When the accused does not give evidence: comment, directions and silence at trial
What may be said to a jury when the accused does not give evidence: who may comment under s 20 of the uniform Acts and what no comment may suggest, the Azzopardi warnings and the rare exception for facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge, Victoria’s Jury Directions Act and the Queensland common law.
Learning outcomes
- Explain why the accused’s decision whether to give evidence belongs to the defence, by reference to s 17.
- State who may comment on the accused’s silence under s 20 of the uniform Acts and what the comment must not suggest.
- Apply Azzopardi v The Queen to distinguish a required direction from a permissible comment, and identify the rare case for comment on a failure to explain.
- Identify the governing source in Victoria and Queensland and apply it to a judge’s remarks about the accused’s silence.
Under the uniform Evidence Acts the prosecution cannot call the accused as its witness, so whether the accused testifies is decided by the defence. That choice produces the question this article answers: if the accused stays silent at trial, what may the judge and the parties say about it, and what may the jury do with it? The prior question is which law governs the trial, because the answer is in a statute in some jurisdictions and at common law in others, and the statutes are not all alike.
The rules below are stated for the uniform Evidence Acts of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory; for Victoria, where the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) has replaced the uniform provision; and for Queensland at common law. For the related question of which witnesses can be made to testify, see Competence and compellability of witnesses.
Why the accused’s silence is a choice
Section 17(2) of each uniform Act provides that a defendant is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution, and s 17(3) provides that an associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant unless being tried separately.12 The defence decides whether the accused gives evidence.
In Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50 the joint reasons traced the problem to the legislation that first made an accused a competent but not compellable witness: the concern from the start was to keep the choice whether to give evidence a real choice, and not “a disguised obligation to give evidence”.3
What the uniform provision permits and forbids
Section 20 applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence. Under s 20(2) the judge or any party other than the prosecutor may comment on a failure of the defendant to give evidence. But unless the comment is made by another defendant, it must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty. The Commonwealth text puts the forbidden reason as the defendant having, or believing that he or she had, committed the offence; the New South Wales, ACT and Northern Territory texts, and Tasmania’s s 20(3), use the words “was ... guilty”.
The prosecutor is outside the permission altogether. As the joint reasons in Azzopardi put it, “The prosecution may say nothing about the fact that the accused did not give evidence.”
Section 20 also allows comment on the failure of the defendant’s spouse or de facto partner, parent or child to give evidence, under the same restriction, and lets the judge comment on comments made by co-accused at a joint trial. Tasmania names only the “spouse”, and the ACT the “domestic partner”.
The prohibition is read widely. In RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620 the trial judge told the jury they were entitled to conclude, from the accused’s election not to deny or contradict the evidence, that his evidence would not have assisted him. The joint reasons of Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ held that this contravened s 20(2): a belief that his evidence would not assist him could proceed only from a belief that he was guilty. Section 20(2), they said, “should be given no narrow construction inviting the drawing of fine distinctions”.5
Comment and direction: Azzopardi
Azzopardi explains how s 20(2) works with the general principles of a criminal trial. The joint reasons of Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ — Callinan J agreed in the orders on separate reasoning, and Gleeson CJ and McHugh J dissented — distinguished a direction, which the jury must follow, from a comment, which the jury may ignore and should be told it may ignore. Warning the jury against impermissible reasoning is a direction; telling the jury they may attach significance to the accused’s silence is a comment.
Where the accused does not give evidence, the joint reasons said it will almost always be desirable for the judge to warn the jury that the accused’s silence in court is not evidence against the accused, is not an admission, may not be used to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence, and may not be used as a make-weight in deciding whether the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A comment on the accused’s failure to offer an explanation is a narrow exception. It may be made only where there are additional facts which, if they exist, would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused and would explain or contradict the inference the prosecution asks the jury to draw. The joint reasons said such cases “will be both rare and exceptional”, and that “A comment will never be warranted merely because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case.”
The trial judge in Azzopardi told the jury that, where the accused had not denied evidence about matters within his personal knowledge, doubts about the prosecution witness “may be more readily discounted”. The joint reasons held that this invited a false process of reasoning even apart from s 20, and that in context it contravened s 20(2). The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.
