Hearsay exceptions: first-hand hearsay and contemporaneous statements
The purpose question comes first
Before looking for an exception, ask why the evidence is being tendered.
The hearsay rule only stops evidence used to prove an asserted fact is true. If the evidence is relevant for some other purpose, and is admitted on that other basis, s 60 says the hearsay rule does not apply. This holds even if the person who made the statement had no personal knowledge of the fact. Just being relevant for another purpose is not enough -- the evidence must actually be admitted on that basis.
Two limits apply. First, s 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission (a statement against the maker’s own interest). Second, s 60(2) was added after Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594. There, the High Court held s 60 removed the hearsay rule from a witness’s own prior statements, but said nothing about a confession reported within them. This shows the section’s scope has been disputed, so older materials may describe the law before this amendment.
So always ask first: what fact is this evidence meant to prove? If it is not being used to prove the truth of what was asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply at all.
The first-hand gate: s 62
Division 2 only covers first-hand hearsay. Section 62(1) limits it to a previous representation made by someone with personal knowledge of a fact. Section 62(2) explains this: knowledge that was, or might reasonably be supposed to be, based on what that person saw, heard or otherwise perceived.
The key point is whose personal knowledge matters. It is the maker’s knowledge, not the witness’s.
So if X saw a collision and told Y, X is the maker with personal knowledge. This makes it first-hand hearsay. Y can then give evidence of it under ss 63 to 66.
But if X tells Y what Z said about the collision, X is only repeating Z’s account. X lacks personal knowledge, so this falls outside Division 2.
Such evidence might still be admissible under Division 3, often through the business records exception in s 69. The lesson: always check s 62 before relying on s 65.
The four first-hand exceptions
There are four first-hand hearsay exceptions. They split along two lines: civil or criminal proceedings, and whether the maker of the statement is available to give evidence.
Section 63 covers civil cases where the maker isn’t available. The hearsay rule doesn’t apply to evidence from someone who saw the statement being made, or to a document containing it.
Section 64 covers civil cases where the maker is available. It isn’t simply the mirror of s 63. Section 64(2) only applies if calling the maker would cause undue expense, undue delay, or isn’t reasonably practicable. Section 64(3) is a separate route, used where the maker has been or will be called.
Section 65 covers criminal cases where the maker isn’t available. Section 65(2) lets in evidence from someone who perceived the statement being made, where it was made under a duty to make it, or made when or shortly after the fact in circumstances unlikely to involve fabrication, among other limbs. Meeting these circumstances isn’t enough alone -- the form the evidence takes also matters.
Section 66 covers criminal cases where the maker is available. The rule doesn’t apply to evidence from the maker, or from someone who saw the statement made, if the fact was “fresh in the memory” of the maker at the time. Victoria has another route too, covered elsewhere. Section 66(3) withdraws this exception for evidence led by the prosecutor, unless it’s about identity -- it doesn’t make the evidence inadmissible under some other exception. The ACT’s equivalent provision is s 66(4).
“Fresh in the memory” is the phrase that usually decides criminal hearsay disputes. Courts may consider any relevant matter, including the nature of the event, the person’s age and health, and the time between the fact and the statement. This appears as s 66(2A) in the Commonwealth, NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian and Northern Territory Acts, but as s 66(3) in the ACT Act, which has no s 66(2A). A note records this was added after Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606, where Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ reasoned that “fresh” meant “recent” or “immediate”.
Contemporaneous statements: s 66A, and what became of res gestae
If you learned evidence under the common law, you may look for res gestae here. The uniform Acts don’t use that name. Instead, s 66A covers only part of that old ground.
Under s 66A, the hearsay rule does not apply to a contemporaneous representation. This means a statement made at the same time as the thing it describes. It must be about the maker’s own health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind.
Two limits matter. First, the statement must be contemporaneous: a later statement about a past intention falls outside s 66A, even if it clearly discusses intention. Second, s 66A only covers the maker’s own states of mind, not external events. A statement about something that actually happened needs a different exception, such as s 65(2)(b) in criminal cases where the maker is unavailable.
So a statement of present intention fits s 66A. A statement used to prove what someone else did does not. The section has a fixed, limited list — it does not do everything res gestae once did.
Notice, which is easy to forget
Don’t forget: some of these exceptions need notice first.
Section 67 says ss 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8) won’t apply unless the party relying on them gives reasonable written notice. This notice must go to every other party, telling them evidence will be adduced (brought forward as evidence).
This isn’t a strict rule though. Under s 67(4), a court can still allow the subsection to apply, even without notice, if a party applies for this direction.
But without that application, a party can lose an otherwise valid exception simply by forgetting to give notice.
Self-check
Before using an exception, check what the evidence is meant to prove. This keeps the analysis focused on the right question.
Test personal knowledge under s 62 first. Do not assume the Division applies without checking this.
Identify which of ss 63 to 66 applies, and explain why. This depends on the type of proceeding and whether the maker is available.
Keep s 66A limited to the maker’s own state of mind. Do not treat it as general res gestae, a broader doctrine about statements made during an event.
Check that the subsection of s 66 you are citing actually exists in the Act that governs your court.
Where the authority sits
The test comes from statute. In the Commonwealth and NSW, it sits in Part 3.2 of the Evidence Act 1995: Division 2 covers first-hand hearsay, Division 3 covers the rest. Sections 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66A and 67 work the same way across the scheme, but s 66 does not.
You must identify the court, not just the State. Section 4(1) applies the Commonwealth Act to federal courts wherever they sit, so a federal proceeding in Brisbane or Perth is still governed by it. This is subject to limits: sentencing is treated differently under s 4(2), and s 4(5) excludes certain appeals.
Those exclusions mostly depend on where a case came from, not on it being a federal appeal. They cover appeals from State courts (even ones using federal jurisdiction) and appeals from the ACT, Northern Territory or external Territories.
One exclusion is different: s 4(5)(e) excludes review of a magistrate’s decision, and any appeal from that review, regardless of origin. All of s 4(5) is subject to s 4(5A) and to provisions applying in every Australian court.
Queensland and South Australia have not adopted this uniform scheme for their own courts. Western Australia has passed the Evidence Act 2025 (WA), but passing an Act is not the same as it commencing. Which Act applies there depends on what has actually commenced, a point covered in a separate article rather than here.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.