Lee v The Queen
Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60
A witness told police that the accused had confessed to him, then denied it in the witness box. The prosecution put his police statement to the jury. Could the jury use it to find that the accused had really confessed?
Superseded by legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), from 1 January 2009
Section 60(2) was inserted in response to this decision, and the Act’s own note to s 60 says so. It provides that s 60 “applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact” (within the meaning of s 62(2)), which removes the footing on which this decision confined s 60 to the representation admitted for the non-hearsay purpose. One limit survives and it is the one this case arose under: s 60(3) provides that s 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission, so on facts like these the exclusion now comes from the subsection rather than from this construction. The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), under which the case was decided, now contains the same subsections (2) and (3).
What happened?
Nathan Lee faced trial in the NSW District Court. He was accused of armed robbery at a video store in 1995. Police arrested him with a handgun, alongside Romeo Calin. Calin told police Lee admitted firing shots, and signed a statement saying so.
At trial, Calin denied the statement’s contents. The judge let the jury treat Calin’s police statement as proof Lee said those words. The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld this. Was that correct?
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial ([45]). Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ gave a single judgment.
The Court did not accept that this was a case for the application of the proviso ([42]-[44]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Mr Calin’s statements to police covered two things: what he did or saw, and what he said or heard. He meant to assert those matters, but not that the appellant “fired two shots” — he had no way of knowing that.
So s 60 only applied to Mr Calin’s own representations. It did not make the appellant’s alleged confession admissible as hearsay, and s 81 did not help either, since the evidence was not first-hand.
The Court stressed s 60 changed the common law significantly, but was not a gateway for any hearsay, however remote. If the statements only went to credit, the judge could have excluded them or given limited-use directions.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Read judgment: [28]–[30] (opens in a new tab), [40] (opens in a new tab)
Under s 60 as it then stood, admitting Calin’s prior statements to challenge his credibility removed the hearsay rule only from his representations, not from the accused’s reported confession. The joint reasons at [28]–[30] therefore held that the report could not prove the truth of the confession; s 81 also did not admit this second-hand evidence. This construction was necessary to establish the evidentiary error on which the successful appeal depended. Paragraph [40] supports that construction by rejecting an unrestricted hearsay gateway; its role here concerns the reported confession, rather than deciding every possible form of remote hearsay. The Court separately refused to apply the proviso at [44] before ordering a new trial. This ratio concerns the provision before s 60(2) was inserted.
Why does this case matter?
Watch for the layered hearsay trap: two reports, two different uses to prove. Note Lee predates a later amendment reversing its reading.