The joint reasons declined to apply the proviso because the misdirection may have affected the jury’s assessment of a case that depended much on the evidence of the man the accused was alleged to have solicited: it could not be said that the misdirection did not deprive him of “a chance of acquittal”. That is a question about what the jury might have done, and it is not how the High Court has since said the proviso is applied. In Weiss v The Queen all six Justices held that the appellate court must itself decide, on the whole record, whether a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, and that this is not an exercise in predicting what a jury would or might do; expressions such as a “real chance” of acquittal must not be taken as substitutes for the statutory language.4
The common law in Queensland: Weissensteiner and GBF
Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217 came from Queensland, where, as the joint reasons noted, a trial judge was not precluded from commenting on an accused’s failure to give evidence. Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said that in a criminal trial “hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused”. They also said that the accused’s silence is not itself evidence and cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case. Gaudron and McHugh JJ dissented.6
The joint reasons in Azzopardi explained Weissensteiner by its facts: any facts explaining the accused’s possession of the missing couple’s boat and belongings were within the knowledge of the accused alone, so it was not a case of a mere failure to contradict other witnesses.
GBF v The Queen (2020) 271 CLR 537 applied the reasoning of the Azzopardi joint reasons to a Queensland trial. The judge told the jury that the absence of sworn evidence from the accused contradicting the complainant “may make it easier”. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ held that this invited the same false reasoning as in Azzopardi, because “rare and exceptional cases apart, there can be no expectation that the accused will give evidence”, and ordered a new trial.7
Victoria: the Jury Directions Act
Victoria has repealed its s 20 and dealt with the subject in Part 4 Division 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic).8 If the accused does not give evidence, defence counsel may request a direction (s 41(1)), and s 14(1) requires the judge to give a requested direction unless there are good reasons for not doing so. In giving it, the judge must explain the prosecution’s obligation to prove guilt, that the accused is not required to give evidence, that the jury should not speculate about what the accused’s evidence might have been, and that the failure is not evidence against the accused, is not an admission, must not be used to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence and does not strengthen the prosecution case (s 41(2)).
Section 42 forbids the judge, the prosecution and defence counsel to say or suggest that the jury may conclude guilt from the accused’s silence, may use the failure to explain facts within the accused’s knowledge to draw an adverse inference more safely, or may infer that the accused stayed silent because evidence would not have helped. Section 44 abolishes any common law obligation to direct the jury when the accused does not give evidence, beyond what Division 6 provides.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the jurisdiction and the governing source: s 20 of the uniform Act, Division 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), or the common law.
- Identify who commented on the accused’s silence. If it was the prosecutor in a jurisdiction where s 20 is in force, s 20(2) gives no permission to do so.
- Ask whether the comment suggested, by any allusion, that the accused stayed silent because of guilt; apply RPS and read s 20(2) widely.
- Separate any direction from any comment, and check that the jury was warned that silence is not evidence, not an admission, cannot fill gaps and is not a make-weight.
- If a comment on a failure to explain was made, ask whether this is one of the rare and exceptional cases Azzopardi allows: additional facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge, not mere failure to contradict prosecution evidence.
- In Victoria, check whether a direction under s 41 was requested and whether anything said breached s 42.
Self-check
- Can I explain why the accused can choose not to give evidence, by reference to s 17?
- Do I know who may comment under s 20(2), and what a comment, other than a co-accused’s, may not suggest?
- Can I state the four warnings Azzopardi says should almost always be given?
- Can I explain why the comments in Azzopardi and GBF were wrong?
- Do I know what the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) forbids in s 42?
Where the authority sits
Sections 17 and 20 of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts are the statutory source in those jurisdictions, with the drafting differences noted above. In Victoria the source is Part 4 Division 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). Azzopardi and RPS construed the New South Wales s 20; Weissensteiner and GBF were Queensland appeals decided at common law. High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Western Australia’s Evidence Act 2025 (WA) contains a counterpart, s 30,9 in a Part that commences on 18 September 2027; see Western Australia’s move to uniform evidence law. South Australia is not stated here.