Weissensteiner v The Queen
Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217
A couple vanished after being seen aboard their yacht near Fitzroy Island with the accused. He later appeared alone aboard and gave no evidence at trial. What could the judge tell the jury about his silence?
Qualified by Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50
Azzopardi v The Queen concerned a New South Wales trial in which s 20(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) applied. Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ held that comment of the Weissensteiner kind may be made only if there is a basis for concluding that additional facts, which would explain or contradict the inference the prosecution seeks and would be peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge, could have been given; that cases in which a judge may comment on a failure to offer an explanation “will be both rare and exceptional”; and that a comment “will never be warranted merely because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case” (at [64], [68]). They said that Weissensteiner was decided where no statute prohibited judicial comment ([59], [63]), that what warranted the remarks approved in it was that any facts explaining the evidence were within the knowledge only of the accused ([61]), and that a comment, where permissible, should be made plain as one the jury are free to disregard and should not go beyond that made in Weissensteiner as adapted to refer to a failure to offer an explanation ([65]-[67]). Gleeson CJ, dissenting, would have adhered to the majority reasoning in Weissensteiner ([23]), and McHugh J, who had dissented in Weissensteiner, said in Azzopardi that Weissensteiner correctly stated the law and should be followed in preference to RPS v The Queen ([86], [174]). GBF v The Queen (2020) 271 CLR 537, an appeal from Queensland, applied the Azzopardi reasoning (at [21]-[26]). In a trial in which the common law governs what may be said about the accused’s silence, Weissensteiner is therefore to be read with the limits stated in Azzopardi.
Qualified by legislation: Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), from 29 June 2015
In Victoria, Part 4 Division 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) now governs what may be said to a jury when the accused does not give evidence. Section 41 allows defence counsel to request a direction, and requires the judge in giving it to explain that the prosecution must prove guilt, that the accused is not required to give evidence, that the jury should not guess or speculate about what the accused’s evidence might have contained, and that the fact the accused did not give evidence is not evidence against the accused, is not an admission, must not be used to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence and does not strengthen the prosecution case. Section 42(b) prohibits the judge, the prosecution and defence counsel from saying or suggesting that, because the accused did not give evidence, the jury may use the failure to provide an explanation of facts that must be within the accused’s knowledge to more safely draw an adverse inference based on those facts. Section 44(1) provides that, except as that Division provides, a trial judge is not required to direct the jury when the accused does not give evidence, s 44(2) abolishes any rule of common law to the contrary, and a note to s 44 states that the provision abolishes directions based on the rule attributed to Weissensteiner and applied in Azzopardi. In a Victorian jury trial, Weissensteiner therefore no longer states the source of what may be said. Other jurisdictions are governed by their own law.
Affirmed by Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50
Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Azzopardi v The Queen restated this proposition in their own words, citing Weissensteiner at 229 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ) and 235 (Brennan and Toohey JJ): the fact that an accused does not give evidence at trial “is not of itself evidence against the accused”, is not an admission of guilt by conduct, cannot fill in any gaps in the prosecution case and cannot be used as a make-weight in considering whether the prosecution has proved the accusation beyond reasonable doubt (at [34]). They added that, because a criminal trial is accusatorial, “as a general rule an accused cannot be expected to give evidence at trial” (at [34]).
What happened?
Hartwig Bayerl and Susan Zack lived together on a 36-foot cutter, the Immanuel, in Cairns. They were last seen with the appellant, Johann Manfred Weissensteiner, aboard the Immanuel near Fitzroy Island in late November 1989 and were never seen again. The Immanuel was later seen in Cairns harbour with only the appellant aboard. When the police searched it in the Marshall Islands in 1990 they found items belonging to the two, including Ms Zack’s clothes, diving watch and bracelet, Mr Bayerl’s opals and German bible, and two rifles that had been concealed. The appellant told a series of inconsistent stories about who owned the boat and where Mr Bayerl and Ms Zack were.
