Good character evidence: what it proves and what the jury is told
What an accused’s good character evidence can prove once admitted, on propensity, credibility and a defence the accused must prove, and when the jury must be directed about it under Melbourne v The Queen.
Learning outcomes
- Distinguish character from reputation, and good character generally from good character in a particular respect under s 110.
- Identify whether good character evidence bears on propensity, on credibility, on both or on neither, from what the evidence says.
- Explain how good character evidence can support a defence the accused must prove, as in Braysich v The Queen.
- Apply Melbourne v The Queen to decide whether a good character direction was required, and state the dissenting view.
Whether an accused may lead evidence of good character is a question for the uniform Evidence Acts, and it is answered in Character evidence about an accused. Once the evidence is in, two further questions arise, and they are the subject of this article: what can good character evidence rationally prove in this case, and must the judge tell the jury how to use it. The answer to the first shapes the answer to the second, so the student’s prior question is what the character evidence actually says about the accused and how that connects with the issues at trial.
The admission rule stated below is the uniform scheme’s, in Part 3.8 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and its counterparts in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory.34 The use of the evidence and the content of directions come from two decisions of the High Court, discussed below.
Character is not the same as reputation
In Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1, McHugh J explained that character, in its strict sense, refers to the inherent moral qualities of a person, while reputation refers to the public estimation of that person irrespective of those qualities.1 The common law has not always kept the two apart. In Braysich v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 434 the joint reasons adopted that distinction and noted that the evidence in that case went to the appellant’s actual disposition: witnesses spoke from their own dealings with him as an honest person.2
The uniform Acts sidestep part of the old difficulty. Section 110(1) disapplies the hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules for evidence adduced by a defendant to prove, directly or by implication, that the defendant is a person of good character either generally or in a particular respect. Good character “in a particular respect” — honesty in money matters, say — is a narrower claim than good character generally, and s 110(2) and (3) match the prosecution’s reply to whichever claim was made.
The two uses: propensity and credibility
Good character evidence can bear on guilt in two different ways. McHugh J framed them as the evidence’s probative significance in relation to the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged and to the accused’s credibility. Hayne J put the same two uses in terms of assessing the probability that the accused committed the offence, and assessing whether the accused should be accepted as having sought to tell the truth in statements made in or out of court.
Neither use follows automatically. Gummow J said that “the issues in the particular case and the nature of the evidence of ‘good character’ which is proffered will guide the process of reasoning of the tribunal of fact”. In Melbourne the accused’s witnesses described him as quiet, gentle and amiable, and he was not adversely known to police. McHugh J held that none of that evidence had any direct probative bearing on the truthfulness or credibility of the accused; it went to the unlikelihood that he would commit the offence.
Good character can also support a defence the accused must prove. In Braysich a stockbroker charged with creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading relied on a statutory defence that his purpose did not include that proscribed purpose, and he bore the burden of establishing it on the balance of probabilities. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that the evidence of his honesty “was capable of supporting a submission that it was improbable that he acted with that dishonest purpose”, and that it was an important element of the evidence relevant to whether the evidential burden on that defence had been discharged. The Court of Appeal had erred in putting it aside as evidence that did not address his subjective purpose. Heydon and Bell JJ dissented.
Is a direction required? Melbourne
The High Court in Melbourne declined to require a good character direction in every case. The majority was McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, each writing separately (Gummow J agreeing with Hayne J’s reasons). Hayne J restated the earlier position of the Court: “there is no rule of law that in every case in which evidence of good character is given the judge must give a direction as to the manner in which it can be used.” He added that if a direction is given, it must be accurate.
McHugh J put the matter as a discretion: the trial judge decides whether to direct the jury after evaluating the evidence’s probative significance for propensity, for credibility, for both or for neither, and whether the discretion miscarried depends on the facts of the case. On the facts, he considered that a credibility direction would have given the accused an advantage to which he was not entitled in law. Gummow J adopted a statement from a dissenting judgment in the New Zealand Court of Appeal: if good character evidence is both probative and relevant, the judge will, “almost as a matter of course”, direct the jury as to its significance.
Hayne J also identified when a direction is clearly needed: where the prosecution and the accused make contrary submissions about whether the evidence can be used for propensity or credibility, the judge must tell the jury the true position, which is that it may be used in either or both of those ways.
Kirby and Callinan JJ dissented. Both would have held that a direction on credibility should have been given, and Kirby J favoured the approach taken in England and New Zealand, where appellate courts had moved towards requiring a good character direction as a general practice. Those decisions are persuasive only, and the majority in Melbourne declined to follow them.
Where the uniform Acts fit
In the Commonwealth Act, Part 3.8 applies only in a criminal proceeding (s 109). It decides what evidence may be adduced and what reply it opens, and s 112 requires leave before a defendant is cross-examined about matters arising out of character evidence. Part 3.8 says nothing about what the jury is to be told about using good character evidence; that is where Melbourne and Braysich do their work.
In Victoria, directions in a criminal jury trial are also regulated by the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). For directions to which its Part 3 applies (s 10 excludes general directions and directions another provision requires or forbids), counsel must request the directions they want (s 12); the trial judge must give a requested direction unless there are good reasons not to (s 14), must not give an unrequested direction (s 15), and must give one that was not requested if the judge considers there are substantial and compelling reasons for it (s 16).5 This article does not state how that Act applies to a good character direction in particular; a Victorian answer must start from it.
Applying this in a problem question
- Confirm the evidence is admissible: identify whether the defendant adduced good character evidence generally or in a particular respect under s 110(1), and what reply s 110(2) or (3) opens.
- Identify what the evidence actually says about the accused, and state whether it bears on propensity, on credibility, on both, or on neither.
- Identify the issues at trial that the evidence connects with, including any defence the accused must prove, as in Braysich.
- Ask whether a direction was sought, and whether the parties made competing submissions about the use of the evidence.
- Apply Melbourne: there is no rule that a direction must be given in every case, but if one is given it must be accurate, and conflicting submissions about the use of the evidence call for the judge to state the true position.
- In a Victorian jury trial, work the request provisions of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) before relying on the common law.
Self-check
- Can I distinguish character from reputation, and good character generally from good character in a particular respect?
- Can I name the two uses of good character evidence and say which one the facts support?
- Do I know who formed the majority in Melbourne and what Kirby and Callinan JJ would have held?
- Can I explain how good character evidence helped the accused in Braysich even though he bore the burden of proof on the defence?
Where the authority sits
Admission and reply are governed by Part 3.8 of the uniform Acts, enacted in the same terms in s 110 of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts (Victoria saying “accused” for “defendant”, and the ACT “presented” for “adduced”). The use of the evidence and the need for a direction rest on Melbourne, decided on appeal from a Northern Territory murder trial at which the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) did not apply, and on Braysich, an appeal from a Western Australian trial of an offence under the Corporations Law. High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Western Australia’s uniform-scheme Act has been enacted but its substantive provisions have not commenced; for the transition, see Western Australia’s move to uniform evidence law.