Judicial warnings about unreliable evidence
What a jury must be told about evidence that may be unreliable: the request-driven obligation in s 165, the prohibition in s 165A(1) about children’s evidence and the exception in s 165A(2), and the forensic-disadvantage direction in s 165B — including who may apply for it, which New South Wales answers differently.
Learning outcomes
- Identify when s 165(2) is engaged, including the jury and request preconditions.
- State what s 165A(1) forbids a judge from saying about a child’s evidence, and what s 165A(2) still permits on a party’s request.
- Apply the three elements of s 165B to a delay complaint, and name who may apply for the direction in the Act that governs.
- Distinguish admissibility from what the jury must be told about admitted evidence.
Some evidence is admissible and still dangerous to act on. The uniform evidence legislation deals with that not by excluding it but by requiring the judge, in a jury trial, to tell the jury what to be careful about. A student who treats admissibility as the end of the analysis has stopped one step early: the question of what the jury must be told is separate, and it is where a good deal of appellate litigation sits.
This article states the position under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) state the same rules, with three departures that are set out below — the most important being that New South Wales allows the s 165B application to be made by a party, not only by the defendant.5 Victoria is different again, and that is worth knowing before citing a section number: the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) confined ss 165 and 165A of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) to civil proceedings and repealed s 165B outright.4
Section 165: evidence of a kind that may be unreliable
Section 165(1) applies to evidence of a kind that may be unreliable, and lists kinds that are included rather than exhausting them — hearsay and admissions evidence, identification evidence, evidence whose reliability may be affected by age, ill health or injury, evidence in a criminal proceeding from a witness who might reasonably be supposed to have been criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceeding, evidence in a criminal proceeding from a witness who is a prison informer, oral evidence of questioning of a defendant by an investigating official where the questioning was recorded in writing the defendant has not signed or otherwise acknowledged in writing, and, in a proceeding against a deceased person’s estate, evidence adduced by or on behalf of the person seeking relief about a matter the deceased could have given evidence about.1 Read the qualifications: two of those kinds exist only in a criminal proceeding, the questioning kind reaches only an unsigned, unacknowledged written record, and the estate kind covers only evidence adduced by the party seeking relief.
The obligation is in s 165(2), and its trigger matters: if there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable, inform it of the matters that may cause that unreliability, and warn it of the need for caution in deciding whether to accept the evidence and what weight to give it.
Three qualifications sit immediately around it. The judge need not comply if there are good reasons for not doing so (s 165(3)); no particular form of words is required (s 165(4)); and the section does not affect any other power of the judge to warn or inform the jury (s 165(5)). A fourth subsection carves something out of s 165(2) altogether: under s 165(6), where a child gives evidence, s 165(2) does not permit the judge to warn or inform the jury that the reliability of the child’s evidence may be affected by the child’s age, and such a warning may be given only in accordance with ss 165A(2) and (3). In the ACT Act that direction to s 165A sits in its own subsection, s 165(7).5
So s 165 is request-driven, not automatic. An answer that says “the judge must warn the jury” without noticing the request, the jury, or the good-reasons escape has misstated the section.
Section 165A: the prohibition about children’s evidence
Section 165A runs the other way. Where a child gives evidence before a jury, the judge must not warn or suggest that children as a class are unreliable witnesses, that their evidence is inherently less credible or reliable or requires more careful scrutiny than an adult’s, or give a warning about the unreliability of the particular child’s evidence solely on account of the child’s age; nor, in a criminal proceeding, give a general warning about the danger of convicting on a child’s uncorroborated evidence.2
Section 165A(1) is a prohibition, not a discretion, and it is the clearest illustration that the warnings regime is a considered statutory scheme rather than a codification of whatever judges used to say. Section 165(6), set out above, is what closes the obvious way round it.
