough.
The witness route is worded differently in Tasmania. Paragraph 48(4)(b) of the Commonwealth Act, and of the New South Wales, Victorian and Northern Territory Acts, permits “adducing from a witness evidence of the contents of the document in question”; the ACT Act says “presenting evidence from a witness of the contents”. The Tasmanian text instead reads “adducing oral evidence of the contents of the document in question”. The others name the source of the evidence and leave its form alone; Tasmania names the form. The lesson is the same as for s 48(1)(f)(i) — read s 48(4)(b) in the Act that governs rather than from the number.3
Two limits on the methods
Section 48(3) confines proof by another party’s admission: evidence adduced under s 48(1)(a) may be used only in the adducing party’s case against the party who made the admission, or in that party’s case against the adducing party. It does not become evidence at large.
Section 49 deals with a document in a foreign country. No paragraph of s 48(1) other than the admission paragraph in s 48(1)(a) applies to it unless the party adducing the evidence has served on each other party a copy of the document proposed to be tendered not less than 28 days — or such other period as may be prescribed by the regulations or by rules of court — before the day on which the evidence is adduced, or the court directs that the paragraph is to apply.
Note what s 49 leaves alone. It restricts the paragraphs of s 48(1), so it does not reach tendering the document in question itself, and it does not reach s 48(4).1
What this does not do
Section 48 is about proving contents. It does not make a document relevant, it does not answer the hearsay rule if the document is tendered to prove the truth of what it asserts, and it does not confer admissibility by itself. A document proved under s 48 and tendered for a hearsay purpose still needs an exception.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the document and what the party wants to prove by it — its existence, or its contents.
- If the contents, ask whether the original is being tendered or one of the s 48(1) methods is being used, and name the method.
- Consider s 48(4): is the document unavailable to the party, or are its existence and contents not in issue? If it is, read the governing Act’s s 48(4)(b) before describing the witness route.
- Having proved the contents, go back to the ordinary rules — relevance, and hearsay if the document is tendered for the truth of an assertion in it.
- Do not argue about originals and secondary evidence; s 51 abolished that framework.
- If the method relied on is the public-document route, read s 48(1)(f) in the governing Act subparagraph by subparagraph: four of the State and Territory texts of (f)(i) name a person authorised on the government’s behalf, and the Commonwealth and ACT texts of (f)(i) do not — but (f)(ii), which every Act has, reaches printing by a government’s authority.
Self-check
- Can I name the method under s 48(1) that the party is using, rather than asserting the document “is admissible”?
- Have I checked whether s 48(4) applies before assuming the original is needed?
- Have I kept proof of contents separate from admissibility?
- Do I know which Acts name a person authorised on behalf of the government in s 48(1)(f)(i), and which do not — and that s 48(1)(f)(ii) is a separate limb in all of them?
- Have I read s 48(4)(b) in the governing Act, rather than assuming every Act offers the witness route in the same words?
- Have I applied the paragraph of cl 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary that I am relying on, rather than asserting that a document is unavailable?
A worked application
A plaintiff wants to prove the terms of a supply agreement. The signed original is in the defendant’s possession; the plaintiff has an emailed PDF of it, and a one-page summary its own manager prepared at the time.
Take the routes in order. The PDF is a document that purports to be a copy produced by a device that reproduces the contents of documents, so s 48(1)(b) is available on its face — the plaintiff does not have to prove it compared the copy against the original. The summary is not a copy, so s 48(1)(b) does not reach it; but if the original is not available to the plaintiff, s 48(4) permits tendering a summary, or adducing evidence of the contents from a witness.
Unavailability is not a matter of impression. Clause 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary provides that a document is taken not to be available to a party if and only if one of its listed cases applies, and one of them fits these facts: cl 5(e)(ii) covers a document that is not in the party’s possession or control and is in the possession or control of another party to the proceeding who knows, or might reasonably be expected to know, that evidence of its contents is likely to be relevant in the proceeding. On these facts the defendant’s holding of the signed original is itself what makes it unavailable to the plaintiff; no unsuccessful attempt to obtain production is needed.
Clause 5(e)(iii) is a different case, and the two must not be run together. It covers a document the other party once held, at a time when that party knew or might reasonably have been expected to have known that such evidence was likely to be relevant. The knowledge is fixed to the time of that past possession or control; (iii) asks nothing about what the party knows now. Other paragraphs of cl 5 have their own conditions again — cl 5(a) requires reasonable inquiry and search — so the paragraph relied on must be named.5
If the defendant admits the terms, s 48(1)(a) is the shortest route of all. But s 48(3) then confines what the admission proves: the evidence may be used only in the plaintiff’s case against the defendant who admitted, or in that defendant’s case against the plaintiff. Against a second defendant who made no admission, it does nothing.
And if the agreement is held in a foreign country, s 49 bites on the s 48(1) methods: each of s 48(1)(b) to (f) requires a copy of the document proposed to be tendered to be served on each other party not less than 28 days beforehand — or such other period as the regulations or rules of court prescribe — unless the court directs that the paragraph is to apply. It does not restrict the admission route in s 48(1)(a), tendering the document in question, or s 48(4).
Where the authority sits
Proof of the contents of documents is statutory — in the Commonwealth Act, Part 2.2, “Documents” — with s 51 abolishing the common law rules about the means of proof. Section 51, s 48(1)(a) to (e), s 48(2), s 48(3) and s 48(4)(a) are enacted to the same effect across the scheme, so the position stated above holds in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory; the differences in those provisions are drafting ones — the ACT says “present” where the others say “adduce”, and Tasmania heads the section “Proof of contents of document”. The statutory notes are not uniform: the New South Wales, Victorian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts carry notes to s 48 and s 51 pointing to s 182 and Part 2.2 of the Commonwealth Act, while the Tasmanian s 48 and s 51 carry no notes at all.
Two provisions are the exceptions, and neither split runs along the usual line. Subparagraph 48(1)(f)(i) carries the authorised-person printing limb in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, but not in the Commonwealth or the ACT. Paragraph 48(4)(b) names a witness in every Act in the scheme except Tasmania’s, whose text requires oral evidence. Identify the court before stating either.
Queensland and South Australia have not enacted the uniform scheme for their own courts. Western Australia has enacted it but has not brought it into force: the Evidence Act 2025 (WA) adopts the scheme’s provisions under its own numbering — the unavailability definition that the uniform Acts put in cl 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is s 8 of that Act — and under its s 2 only Part 1 and s 384 have commenced. Its s 2 does not put every remaining provision on one footing, and the distinction matters if you go looking for a commencement date. Paragraph (e) is the proclamation limb, and the proclamation has been made: Parts 2 to 9, the rest of Part 10, Part 11 and Part 12 Divisions 2 to 7 and 9 to 24 come into operation on 18 September 2027. Paragraphs (c) and (d) are different — conditional commencement arrangements tied to other Acts: Part 12 Division 1 to s 240 of the Aquatic Resources Management Act 2016 and Part 12 Division 17 to s 158 of the Privacy and Responsible Information Sharing Act 2024. Division 17 reaches the 18 September 2027 date through its conditional limb; Division 1 does not, and commences immediately after the Aquatic Resources provision does. Part 12 Division 8 will never commence at all, the provision it would have amended having been deleted. None of that changes the answer for this article: the documentary-evidence provisions are in Part 2 and are not yet operative. So proof of the contents of a document in a Queensland, Western Australian or South Australian court is governed by that State’s own evidence legislation — in Western Australia, still the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) — and the applicable common law, which this article does not state.