Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King
Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King [2026] HCA 25
A wife secretly recorded her husband admitting that he had had sex with her while she was asleep. Was the recording lawful under South Australian surveillance law, and could the jury hear it?
What happened?
The appellant stood trial in the District Court of South Australia on four counts of rape. The complainant on each count was his wife, and the prosecution alleged that he had sex with her without her knowledge and consent while she was asleep. He was convicted on the second and fourth counts, and the jury could not reach a verdict on the other two ([1]-[2]).
On 14 December 2019 the complainant recorded a conversation with the appellant on her mobile phone without his knowledge. In it he said “I sexually assaulted you” and “I started having sex with you when you were asleep and then I stopped”. At the trial he accepted that he had said those things but said that he made the statements to placate her ([24]). The fourth count was alleged to have occurred on 25 January 2020, after the recording ([25]). In an affidavit read by the prosecution on the application to exclude the recording, the complainant said that she made it “so that I could use it to convince myself never to go back to him”, as a reminder to herself, and that at the time she had no intention of taking it further ([28]).
The appellant objected to the recording being put in evidence. The trial judge admitted it, holding that making the recording was not unlawful because it was reasonably necessary for the protection of the complainant’s lawful interests within the meaning of s 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) ([3], [29]). A majority of the Court of Appeal (S Doyle and David JJA) held that s 4(2)(a)(ii) was not satisfied but dismissed the appeal on the basis that the evidence should have been admitted in the exercise of the discretion to admit unlawfully obtained evidence ([4], [32]-[33]). Kourakis CJ held that s 4(2)(a)(ii) was satisfied ([4], [34]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court gave one set of joint reasons, of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ ([1]-[60]), and dismissed the appeal ([60]). The questions it addressed were whether the Court of Appeal majority was right to hold that making the recording did not satisfy s 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Act, and what follows for the admissibility of the recording at trial if it did not ([5], [35]-[37]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint reasons construed the exception in s 4(2)(a)(ii), which provides that the prohibition in s 4(1) on using a listening device to record a private conversation does not apply to a party’s use of a listening device to record the conversation if “the use of the device is reasonably necessary for the protection of the lawful interests of that person” ([8], [10]). The Act seeks to protect personal privacy by restricting electronic recording of private conversations, and the exceptions that concern lawful interests are limited by the requirement that the use be “reasonably necessary” for the “protection” of those interests ([44]-[45]).
“Reasonably necessary” does not mean that the use had to be “essential”; it is sufficient if the use was “appropriate” to protect the lawful interest. The respondent’s contention that the term means “reasonably appropriate and adapted”, and imports a form of proportionality analysis, was rejected ([46]). “Reasonably” imports an objective evaluation of the circumstances existing at the time of the use, undertaken by reference to the circumstances faced by the party using the device, and the person’s reasons for making the recording inform but do not determine the analysis ([47]).
“Protection” connotes defence or preservation from harm, danger or impairment ([48]). “Lawful interests” is not confined to legal rights, title, duty or liability, and is best left to be applied case by case ([42], [49]-[50]). The approach is to identify the interest said to have been in need of protection, determine whether it was lawful, and ask, having regard to the nature of that interest and to the fact that s 4(2)(a)(ii) is an exception to a protection afforded to private conversations, whether in all the circumstances the use was reasonably necessary (in the sense of appropriate) to protect it ([51]). Other matters being equal, the greater the interest, the stronger the case that recording an admission of its infringement was reasonably necessary to protect it ([53]).
Applying that approach, the joint reasons held that the Court of Appeal majority had erred in characterising the complainant’s purpose as a “reminder to herself not to resume the relationship” and so her lawful interest as an interest in escaping the relationship ([54]). The recording was a reminder to her, by replaying it, to avoid being exposed to the real risk of being raped, and her interest was properly characterised by Kourakis CJ as her right of bodily autonomy and integrity and any associated personal wellbeing ([54]-[55]).