But s 165A is not only a prohibition. Section 165A(2) preserves a route in: it does not prevent the judge, at the request of a party, from informing the jury that the particular child’s evidence may be unreliable and why, and from warning or informing it of the need for caution in deciding whether to accept that evidence and what weight to give it — if the party has satisfied the court that there are circumstances particular to the child, other than solely the child’s age, that affect the reliability of the child’s evidence and that warrant the warning or the information. Section 165A(3) preserves the judge’s other powers to warn or inform the jury.2 So what s 165A forbids is the generic, class-based or age-alone warning; a warning grounded in something about this child is available on request.
Section 165B: forensic disadvantage from delay
Where there is a jury in a criminal proceeding and the court is satisfied, on application, that the defendant has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of delay, the court must inform the jury of the nature of that disadvantage and of the need to take it into account.3 Under the Commonwealth, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts the application is by the defendant; under the New South Wales s 165B(2) it may be made by a party.5
Again the detail carries the answer: the section applies only where there is a jury; there must be an application, by whoever the governing Act allows; the test is significant forensic disadvantage caused by the consequences of delay, not delay by itself; the judge need not comply if there are good reasons not to; and while no particular form of words is required, s 165B(4) forbids the judge suggesting that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict solely because of the delay or the disadvantage.
Two further subsections are easy to miss. Section 165B(5) makes this the exclusive route: the judge must not warn or inform the jury about any forensic disadvantage from delay except in accordance with the section, although other powers to warn or inform are preserved. And s 165B(6) supplies the definitions that decide most problems — delay includes delay between the alleged offence and its being reported, and a significant forensic disadvantage is not to be regarded as established by the mere existence of a delay. New South Wales and the Northern Territory add a s 165B(7), absent from the other Acts, listing non-exhaustive factors that may establish the disadvantage: potential witnesses having died or being untraceable, and potential evidence having been lost or otherwise unavailable.5
Applying this in a problem question
- Ask first whether there is a jury. These provisions are directed at what a jury is told.
- Identify the kind of evidence and whether it falls within s 165(1) — remembering the list is inclusive.
- Ask whether a party has requested a warning. Section 165(2) is not self-executing.
- If a child gave evidence, check s 165A before saying anything about age and reliability; the section forbids much of what intuition suggests.
- If the complaint is delay, work s 165B’s elements: application — by a party in New South Wales, by the defendant elsewhere — significant forensic disadvantage, caused by the consequences of delay.
- For ss 165 and 165B note the good-reasons exception and that no form of words is prescribed. Neither applies to s 165A(1), which is a prohibition rather than an obligation — but check s 165A(2). And under s 165B(4) the judge must not suggest that conviction would be dangerous or unsafe solely because of the delay or the disadvantage.
Self-check
- Can I say what triggers s 165(2), rather than treating the warning as automatic?
- Do I know what s 165A(1) forbids, why that is not an oversight, and what s 165A(2) still allows?
- For a delay question, can I name the three elements of s 165B, and say who may apply in the Act that governs?
A worked application
A defendant is tried before a jury on a charge alleging conduct fifteen years earlier. The prosecution relies on the complainant, who was nine at the time and is now an adult, and on a cell-mate who says the defendant admitted the offence.
Two provisions require consideration, and the third turns out not to be engaged at all.
The cell-mate is a prison informer giving evidence in a criminal proceeding, which s 165(1)(e) names expressly. So s 165 is available — but only if there is a jury, which there is, and a party requests the warning. If the defence does not ask, s 165(2) is not engaged, though s 165(5) leaves the judge’s other powers intact.
The complainant’s age at the time is where intuition goes wrong. Section 165A(1) applies to a proceeding “in which evidence is given by a child before a jury”, and s 165(6) likewise speaks of a proceeding in which a child gives evidence. This complainant gives evidence as an adult, so neither provision is engaged by the fact that she was nine when the alleged conduct occurred. Had she given the evidence as a child, s 165A(1) would have barred a class-based or age-alone warning and s 165A(2) would have been the only route in.
