Hearsay exceptions: first-hand hearsay and contemporaneous statements
How the uniform evidence legislation lets hearsay in: the purpose question under s 60, the first-hand gate in s 62, the four exceptions in ss 63 to 66, and what became of res gestae under s 66A.
Learning outcomes
- Ask what a representation is tendered to prove before reaching for a hearsay exception.
- Apply the first-hand restriction in s 62 and recognise second-hand hearsay that leaves Division 2.
- Choose between ss 63 to 66 from the type of proceeding and the maker’s availability.
- Work the freshness factors on the facts rather than asserting that a memory was fresh, and name the subsection that carries them in the governing Act.
- Keep s 66A to the maker’s own states of mind rather than treating it as general res gestae.
- Recognise that Victoria’s s 66(2) does not condition the exception on freshness where the maker was a child victim.
The hearsay rule excludes a previous representation tendered to prove an asserted fact. It is not, in practice, an absolute bar: the uniform evidence legislation sets out a structured body of exceptions, and most hearsay disputes are decided inside that structure rather than at the rule itself. Before applying any exception, ask two prior questions — what is the evidence being tendered to prove, and was the maker’s knowledge first-hand — because the first can take the evidence outside the rule altogether and the second decides whether Division 2 is available at all.
This article states the position under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Sections 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66A and 67 are enacted to the same effect in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory.8 Section 66 is the exception, in two different ways: Victoria’s s 66(2) offers an alternative to freshness of memory where the maker was a child victim, and the ACT Act renumbers the subsections so that it has no s 66(2A) at all. Both are set out below, and they are the reason to identify the governing Act before citing a subsection of s 66.9 Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia are not uniform jurisdictions; Western Australia’s transition to the uniform scheme is covered in Western Australia’s move to uniform evidence law.
The purpose question comes first
The hearsay rule applies to a representation tendered to prove an asserted fact. Where the representation is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the asserted fact, s 60 provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to it, and it applies whether or not the maker had personal knowledge of the asserted fact.1 Relevance for another purpose is not enough on its own: the evidence must be admitted on that other basis.
Two limits matter. The section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. And the Act’s own note records that s 60(2) was inserted as a response to the High Court’s decision in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594, where the Court held that s 60 lifted the hearsay rule from the witness’s own prior statements but “had nothing to say to” the confession reported inside them11 — a reminder that the provision’s width was contested and that the reading a student brings from an older text may be the pre-amendment one.
So the first move is not to reach for an exception. It is to ask what the evidence is tendered to prove. If the answer is something other than the truth of the asserted fact, the rule does not bite.
The first-hand gate: s 62
Division 2 is available only for first-hand hearsay. Section 62(1) restricts the Division to a previous representation made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact, and s 62(2) defines that: knowledge that was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by another person about the fact.2
That last clause is the gate. The personal knowledge s 62 asks about is the maker’s, not the witness’s. If X saw the collision and told Y, X is the maker and X had personal knowledge, so the representation is first-hand — and Y, who perceived it being made, is exactly the person ss 63 to 66 allow to give evidence of it. What leaves Division 2 is a representation whose maker was repeating someone else’s account: X telling Y what Z said about the collision. It may still come in under Division 3 — the business records exception in s 69 is the common route — but the student who reaches for s 65 without testing s 62 has skipped the step that decides the question.
The four first-hand exceptions
The Division splits on two axes: civil or criminal, and whether the maker is available to give evidence about the asserted fact.
- Civil, maker not available — s 63. The rule does not apply to evidence of the representation given by a person who perceived it being made, or to a document so far as it contains it.3
- Civil, maker available — s 64. Not simply the mirror of s 63. Section 64(2) applies only where calling the maker would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable; s 64(3) is a separate route where the maker has been or is to be called.
- Criminal, maker not available — s 65. Section 65(2) disapplies the rule for evidence of the representation given by a person who perceived it being made, where the representation was made under a duty to make it, or when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred in circumstances making fabrication unlikely, among other limbs. The listed circumstances alone do not suffice — the form of the evidence matters too.4
- Criminal, maker available — s 66. Where the maker has been or is to be called, the rule does not apply to evidence given by the maker, or by a person who perceived the representation being made, if the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the maker when it was made. In Victoria that is not the only route — see below. Where a representation was made to indicate the evidence the maker could give in a proceeding, s 66(3) withdraws the s 66(2) exception for evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it concerns identity — it does not make the evidence inadmissible under some other exception. That restriction is s 66(4) in the ACT Act.5
“Fresh in the memory” is where criminal hearsay arguments are usually won or lost. The freshness factors provide that the court may take into account all matters it considers relevant, including the nature of the event, the age and health of the person, and the period of time between the fact and the representation. They are s 66(2A) in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victorian, Tasmanian and Northern Territory Acts, and s 66(3) in the ACT Act, which has no s 66(2A).9 The Act’s note records that the subsection was inserted as a response to Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606, where Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ read “fresh” as meaning “recent” or “immediate” and held that a complaint six years after the events was not fresh10 — so, again, an older statement of how narrowly “fresh” is read may not be the current one.
