Domican v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 1992

EvidenceJudicial Warnings And Directions

Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555

A witness saw a gunman for a moment, nearly nine months passed, and she recognised the accused after seeing him on television. The judge gave the jury a warning about identification evidence. Was that enough?

Clarified by Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1

Dhanhoa concerned s 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which provides that if identification evidence has been admitted the judge is to inform the jury that there is a special need for caution before accepting it and of the reasons for that need, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J said that the common law principle in Domican “contains the obvious qualification that the warning is to be given where the reliability of the evidence of identification is disputed”, that the same qualification is implied in s 116, and that the section means the information is to be given where the reliability of the identification evidence is disputed (at [19]-[22]). McHugh and Gummow JJ held that s 116 must be read in the context of the adversarial system and is not to be read as requiring a direction about identification evidence when identification was not an issue (at [53]), and Callinan J, who would have allowed the appeal on the facts, held that s 116 applies only where the identification of the accused is in issue (at [94]). Where s 116 applies, it is the source of the obligation, read with that qualification.

Qualified by legislation: Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), from 29 June 2015

In Victoria, Part 4 Division 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) now governs directions on identification evidence. Under s 36 the prosecution or defence counsel may request a direction on identification evidence and must specify the significant matters that may make the evidence unreliable; in giving it the judge must warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it, inform the jury of the significant matters that the judge considers may make the evidence unreliable, and inform the jury that a witness may honestly believe that his or her evidence is accurate when the witness is in fact mistaken and that the mistaken evidence of a witness may be convincing; if relevant, the judge must also inform the jury that a number of witnesses may all be mistaken and that mistaken identification evidence has resulted in innocent people being convicted. Section 37(1) provides that, except as provided by that Division, a trial judge is not required to direct the jury regarding the unreliability of identification evidence, and s 37(2) abolishes any rule of common law to the contrary. In a Victorian jury trial the obligation stated in Domican therefore no longer applies as a rule of common law. The position in other jurisdictions depends on their own law.

What happened?

Thomas Christopher Domican was convicted by a jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales of shooting at Christopher Dale Flannery with intent to murder him. On 27 January 1985 a gunman sitting in a parked green car fired about 30 shots from an Armalite rifle at Mr Flannery and his wife as they walked in their driveway. Mrs Flannery looked up when the shooting stopped and saw a man in the driver’s seat trying to disconnect part of the gun (joint reasons at [2]).

Her identification of the accused came late and by stages. At the trial she said that the gunman appeared to be wearing a wig and a false moustache, although in her first interview and her later statements she had not suggested that he was disguised ([2]). She said that in April 1985 she recognised the accused as the gunman after seeing him interviewed on four television programmes, and that some weeks after the shooting she had seen the gunman, without the wig or moustache, driving a milk truck near her home ([2]). In May 1985 she told police that she could not identify the gunman, and nearly nine months passed before she formally identified the accused from photographs that had been altered to show him wearing a wig and a false moustache ([2], [12]-[13]).

The Crown also relied on the evidence of Mr Patience, who had been granted immunity from prosecution, and on two prisoners who said that the accused had told them in custody that he had shot at Mr Flannery ([3]-[4]). The trial judge gave the jury what the joint reasons call “a very full direction on the dangers of acting on identification evidence”, including four matters to consider: whether the witness had previously known the person identified, the witness’s opportunity to see him, the time between the event and the first identification, and the circumstances of that first identification ([8]).

The accused complained that the judge did not draw the jury’s attention to particular weaknesses in Mrs Flannery’s evidence ([8]). The Court of Criminal Appeal (Kirby ACJ giving the leading judgment) accepted that the directions fell short of the standard required by certain of its own decisions, but held that the other evidence “remained to remove any concern” and dismissed the appeal (opening paragraph, [19]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ gave joint reasons allowing the appeal, on the ground that the trial judge’s directions on identification were a misdirection that may well have affected the verdict ([18], [24]). Brennan J gave separate reasons and would have dismissed the appeal (Brennan J at [9]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

What the warning must contain. The joint reasons state: “Whatever the defence and however the case is conducted, where evidence as to identification represents any significant part of the proof of guilt of an offence, the judge must warn the jury as to the dangers of convicting on such evidence where its reliability is disputed” (173 CLR 555 at 561 [11]). The terms need follow no particular formula, but the warning “must be cogent and effective” and “appropriate to the circumstances of the case”, so the jury must be told of the factors that may affect the evidence in the circumstances of the particular case.

