Electronic communications: proving the message and its contents

Work through electronic messages by separating proof of contents, transmission presumptions and the narrow hearsay exception for communication details.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, tas, act, nt
Subjects
evidence
Topics
documentary-evidence, hearsay

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish documentary proof, transmission facts and the truth of assertions inside a message.
  • Apply the precise scope and rebuttal threshold of s 161, including its contract qualification.
  • Use s 71 without treating all email or chat content as an exception to hearsay.

An email can raise three different evidentiary questions: what the document says, who transmitted it and whether an assertion inside it is true. Ask which fact the party seeks to prove before choosing a provision. A presumption about transmission does not transform every sentence in the message into admissible proof of its truth.

This article concerns the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT). Section 71’s communication-details exception and s 161’s main transmission presumptions are substantively shared, but the ACT’s contract qualification differs. These are rules for proceedings to which the relevant Act applies, rather than rules governing every electronic exchange in Australia.123456

First prove what the document contains

Section 48 permits proof by tendering the document itself or using specified methods. For electronically stored information, s 48(1)(d) matters where the information cannot be used by the court unless a device retrieves, produces or collates it. The party may tender a document produced, or purporting to have been produced, by that device. Section 48(1)(b) separately deals with documents purporting to be copies produced by a copying device.

Identify the route that fits the material. A printout produced from a mailbox may engage the stored-information route; a screenshot or PDF may raise questions about what it copies or displays. The existence of several methods does not require exhaustion of one before another. The task is to identify a statutory method and apply its conditions, rather than assume that electronic evidence needs an original sheet of paper.

This is proof of contents. It does not resolve whether the apparent sender actually sent the message, whether the extract omits context, or whether its assertions are true. Proving the contents of a document treats the wider documentary scheme and its local variations.

The transmission facts presumed by s 161

Section 161 applies if a document purports to record an electronic communication other than a communication referred to in s 162, which deals with lettergrams and telegrams. Subject to its qualifications, it presumes the apparent:

  • form of electronic communication;
  • person by or on whose behalf it was sent or made;
  • day, time and place of sending or making;
  • destination at which it was received; and
  • time of receipt, where the document indicates that sending concluded at a particular time.

Each is tied to what appears from the document. A record that says nothing about place or completion time does not supply those details merely because some other transmission fact appears. Likewise, receipt at an apparent destination is the statutory proposition; describing it as proof that a particular person read and understood the message would add something the section does not say.

The presumption yields where evidence sufficient to raise doubt about it is adduced. The opponent need not prove the contrary to displace this presumption. Evidence that an account was compromised, or that a particular display time was produced by a disputed setting, may matter to the relevant apparent fact. Explain how the evidence raises doubt about that presumption, rather than merely saying electronic records can be manipulated.

Displacement of a presumption removes that statutory assistance. It does not conclusively prove the opposite fact. The proponent may still seek to establish sending, timing or receipt through other evidence, subject to its admissibility.

Contract terms can alter the presumption’s operation

Read s 161(2) in the governing Act. In the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, a provision of subsection (1) does not apply where the proceeding relates to a contract, all parties to the proceeding are parties to the contract and that provision is inconsistent with a contractual term.

The ACT instead provides that the section does not apply where the proceeding relates to a contract, all proceeding parties are parties to it and subsection (1) is inconsistent with a contractual term. Its language switches off the section, rather than a particular provision of subsection (1). Do not replace this wording with the provision-specific formulation from another jurisdiction.

For example, a supply contract may specify a particular receipt rule. Before relying on s 161 to prove receipt, examine the actual term and every statutory condition, including the identity of all proceeding parties. A dispute involving an outsider to the contract does not satisfy the all-parties condition merely because two principal litigants signed it. These evidence provisions also do not themselves decide the substantive contract question of whether notice validly terminated an agreement.

Section 71 is a narrow hearsay exception

Section 71 concerns a representation contained in a document recording an electronic communication. It removes the hearsay rule so far as the representation concerns the sender’s identity, including someone on whose behalf the communication was sent; the sending date or time; or the destination or addressee’s identity.

Compare that list with s 161. Section 71 is an exception to a rule of admissibility; s 161 presumes specified facts. They perform different work, and their lists should not be merged. In particular, s 71 does not state a blanket hearsay exception for the message’s substantive narrative.

An email saying “I inspected the pump yesterday and it was leaking” contains an assertion about a leak. If tendered to prove the leak, that assertion raises s 59 despite the email’s form. Section 71 may assist with sender or timing representations, but another basis is needed for the leak assertion. Depending on the facts, consider a business-record exception under s 69, an admission under ss 81–83, or an applicable first-hand-hearsay exception. Each has conditions; being in a workplace inbox does not itself satisfy them.

A worked application: a disputed delivery message

A buyer tenders a printed email apparently from the seller saying a shipment arrived on Tuesday. The seller says another employee used the account and the displayed timestamp is wrong. The contract provides its own receipt rule.

Begin with s 48 to identify how the printout proves contents. Next separate the apparent sender, sending time and receipt facts for s 161. Examine whether the account-use and timestamp evidence is sufficient to raise doubt about the particular presumptions. Apply the contractual qualification in the correct jurisdictional form.

Then ask what “arrived on Tuesday” is used to prove. If the buyer relies on actual delivery, s 71 does not supply an exception for that substantive assertion. The message might be an admission, but establish the maker or applicable authority and the permitted use against the party. If it is offered as a business record, establish s 69’s record, purpose and knowledge conditions. A successful transmission argument does not dispense with these questions.

Device presumptions may assist under ss 146–147. Section 146 requires a reasonably open finding about the device’s ordinary outcome if properly used. Section 147 requires the business-record and business-use conditions. Its subsection (3) withdraws the presumption for the contents of documents produced for proceedings or in connection with investigations relating or leading to criminal proceedings. Section 183 permits examination and reasonable inferences where a question arises about applying an Act provision to a document or thing. These powers do not establish a human author’s accuracy.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Separate contents, apparent transmission facts and substantive assertions, and state the purpose of tender for each.
  2. Identify a s 48 proof method and address any dispute about the document or extract actually tendered.
  3. Apply s 161 only to the facts it presumes, checking the document’s apparent details and evidence sufficient to raise doubt.
  4. Apply the contract qualification, including every-party participation and the ACT’s different formulation where relevant.
  5. Use s 71 for its specified communication details; identify another admissibility basis for substantive hearsay assertions.
  6. Address other exclusions and the remaining evidence, then distinguish presumed receipt from proof of reading, legal notice or the truth of the message.