The interest of a person in not being raped deserves “the very strongest protection” in the application of s 4(2)(a)(ii) ([55]). The evaluation was objective but made on the circumstances she faced when the recording was made, including her evidence of earlier rapes while she slept, the most recent in August 2019, her health problems, her responsibility for two small children, her limited support, and that she and the appellant lived in the same home ([22]-[23], [57]).
In those circumstances it was reasonably necessary, that is appropriate, to record his admission as a powerful audio reminder of the peril she faced, more powerful than a handwritten note ([58]). That she could have approached the police did not mean that using her phone was not reasonably necessary, because the police response and the course and timing of any investigation were out of her control ([58]). The recording did not contravene s 4(1), and the evidence of the conversation was properly admitted ([59]).
The joint reasons also explained what turns on s 4(1) for admissibility. Playing the recording at trial involved the use, communication or publication of material derived from the use of a listening device, so that if making the recording did not satisfy s 4(2)(a)(ii), its use at trial was prohibited by s 12(1) because s 9(1)(d) was not engaged ([14]). They said that, “reflecting the parties’ common position in this Court”, “no question of any discretionary exclusion (or inclusion) of the evidence of the covert recording should have arisen” in that event ([14]).
The respondent conceded that the Court of Appeal majority had erred in treating admissibility as governed by the public policy discretion rather than the evidence being necessarily excluded by the Act, and the joint reasons said that the concession was “correctly made” ([36]). The prosecution, as the moving party seeking to rely on the exception, bore the onus of proving the facts necessary to satisfy s 4(2)(a)(ii), to the balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt, by the principles that apply to the voluntariness of a confession ([26]-[27]). These statements about the consequences of a contravention were made in a case in which the Court held that the recording did not contravene s 4(1) ([59]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [44]–[53] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs construe s 4(2)(a)(ii) and state the approach to its application. They are necessary to the ground on which the appeal was dismissed, that the recording was not prohibited by s 4(1) because the exception was satisfied ([5], [59]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [54]–[59] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs apply s 4(2)(a)(ii) to the complainant’s circumstances, correct the Court of Appeal majority’s characterisation of her interest and conclude that the recording was not prohibited. They are the ground of the order dismissing the appeal on the notice of contention.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [14] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [36] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
The Court held that s 4(2)(a)(ii) was satisfied, so the recording was not prohibited and the question what follows from a contravention did not arise for decision. The statement at [14] is made ‘reflecting the parties’ common position’, and [36] approves a concession that the respondent made about the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. They are the Court’s reasoned endorsement of the position, not a ground necessary to dismiss the appeal.
Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [26]–[27] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)
The Court recorded that the allocation of the onus was common ground and stated the onus and the standard of proof of the facts that condition admissibility. The onus was not contested and the appeal turned on how s 4(2)(a)(ii) applied to facts that were not in dispute in this Court, so these paragraphs describe the legal position rather than decide a contested question.
Why does this case matter?
A problem about a covertly made recording asks which statute governs the making of the recording and its use in court, and then how the statute’s exception applies to the maker’s circumstances at the time. Examiners reward an answer that keeps those steps apart, characterises the interest the maker was seeking to protect with some precision, and uses the facts the question supplies rather than a general sympathy for the maker.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the surveillance or listening devices legislation of the jurisdiction in which the recording was made, whether the maker was a party to the conversation, and the exact words of any exception relied on. Apply each element of the exception to the facts the problem gives, using the circumstances the maker faced when recording. Then ask what the statute says about the use of the recording in the proceedings.
Potter concerned the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA). The joint reasons noted that the surveillance legislation of the States and Territories is not uniform, that the differences may be material, and that none of the other jurisdictions’ legislation has an equivalent of s 9(1) of the South Australian Act ([43]), so check the wording of the statute that applies.
Check your understanding
1. Which provisions of the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) did the Court identify as governing the making of the recording and its use at trial ([8], [12]-[14])?
2. What did the joint reasons say “reasonably necessary” means, and what contention about it did they reject ([46])?
3. How did the joint reasons characterise the complainant’s lawful interest, and how did that differ from the characterisation of the Court of Appeal majority ([54]-[55])?
4. What role did the complainant’s own reasons for making the recording play in the evaluation ([47])?