Electronic communications: proving the message and its contents

First prove what the document contains

Section 48 lets you prove a document by tendering it, or by other listed methods. Section 48(1)(d) covers electronic information that a court cannot use unless a device retrieves or produces it. Here you may tender what that device produced, or what appears to have been produced by it.

Section 48(1)(b) is different. It deals with documents that appear to be copies made by a copying device.

Work out which method fits your material. A mailbox printout may fit the electronic-information route. A screenshot or PDF may raise harder questions about what it actually copies or shows.

You do not have to try one method first before using another. The real task is picking a method that fits, then meeting its conditions. Electronic evidence does not need an original paper version.

This process only proves what the document contains. It does not show the apparent sender really sent it, that nothing is missing, or that its contents are true.

The transmission facts presumed by s 161

Section 161 covers documents that look like records of electronic communications. It does not apply to lettergrams and telegrams. Those are dealt with separately, under s 162.

Where it applies, s 161 presumes certain facts, but only facts that appear on the document itself. These include the form of communication, who sent it, when and where it was sent, where it arrived, and the time it was received, if the document shows sending finished at a set time.

The presumption only covers what is apparent from the document. If a record is silent on place or completion time, the presumption does not fill that gap. And receipt at an apparent destination is as far as the presumption goes. It does not presume that a person actually read or understood the message.

The presumption can be displaced. A party need only adduce evidence raising doubt about it; they do not need to disprove it outright. Evidence like a compromised account, or a disputed clock setting, may be relevant. But the evidence must explain how it raises doubt about the specific presumed fact. A general claim that electronic records can be manipulated is not enough.

If the presumption is displaced, this just removes the statutory shortcut. It does not prove the opposite is true. The party relying on the communication can still try to prove sending, timing or receipt by other evidence, provided that evidence is admissible.

Contract terms can alter the presumption’s operation

Check s 161(2) in your jurisdiction’s Act, because contracts can switch off the presumption.

In the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, a specific provision of subsection (1) stops applying if three things are true. The proceeding must relate to a contract, all parties to the proceeding must be parties to that contract, and the provision must be inconsistent with a term of the contract.

The ACT works differently. There, the whole section switches off if those same three conditions are met, not just one provision. Do not apply the other jurisdictions’ narrower wording to the ACT.

For example, a supply contract might set its own rule for receipt of messages. Before using s 161 to prove receipt, check the actual contract term and every statutory condition, including who is a party to the proceeding.

If someone outside the contract is involved in the dispute, the all-parties condition fails. This stays true even if the main parties signed the contract.

Finally, these evidence provisions only help prove facts. They do not decide separate contract law questions, such as whether a notice validly terminated the agreement.

Section 71 is a narrow hearsay exception

Section 71 is a hearsay exception. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement used to prove what it says. Section 71 only covers certain things: who sent an electronic communication, when it was sent, and who it was sent to.

This is narrower than s 161, which presumes certain facts instead. The two sections do different jobs. Section 71 does not cover the truth of what the message actually says.

For example, an email claiming “the pump was leaking” contains a factual assertion. Using it to prove the leak raises s 59, the hearsay rule itself. Section 71 cannot help with that part.

To prove the leak really happened, you need another basis. The passage suggests options like a business-record exception under s 69, an admission under ss 81–83, or a first-hand-hearsay exception. Each has its own conditions. Simply finding the email in a work inbox does not satisfy them.

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