When the accused does not give evidence: comment, directions and silence at trial
What the uniform provision permits and forbids
Section 20 applies only to indictable offences tried on indictment. Under s 20(2), the judge or any party other than the prosecutor may comment on the defendant’s failure to give evidence.
But this comment must not suggest the defendant stayed silent because they were, or believed they were, guilty. This limit does not apply if another defendant makes the comment. Different jurisdictions phrase the forbidden reason slightly differently, but the substance is the same.
The prosecutor cannot comment at all. As the court put it in Azzopardi, the prosecution may say nothing about the accused’s failure to give evidence.
Section 20 also covers failure to give evidence by the defendant’s spouse, de facto partner, parent or child, under the same restriction. It lets the judge comment on comments made by co-accused at a joint trial. Tasmania refers only to “spouse”; the ACT uses “domestic partner”.
Courts read this prohibition broadly. In RPS v The Queen, the trial judge told the jury the accused’s silence meant his evidence would not have helped him. The majority held this breached s 20(2), because that reasoning assumes guilt. They said the provision should not be read narrowly, to allow fine distinctions.
Comment and direction: Azzopardi
Azzopardi explains how s 20(2) fits with normal trial rules. The majority judges (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) drew a line between a direction, which the jury must follow, and a comment, which the jury may ignore. A warning against wrong reasoning is a direction. Telling the jury they may attach weight to the accused’s silence is a comment.
Where the accused does not give evidence, the majority said it will almost always be desirable to warn the jury. The silence is not evidence, not an admission, cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case, and cannot be used as a make-weight toward guilt.
A comment on the accused’s failure to explain something is a narrow exception. It only applies where extra facts, known peculiarly to the accused, would explain or contradict an inference the prosecution wants drawn. The majority called such cases “rare and exceptional”, and said a comment is never justified merely because the accused failed to contradict part of the prosecution case.
In Azzopardi, the trial judge told the jury that doubts about a witness “may be more readily discounted” if the accused hadn’t denied certain matters. The majority held this invited faulty reasoning and breached s 20(2). The conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered.
The majority refused to apply the proviso (which can uphold a conviction despite an error), since the misdirection might have affected the jury’s view of a key witness. They reasoned the accused may have lost “a chance of acquittal”.
That reasoning asked what the jury might have done. The High Court later rejected this approach in Weiss v The Queen. There, all six Justices held an appellate court must itself decide, from the whole record, whether a substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred — not predict what a jury would do. Phrases like a “real chance” of acquittal are not a substitute for that test.
The common law in Queensland: Weissensteiner and GBF
This section looks at two Queensland cases on a judge commenting on an accused’s silence.
In Weissensteiner v The Queen, the High Court said a trial judge can comment on an accused not giving evidence. The majority (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ) said that innocent explanations can stop being reasonable if the missing evidence would only be known to the accused. But they stressed the accused’s silence is not evidence itself, and cannot fill gaps in the prosecution’s case. Gaudron and McHugh JJ disagreed.
Azzopardi later explained Weissensteiner by its specific facts: only the accused could know why he had the missing couple’s boat and belongings. This made it different from a case where the accused simply fails to contradict other witnesses.
GBF v The Queen applied this reasoning to another Queensland trial. There, the judge told the jury that the lack of sworn evidence contradicting the complainant “may make it easier” to convict. The High Court held this invited the same flawed reasoning warned against in Azzopardi, since, apart from rare and exceptional cases, there is no expectation that an accused will testify. A new trial was ordered.
Victoria: the Jury Directions Act
Victoria has its own rules in the Jury Directions Act 2015. The old s 20 no longer applies there.
If the accused does not give evidence, defence counsel may ask for a direction under s 41(1). Section 14(1) says the judge must give it if asked, unless there are good reasons not to.
The direction must cover several things under s 41(2). It explains the prosecution must prove guilt, and the accused need not give evidence. It also tells the jury not to guess what the accused might have said, and that the silence is not evidence of guilt, not an admission, cannot fill gaps in the prosecution’s case, and does not strengthen that case.
Section 42 stops the judge, prosecution and defence from suggesting the jury can use silence in certain ways. They cannot say silence shows guilt, makes other adverse inferences safer, or means the accused had nothing helpful to say.
Section 44 removes any other common law duty to direct the jury on this topic. Only Division 6 now governs what directions are required.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by working out which law applies: s 20 of the uniform Act, Division 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), or the common law.
Next, check who made the comment. If the prosecutor commented, and s 20 applies, s 20(2) does not allow this.
Then ask if the comment hinted, even indirectly, that silence showed guilt. Apply RPS and read s 20(2) broadly.
Keep directions separate from comments. Confirm the jury was told silence is not evidence, not an admission, cannot fill gaps, and is not a make-weight.
If someone commented on a failure to explain something, check whether Azzopardi’s rare exception applies. This covers only extra facts known solely to the accused, not just a failure to contradict the prosecution’s case.
In Victoria, also check if a s 41 direction was sought, and whether anything breached s 42.
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