Victoria does not always ask the freshness question. Its s 66(2), substituted in 2017, requires that the maker has been or is to be called and either that the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the maker’s memory when the representation was made, or that the maker “is a victim of an offence to which the proceeding relates and was under the age of 18 years when the representation was made”. Where the second limb is relied on the exception is not conditioned on freshness at all, and the s 66(2A) factors are never reached. The Victorian Act says as much in its own note: “Subsection (2) differs from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act.” New South Wales, Tasmania and the Northern Territory follow the Commonwealth and ask only about freshness.9
Contemporaneous statements: s 66A, and what became of res gestae
Students arriving from a common law course look for res gestae. Under the uniform Acts there is no provision of that name, and s 66A covers only part of the ground: the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation that was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind.6
Two limits do the work. The representation must be contemporaneous, so a later statement about a former intention is outside the section however clearly it concerns intention. And the listed states are the maker’s own: a representation is within s 66A so far as it is about those states, and a representation whose asserted fact is an external event will ordinarily need another exception — s 65(2)(b) in a criminal proceeding where the maker is unavailable, for instance.
So a contemporaneous statement of what the maker then intended is within s 66A; a statement tendered to prove what someone else did is not. The section’s closed list is the answer to the student who expects it to do the work res gestae did.
Notice, which is easy to forget
Several of these exceptions are conditioned on notice. Section 67 provides that ss 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8) do not apply to evidence adduced by a party unless that party has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the intention to adduce it.7 It is not absolute: under s 67(4) the court may, on a party’s application, direct that a subsection applies despite the failure to give notice. But an exception that would otherwise apply can fail on this alone if no direction is sought.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the representation and the asserted fact it is tendered to prove.
- Ask what the evidence is tendered for, and whether it is admitted on that other basis — s 60 turns on admission for a non-hearsay purpose, not on the existence of one. Note the admission carve-out in a criminal proceeding.
- Test s 62: did the maker perceive the fact, or repeat another’s account? Second-hand hearsay leaves Division 2.
- Place the proceeding on the two axes — civil or criminal, maker available or not — and name the section that follows.
- In a criminal case with the maker available, work the freshness factors on these facts rather than asserting that the memory was or was not fresh — s 66(2A) in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victorian, Tasmanian and Northern Territory Acts, s 66(3) in the ACT. In a Victorian proceeding, ask first whether the maker was a child victim, because the second limb of Victoria’s s 66(2) does not ask about freshness.
- Check s 67 notice before concluding that the exception applies.
Self-check
- Have I asked what the evidence is tendered to prove before reaching for an exception?
- Have I tested personal knowledge under s 62 rather than assuming the Division is available?
- Can I say which of ss 63 to 66 applies, and why, from the proceeding and the maker’s availability?
- Have I kept s 66A to the maker’s own state of mind rather than treating it as general res gestae?
- Does the subsection of s 66 I am citing exist in the Act that governs this court?
Where the authority sits
The test is statutory. In the Commonwealth and New South Wales it is stated in Part 3.2 of the Evidence Act 1995, Division 2 holding the first-hand exceptions and Division 3 the others. Sections 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66A and 67 are enacted to the same effect across the scheme; s 66 is not, for the two reasons set out above.9 Identify the court, not just the State, before stating the test. Section 4(1) applies the Commonwealth Act to proceedings in a federal court wherever that court sits, so a federal proceeding in Brisbane or Perth is governed by it — subject to the Act’s own limits, which include sentencing under s 4(2) and the exclusions in s 4(5). Those exclusions turn mainly on where the matter came from: appeals from a State court (including one exercising federal jurisdiction), and appeals from a court of the ACT, the Northern Territory or an external Territory. So being an appeal in a federal court is not itself an exclusion. But one limb is not about origin at all — s 4(5)(e) excludes a review of a magistrate’s decision or order and any appeal from such a review — so an appeal can be excluded where it comes up through that route. All of s 4(5) is subject to s 4(5A) and to the Act’s provisions that apply in all Australian courts. Queensland and South Australia have not enacted the uniform scheme for their own courts. Western Australia has enacted the Evidence Act 2025 (WA); passage is not commencement, and which Act governs there depends on what has commenced. That position is stated and kept current in Western Australia’s move to uniform evidence law rather than restated here.