Melbourne v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 1999

EvidenceCharacter Evidence

Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1

A man who killed his neighbour ran diminished responsibility. The judge told the jury his good character made the offence improbable, but not that it bore on whether his out-of-court statements were credible. Did the judge have to say more?

Qualified by legislation: Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), from 29 June 2015

In Victoria, Part 3 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) regulates the directions given in a jury trial. After the matters in issue have been identified, the prosecution and defence counsel must each request that the trial judge give, or not give, particular directions about the matters in issue and the evidence relevant to them (s 12). The judge must give a requested direction unless there are good reasons for not doing so, having regard to the evidence and to the way the prosecution and the accused have conducted their cases (s 14), and must not give a direction that has not been requested (s 15) unless the judge considers that there are substantial and compelling reasons for giving it, having first invited submissions from counsel (s 16). Part 3 does not apply to general directions, or to a direction that the judge is required to give, or not to give, under any provision of that or any other Act (s 10(1)). In a Victorian jury trial, whether a good character direction is given therefore turns on that regime and not on the trial judge’s discretion as McHugh J described it in Melbourne, to the extent that the direction is not a general direction or one that an Act requires or prohibits.

Affirmed by Braysich v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 434

In Braysich v The Queen, French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ applied Melbourne to evidence of an accused’s honesty that bore on a statutory defence the accused had to establish on the balance of probabilities. They quoted Gummow J’s statement that the issues in the particular case and the nature of the evidence of good character will guide the process of reasoning of the tribunal of fact (at [42]), and Hayne J’s example of an accused of previous undoubted honesty in money matters tried for fraudulently obtaining financial advantage, with Hayne J’s caveat that on bare facts no direction is required (at [43]). They held that evidence of the appellant’s honesty “was capable of supporting a submission that it was improbable that he acted with that dishonest purpose” and that the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing it as not addressing his subjective purpose (at [44]). Heydon and Bell JJ dissented in the result.

Affirmed by Braysich v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 434

French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Braysich v The Queen adopted McHugh J’s distinction in Melbourne, saying that character refers to the inherent moral qualities or disposition of a person and is to be contrasted with reputation, which refers to the public estimation or repute of a person irrespective of that person’s inherent qualities, and that the common law’s history of admitting evidence of good character has been characterised by conceptual confusion between reputation and actual disposition (at [41]). They held that the evidence in that case went to the actual disposition of the appellant, because the witnesses called on his behalf testified to their dealings with him and knowledge of him as an honest person (at [41]).

What happened?

In July 1995 Roy Bernard Melbourne killed his next-door neighbour, Mrs Irene Chambers, by stabbing her three times (McHugh J at [4]). At his trial for murder in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, before Thomas J and a jury, he did not deny the stabbing and sought a verdict of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility under s 37 of the Criminal Code (NT), a defence on which he bore the onus ([7], [9]). He did not give evidence ([12]).

His experts, who gave evidence that he suffered frontal lobe damage, clinical depression and a delusional disorder, based their diagnoses substantially on what he had told them out of court, and the Crown challenged those diagnoses ([8]-[13]). To show that he was a person of good character, he called evidence that he had no previous convictions other than a drink-driving conviction in 1975, that he was not adversely known to the police, and that witnesses who knew him described him as quiet, gentle, amiable and well behaved ([15], [53]).

The trial judge told the jury that, in considering that evidence, they were “entitled to consider the improbability of Roy Melbourne committing the instant offence, having a history of good character of some 61 years, and that this is of considerable significance” ([19]). She gave no direction on how the evidence might be used in assessing his credibility. Defence counsel did not seek a further direction on credibility after it was given; on appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Northern Territory gave leave to raise the point and dismissed the appeal ([20]-[21]). The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) did not apply at the trial (Gummow J at [56]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal, three Justices to two. McHugh J, Gummow J and Hayne J formed the majority and each gave separate reasons, Gummow J agreeing with the reasons of Hayne J and adding some of his own. Kirby J and Callinan J each dissented, and each would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

No rule requiring a direction in every case. The majority held that there is no rule of law requiring a good character direction whenever evidence of good character is given. The question arose against Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319, in which the Court had said that “There is no rule of law that in every case in which evidence of good character is given the judge must give a direction as to the manner in which it can be used” (quoted at [22]). Counsel for the accused asked the Court to follow the English and New Zealand appellate courts, which had adopted rules of practice requiring a direction (R v Berrada, R v Vye, R v Aziz, R v Falealili: [24]-[29]), and the majority declined.