The fifteen-year delay is s 165B, on application — by the defendant in a court applying the Commonwealth, Tasmanian, ACT or Northern Territory Act, or by any party in New South Wales. The court must be satisfied of a significant forensic disadvantage caused by the consequences of the delay — lost witnesses, destroyed records — not of delay as such, and s 165B(6) says in terms that the mere existence of a delay does not establish it. If satisfied, the court must inform the jury of the nature of that disadvantage and the need to take it into account. And s 165B(4) sets the limit: the judge must not in any way suggest it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict solely because of the delay or the disadvantage.
Where the authority sits
The warnings regime is statutory, in Part 4.5 of the Evidence Act 1995 in the Commonwealth and New South Wales. These provisions are expressed as directions to a jury, but it does not follow that they are inert in a trial without one. In New South Wales s 133(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that “[i]f any Act or law requires a warning to be given to a jury in any such case, the Judge is to take the warning into account in dealing with the matter” — “such case” being criminal proceedings tried by a Judge without a jury (s 133(1)). So in a New South Wales judge-alone criminal trial there is no jury to inform, warn or direct, but the warning the Evidence Act would have required to be given is something the judge must take into account in dealing with the matter — and because s 133(2) requires the judgment to include the principles of law applied and the findings of fact relied on, whether that was done is reviewable on the face of the reasons.6 Queensland and South Australia have not enacted the uniform scheme for their own courts, and their warning requirements are found in their own legislation and common law. Western Australia is in transition and the date matters. The Evidence Act 2025 (WA) (Act No. 15 of 2025, assented to on 25 September 2025) enacts a uniform-scheme Act for Western Australia, and its Part 8 Division 3 carries the warnings provisions: s 317 on evidence of a kind that may be unreliable, s 318 on warnings about evidence given by children, and s 319 on warnings about delays causing forensic disadvantage, which correspond to s 165, s 165A and s 165B of the Commonwealth Act; the Act itself marks ss 317 and 318 “Compare: Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth)” s 165 and s 165A. Compare is not copy: s 319(1) abolishes the rule of law or practice requiring a Longman warning, s 319(2) requires the judge on an accused’s application to “explain” the disadvantage and “direct” the jury to take it into account rather than to inform the jury of it, s 319(5)(c) provides that the explanation or direction “must not take the form of a warning”, and ss 320 and 321 add prohibited and required directions about delay in complaint that have no Commonwealth counterpart in Part 4.5. Those provisions had not commenced as at 10 October 2026. Section 2 of the Act brought only Part 1 into operation on assent and s 384 on the following day, leaving “the rest of the Act” to a day fixed by proclamation (s 2(e)); the Act’s uncommenced provisions table records Parts 2 to 9 as commencing on 18 September 2027 under SL 2026/190 cl 2. Until that day a Western Australian proceeding is governed by the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) and the common law, and an answer that applies ss 317 to 319 to a current trial applies a provision that is not yet in force.7
Outside Victoria the four other Acts state the same rules, but not in the same words throughout. Two differences have been noted above — who may apply under s 165B, and the s 165B(7) factor list in New South Wales and the Northern Territory. One more is worth knowing: the Tasmanian s 165(1)(f) requires only that the written record of questioning has not been “signed or otherwise acknowledged” by the defendant, omitting the Commonwealth’s “in writing” after “acknowledged”, and the Tasmanian Act records that difference in its own note to the paragraph.5
Victoria is the larger trap, because it has enacted the scheme and then taken these provisions out of it. The Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) amended s 165(1) and s 165A(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) to apply only in a civil proceeding, repealed s 165(1)(d)-(f) and s 165A(1)(d), and repealed the whole of s 165B(1)-(6). Directions about unreliable evidence, identification evidence and children’s evidence in a Victorian criminal trial are given under Part 4 Divisions 3 and 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), and directions about delay and forensic disadvantage under Part 4 Division 5. The Victorian Act says so itself, in notes appended to each of those sections. The lesson is larger than this topic: matching section numbers across the uniform Acts do not establish a matching rule, and the only way to know is to read the provision in the Act that governs your problem.4