“A warning in general terms is insufficient”, and the jury’s attention should be drawn to weaknesses in the identification evidence. Reference to counsel’s arguments is not enough: “The jury must have the benefit of a direction which has the authority of the judge’s office behind it”. It follows that “the trial judge should isolate and identify for the benefit of the jury any matter of significance which may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of the identification evidence”. Applying that, the joint reasons found significant weaknesses in Mrs Flannery’s evidence that the summing-up did not bring home to the jury, and found that some of the judge’s remarks could have conveyed that her identification was more reliable than usual ([12]-[18]).

Brennan J. Brennan J accepted that a warning must be given “in terms that bring home to the jury the reason for the warning” (Brennan J at [2]), but held that a trial judge discharges the duty by a warning “sufficient to alert the jury to the dangers of acting on the particular identification evidence given in the case”, and that the duty does not “require the trial judge to lend his or her judicial authority to every argument reasonably open to defence counsel on the evidence” (at [4]-[5]).

Adequacy and the rest of the Crown case. The joint reasons hold that the adequacy of a warning “is evaluated by reference to the identification evidence and not the other evidence in the case”, and that the judge “must direct the jury on the assumption that they may decide to convict solely on the basis of the identification evidence” ([20]). A judge “is not absolved from his or her duty to give general and specific warnings concerning the danger of convicting on identification evidence because there is other evidence, which, if accepted, is sufficient to convict the accused” ([20]).

Here the case on paper was strong, and three bodies of Crown evidence were each sufficient to convict, but the jury might reasonably have regarded the evidence of the two prisoners as worthless and would have scrutinised Mr Patience’s evidence with great care. If the jury were not prepared to convict on those, Mrs Flannery’s identification was decisive ([21]-[23]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Only selected propositions are annotated. An unmarked proposition has not been classified.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ

Read judgment: p 561 (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons require a warning where disputed identification evidence forms a significant part of the proof of guilt. That requirement was necessary to their decision: Mrs Flannery’s identification could independently support conviction, and their finding that the warning failed to address its significant weaknesses supplied the misdirection on which they ordered a new trial. This classification concerns the joint reasons’ warning requirement at 173 CLR 561. Brennan J’s view that the warning was sufficient was his dissenting assessment, not part of this ratio.

Why does this case matter?

A summing-up set before a student poses the Domican question: what did the judge say about this witness, on these facts?

The case was decided in 1992 on the common law, before the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) existed. A problem set in a jurisdiction with legislation on identification directions raises a second question, which is how much of this case still operates alongside the statute.

Exam and application relevance

Put three questions to any summing-up on identification. What made a warning necessary in this trial? What did the judge actually say about this witness’s evidence, compared with the weaknesses the joint reasons examined in Mrs Flannery’s evidence: her prior acquaintance with the accused, her opportunity to see the gunman, the delay before identification, the circumstances of her first identification, changes in her account, and the influence of what she had seen on television? And does the rest of the Crown case bear on that assessment, and how did the joint reasons and Brennan J answer that?

Attribute each view by name. For a trial governed by s 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), apply s 116 as the Justices read it in Dhanhoa; for a Victorian jury trial, apply ss 36 and 37 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). Domican supplies the common law background.

Check your understanding

1. The trial judge in Domican told the jury about the dangers of identification evidence and gave them four matters to consider. Why did the joint reasons still hold that the directions were inadequate, and what did they make of the judge’s remark that it was “a chance occurrence that she saw this man”?

2. The Crown relied on three bodies of evidence each sufficient to convict. Why did the joint reasons hold that this did not answer the complaint about the identification warning?

3. On which question did Brennan J differ from the joint reasons, and what did he say a warning must do in terms of the dangers of the particular identification evidence?

4. Which later decision read a limit about disputed reliability into s 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), and what did Gleeson CJ and Hayne J say about Domican in doing so?