McHugh J said that the Court “should not depart from the rule that a judge is not obliged to direct the jury concerning the accused’s good character”, and that “the trial judge must retain a discretion as to whether to direct the jury on evidence of good character after evaluating its probative significance in relation to both: (a) the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged; and (b) the accused’s credibility” ([30]). The judge may conclude that the evidence is relevant to propensity only, credibility only, both or neither ([31]).

Gummow J said that there should be no departure from Simic ([77]); that “standard rules of practice too readily ossify into rules of law” ([78]); and that he preferred, as consistent with the established position, the statement of Thomas J, dissenting in Falealili, that if the evidence is both probative and relevant the judge will, “almost as a matter of course”, direct the jury as to its significance, but that if it is lacking in probative force and of remote relevance the judge may decide that a direction is not warranted ([79]).

Hayne J held that where the prosecution and the accused make contrary submissions to the jury about whether prior good character can be used, “the judge must tell the jury what is the true position in law: that the previous good character may be used in either or both of these ways” ([156]). Otherwise there is no rule of law requiring a direction in every case; “if a direction is given, it must be accurate”; and “ordinarily”, unless the evidence has “an immediate and obvious connection with an issue in the case”, it is better that the judge say nothing about how the jury may use it beyond any restatement of counsel’s arguments ([157]).

The dissents. Kirby J would have held that “In all cases in which there is evidence as to the accused’s good character, a direction must be given” as to its use by the jury, and that unless doing so is unnecessary, or would be unwarranted for reasons the judge gives, the direction must relate both to propensity and to credibility ([120]); he accepted that the common law would not require a direction where giving it would be absurd or an affront to common sense ([114]). Callinan J would have held that “Prima facie the direction should be given”, and that “strong contra-indicative factors would have to be present” before a judge concluded otherwise ([198]).

Uses of the evidence, and the evidence in the case. On the facts, McHugh J held that none of the evidence “had any direct probative bearing on the truthfulness or credibility of the accused”, because it “was all directed to the unlikelihood that he would commit the offence charged” ([54]). Hayne J held that it provided no assistance to the jury on any question of credibility, since nothing in the descriptions of a quiet, gentle man not adversely known to the police said whether he was confabulating in a police interview or feigning mental illness ([149], [152]). Gummow J held that the evidence did not require a direction further to that given ([80]). Kirby J and Callinan J held that the accused’s out-of-court statements to the police and the experts put his credibility in issue, so that a credibility direction should have been given ([126], [201], [211]).

Character and reputation. McHugh J said that in its strict sense character “refers to the inherent moral qualities of a person”, which is “to be contrasted with reputation”, the public estimation of a person irrespective of those qualities, and that the common law has not always drawn the distinction in criminal cases ([33]). Gummow J said that the law “does not always clearly distinguish between the two” ([64]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McHugh J

Read judgment: [30]–[31] (opens in a new tab), [53]–[54] (opens in a new tab)

Rejecting an automatic direction was necessary to McHugh J’s dismissal of the appeal: the judge had to evaluate the evidence’s bearing on propensity and credibility, and this evidence did not justify a credibility direction.

Ratio · Gummow J

Read judgment: [77]–[80] (opens in a new tab)

Gummow J rejected departure from Simic and held that no further direction was required. His approval at [79] of Thomas J’s dissent in Falealili adopts a relevance-based discretion; the quoted words remain Thomas J’s formulation.

Ratio · Hayne J (Gummow J agreeing)

Read judgment: [59] (opens in a new tab), [157]–[158] (opens in a new tab)

The rejection of an invariable direction supported the conclusion that this evidence required no further instruction. Gummow J expressly agreed with Hayne J’s reasons. This common conclusion does not make every observation in the separate majority judgments a shared holding.