He was convicted of the murder of both of them and of stealing the vessel. The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial. The appellant gave no evidence and called none. In his summing-up the trial judge told the jury that they could not infer guilt simply from the appellant’s failure to give evidence, and also directed them about the use they could make of that failure. On the appeal to the High Court from the Queensland Court of Appeal, the only ground argued was that the judge erred in giving the second direction.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal, five Justices to two. Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ gave joint reasons and Brennan and Toohey JJ gave joint reasons; those five Justices formed the majority. Gaudron and McHugh JJ gave joint reasons dissenting, and would have allowed the appeal, quashed all three convictions and ordered a new trial.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
What may be said where comment is not prohibited. In Queensland a trial judge is not precluded from commenting on the failure of an accused to give evidence. The trial judge here had told the jury that “such an inference may be more safely drawn from the proven facts when an accused person elects not to give evidence of relevant facts which it can easily be perceived must be within his knowledge”. Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said that “it has never really been doubted” that a court may more readily accept evidence against a party who fails to place before it evidence of facts within that party’s knowledge which would explain or contradict that evidence, and that “in a criminal trial, hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused” (178 CLR 217 at 227-228).
It was relevant to assess the prosecution case “on the footing that the accused has not offered evidence of any hypothesis or explanation which is consistent with innocence” (at 229). They added that “Not every case calls for explanation or contradiction in the form of evidence from the accused”, that there may be no facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge, and that a jury should not be invited to take the failure into account “unless that failure is clearly capable of assisting them in the evaluation of the evidence before them” (at 228). They held the direction correct because the appellant, if anyone, could have explained his possession of the boat in the absence of its owners.
Brennan and Toohey JJ. Brennan and Toohey JJ said that in Queensland and in other jurisdictions without a statutory prohibition a judge may tell the jury that “where the facts which they find to be proved by the evidence can support an inference that the accused committed the offence charged and where it is reasonable to expect that, if the truth were consistent with innocence, a denial, explanation or answer would be forthcoming, the jury may take the accused’s failure to give evidence into account in determining whether the inference should be drawn” (at 236).
The jury must be told that the accused is not bound to give evidence and that the onus remains on the prosecution (at 235). They held that the appellant’s claims to know where Mr Bayerl and Ms Zack were, his possession of their vessel and belongings, and his account of that possession called for an explanation and that none was forthcoming.
Gaudron and McHugh JJ, dissenting. Gaudron and McHugh JJ held that “if failure to give evidence has any significance at all, it can only be in very limited circumstances”, because of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, and that what the authorities allow to be taken into account is the failure to explain and not the failure to give evidence as such. Directions should therefore be given “in terms of the unexplained facts, rather than in terms of the failure to give evidence” (at 245-246). The directions in the case were defective in two respects: they were framed in terms of the failure to give evidence, and they were not confined to the appellant’s unexplained possession of the Immanuel and his failure to explain the different accounts he had given.
Why does this case matter?
Weissensteiner is a case a student has to place in time and in space before using it. A later decision of the Court bears on how far it reaches, and legislation in some jurisdictions has taken the subject over.
Because the Court divided, a statement attributed to “the High Court” in this area needs the Justices behind it named.
Exam and application relevance
Ask what the prosecution case rests on, and what facts are said to call for an explanation. Ask whether the jurisdiction allows the judge to comment on an accused’s silence, and what later authority or legislation governs the question there.
Attribute any formulation to the Justices who gave it: Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ; Brennan and Toohey JJ; and, in dissent, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.
Check your understanding
1. What did the trial judge tell the jury about the use they could make of the appellant’s failure to give evidence, and which Justices held that direction correct (at 223-224, 227-228, 235-236)?
2. What limits did Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ place on the jury’s use of silence, and how did they reconcile those limits with the approved direction (at 229)?
3. What distinction underpinned the dissent, and what two defects did it identify in the directions (at 245-246)?