Lee v The Queen
Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60
A witness told police that the accused had confessed to him, then denied it in the witness box. The prosecution put his police statement to the jury. Could the jury use it to find that the accused had really confessed?
Superseded by legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), from 1 January 2009
Section 60(2) was inserted in response to this decision, and the Act’s own note to s 60 says so. It provides that s 60 “applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact” (within the meaning of s 62(2)), which removes the footing on which this decision confined s 60 to the representation admitted for the non-hearsay purpose. One limit survives and it is the one this case arose under: s 60(3) provides that s 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission, so on facts like these the exclusion now comes from the subsection rather than from this construction. The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), under which the case was decided, now contains the same subsections (2) and (3).
What happened?
Nathan Lee was indicted in the District Court of New South Wales on a charge that on 21 March 1995, armed with a pistol, he assaulted Mrs Jones with intent to rob her at her video store in Paddington ([4]). A short time later police arrested the appellant, who had a handgun tucked in his jeans, together with another man, Romeo Calin ([5]). Mr Calin told police that he had met the appellant in the street, that the appellant had said “Don’t bother me I have just done job, I fired two shots”, and he signed a written statement saying the same ([6]).
At the trial the prosecution called Mr Calin. He gave evidence of speaking to the appellant about money the appellant owed him and said he could not recall any other conversation ([8]). The prosecution cross-examined him on his written statement. He admitted signing the document but denied that the statements in it were his ([11]). A police officer gave evidence of taking the statement, and the statement was tendered ([11]). The trial judge instructed the jury that if they accepted that Mr Calin had told police what the accused had said to him, that was evidence of the fact that the appellant did say those words to Mr Calin ([12]). The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the appellant’s challenge to the use of the statement ([14]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial ([45]). Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ gave a single judgment.
The Court did not accept that this was a case for the application of the proviso ([42]-[44]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
What s 60 operated on. The judgment explains that the statements Mr Calin made to police were of two kinds, statements of what he had done or seen, and statements of what he had said or heard ([23]). Mr Calin could be seen to have intended to assert that he had done the things recorded, seen what was recorded, and said and heard the words set out; but there was no basis for concluding that he intended to assert as a fact that the appellant had “fired two shots”, and Mr Calin “had no way of knowing these facts” ([23]).
The holding. “Section 60 operated only upon the former representations; it had nothing to say to the representations made by the appellant to Mr Calin” ([28]). The hearsay rule was rendered inapplicable to Mr Calin’s representations, but not to the representations allegedly made by the appellant ([28]). Nor were the appellant’s representations admissible under the exception for admissions in s 81, because the evidence of the confessional statements was not first-hand ([28]). The Court said: “s 60 does not convert evidence of what was said, out of court, into evidence of some fact that the person speaking out of court did not intend to assert” ([29]), and so “evidence that Mr Calin had earlier reported that the appellant had confessed was not evidence of the truth of that confession” ([30]).
The scheme of the Act. The Court said that s 60 was intended to work a considerable change to the common law, but that there was no basis for concluding that it was intended to provide a gateway for the proof of any form of hearsay, however remote ([40]). It added that if the prior statements went only to Mr Calin’s credit, the trial judge could have rejected those parts of them or, if not, would have had to give clear directions about the very limited use to which they could be put ([41]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Read judgment: [28]–[30] (opens in a new tab), [40] (opens in a new tab)
Under s 60 as it then stood, admitting Calin’s prior statements to challenge his credibility removed the hearsay rule only from his representations, not from the accused’s reported confession. The joint reasons at [28]–[30] therefore held that the report could not prove the truth of the confession; s 81 also did not admit this second-hand evidence. This construction was necessary to establish the evidentiary error on which the successful appeal depended. Paragraph [40] supports that construction by rejecting an unrestricted hearsay gateway; its role here concerns the reported confession, rather than deciding every possible form of remote hearsay. The Court separately refused to apply the proviso at [44] before ordering a new trial. This ratio concerns the provision before s 60(2) was inserted.
Why does this case matter?
A hearsay problem in which one witness reports what another said often has two layers, and a student who stops at the first has not asked what each layer is being used to prove. Lee is also a case a student must date: it describes the section as the Court read it before the amendment that responded to it, and on facts like these a different provision now does the work.
Exam and application relevance
When a witness’s earlier statement contains a report of what someone else said, treat each layer separately, identify what each is tendered to prove.
Keep the limits in view. The case was decided on s 60 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) before s 60(2) existed. The Court said that its conclusion is consistent with basic principle and with the scheme of the Act as a whole, and is not a retreat to outdated technical distinctions ([31]).
Check your understanding
1. At [28], whose representations did s 60 operate on, and whose remained subject to the hearsay rule?
2. Why did the Court say at [28] that the appellant’s reported confession could not be admitted under s 81?
3. What did the Court say at [40] about whether s 60 was intended to be a gateway for hearsay, and what did it say at [41] the trial judge could have done with the prior statements?