Obiter · Hayne J (Gummow J agreeing)

Read judgment: [156] (opens in a new tab)

The competing-submissions example and the hypothetical fraud trial explain when a direction might be required or useful. Neither hypothetical had to be decided to dismiss this appeal; they are guidance beyond the ground of decision.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [114] (opens in a new tab), [120]–[122] (opens in a new tab)

Dissenting, Kirby J would require a direction on established good character, ordinarily addressing both uses, subject to the stated qualifications. Applying that approach, he found the direction incomplete; this is not the majority rule.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [198] (opens in a new tab), [211] (opens in a new tab)

Dissenting, Callinan J adopted a prima facie requirement for a direction, with strong countervailing factors ordinarily needed to dispense with it. He would have ordered a retrial because a credibility direction should have been given.

Proposition 2

Ratio · McHugh J

Read judgment: [53]–[54] (opens in a new tab)

The lack of a probative connection between the actual character evidence and truthfulness was McHugh J’s reason for finding no miscarriage from the missing credibility direction. The conclusion concerns this evidence, rather than all good character evidence.

Ratio · Hayne J (Gummow J agreeing)

Read judgment: [59] (opens in a new tab), [149] (opens in a new tab), [152] (opens in a new tab), [158] (opens in a new tab)

As an alternative to his conclusion about the way the trial was conducted, Hayne J held that these descriptions of the accused gave no assistance on credibility. This was a ground for rejecting the asserted need for a further direction, and Gummow J agreed with his reasons.

Ratio · Gummow J

Read judgment: [72]–[73] (opens in a new tab), [80] (opens in a new tab)

Gummow J’s own explanation makes the issues and the content of the character evidence control its use. That reasoning connects his acceptance of the potential significance of the accused’s statements with his conclusion that this evidence required no further direction. The quotation from Attwood at [72] is distinguished from his own following explanation.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [122] (opens in a new tab), [126]–[127] (opens in a new tab)

Dissenting, Kirby J treated the credibility of the statements to police and experts as potentially affecting diminished responsibility. This supported his conclusion that the omitted credibility direction was material and a retrial required.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [201]–[202] (opens in a new tab), [211] (opens in a new tab)

Dissenting, Callinan J held that credibility was in issue despite the accused not testifying. The jury’s use of his out-of-court statements made a credibility direction necessary on his approach, leading him to order a retrial.

Proposition 3

Obiter · McHugh J

Read judgment: [33] (opens in a new tab)

The distinction between actual disposition and public reputation supplies conceptual background. The appeal did not require a ruling admitting or excluding either kind of evidence: the decisive question was whether the evidence actually received justified a credibility direction. The definition should not be treated as a separate holding on admissibility.

Obiter · Gummow J

Read judgment: [64] (opens in a new tab)

The warning that the law does not clearly distinguish character from reputation explains the conceptual difficulty. Resolving the terminology was not necessary to the conclusion that no further direction was required on this evidence.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [108] (opens in a new tab)

In his dissent, Kirby J expressly adopted Henry J’s observation in Falealili that absence of convictions alone is generally neutral. This qualifies the threshold for Kirby J’s proposed duty to direct; it is not a majority holding that mere absence of convictions triggers that duty.

Why does this case matter?

Melbourne is where Australian courts decided whether to follow the practice that had developed in England and New Zealand. A student who cites it as “the High Court’s rule” has to say whose reasoning is being used, because the Justices wrote separately.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the precise character evidence and explain its connection to a contested issue. Assess any direction given using the reasoning of the identified Justices.

Say which Justices’ reasoning you are using, and whether the trial is a common law trial or governed by an Act; in Melbourne the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) did not apply.

Check your understanding

1. What did the Court in Simic say about a good character direction, and which three Justices in Melbourne held that there should be no departure from it ([22], [30], [77], [157])?

2. What did Hayne J say the judge must do where the prosecution and the accused make contrary submissions about the use of good character evidence, and what did he say about a direction that is given ([156]-[157])?

3. How did McHugh J and Hayne J assess the character evidence, and how did their reasoning differ from that of Kirby J and Callinan J ([54], [149], [126], [201])?

4. How did McHugh J distinguish character from reputation, and which later decision adopted the distinction ([33])?