Terms left to be fixed later: standards, third parties and conditions of satisfaction

How the High Court has treated a term left to a third party, an objective standard or a party’s satisfaction, where Booker, Hall v Busst and Meehan v Jones divide the Court and what Godecke left open.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
contract-formation

Learning outcomes

  • Identify what is to settle an open term in an agreement (a further agreement, a third party, an objective standard or one party’s satisfaction) and say why that decides whether a court has anything to apply.
  • Explain how Godecke v Kirwan and Booker v Wilson Parking treat a term left to a third party, and distinguish the joint reasons from Brennan J on failure of the agreed machinery.
  • State accurately the division in Hall v Busst on the certainty of its option-price formula, without extending it to every land-price clause, and the points Godecke and Meehan v Jones left open.

A promise that leaves a matter open is not, for that reason alone, too uncertain to enforce. Before asking whether an agreement is “void for uncertainty”, a student must first ask what is to settle the open matter: a further agreement between the parties, a person outside the contract, an objective standard such as “reasonable” or “fair”, or the satisfaction of one party. The answer decides whether a court has anything to apply. This article takes up that question through four High Court decisions, Godecke v Kirwan, Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd, Hall v Busst and Meehan v Jones. It builds on Certainty and completeness, which introduces the general approach and the unenforceability of a bare agreement to agree, and it states common law as the High Court has stated it. The binding principles of those decisions bind the lower courts throughout Australia, but dissenting reasons and questions left open do not.

Four ways of leaving a term open

The sorting below is a way of organising the cases; no court adopted it as a classification.

  • A further agreement between the parties. This is the agreement to agree, covered in the article linked above.
  • A person outside the contract. The parties name a third party, such as an arbitrator or a solicitor, to settle the matter.
  • An objective standard. The parties refer to a “reasonable” or “fair” measure and leave a court to apply it.
  • One party’s decision or satisfaction. One side is to decide the matter, or the contract depends on that side being satisfied.

The cases do not treat the four alike. The first is the weakest ground for enforcement. The others are contested to differing degrees, and the High Court was divided on one of them.

A third party to settle the term

In Godecke v Kirwan (1973) 129 CLR 6291 a document signed by the vendor and the purchaser of land in Western Australia provided that the purchaser would, if the vendor required it, execute a further agreement prepared by the vendor’s solicitors containing the terms already agreed and “such other covenants and conditions as they may reasonably require”. The primary judge held that there was no binding contract. The High Court allowed the appeal and held that a binding contract had been made.

Gibbs J said that “the parties to a contract may leave terms - even essential terms - to be determined by a third person”. In such a case, his Honour said, the contract is not bad for uncertainty, because if the third person settles the terms the contract is rendered certain, and it is no objection that the power to settle them is left to the solicitors for one of the parties. Walsh J reached the same result on the clause by a related route, discussed below. Mason J agreed with the reasons of Walsh J.

Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 6002 applied the same idea to a lease. The lease gave the tenant an option to renew for three years on the same terms, except that the rental for the renewed term would be “such rental as may be mutually agreed” and, failing agreement, “such rental as may be fixed by an arbitrator” nominated in a way the lease set out, and in any event not less than the rental in the last year of the first term. The only issue left in the High Court was whether the renewal agreement in the lease was a concluded agreement. In the joint reasons of Gibbs CJ, Murphy and Wilson JJ, the Court said that “if the lease provided for a renewal ‘at a rental to be agreed’ there would clearly be no enforceable agreement”, but that terms, even essential terms, may be left to a third person. Their Honours held that the lease itself supplied the entire mechanism for fixing the rental and required no further agreement of the parties, so that there was “a valid agreement for the renewal of the lease subject to the fixation of a rental for the new term”. The fixing of the rental was a condition precedent to performance.

When the machinery fails

The joint reasons in Booker did not stop at validity. They assumed that if the nominating officer declined to act, or the person nominated declined to fix a rental, “the renewal cannot be effected”, and the exercise of the option would have been fruitless. That risk did not make the agreement uncertain. It meant that the tenant could not yet have an order requiring the landlord to grant the new lease.

What the Court did order depended on an implied term. To give business efficacy to the renewal clause and the arbitration clause, the joint reasons implied a term that, once the conditions for the option were met, both parties would do all that was reasonably necessary to procure the nomination of an arbitrator. The joint reasons said that there should be a limited decree of specific performance of that kind, with an order that the lease be granted once the rental was fixed.

Brennan J gave separate reasons and also concluded that the tenant was entitled to specific performance, but by a different route. His Honour considered that the clause did not contemplate a rental fixed “according to the idiosyncratic view of a nominated third party”, and construed it as providing for a fair and just rental to be ascertained by the arbitrator or, in default, by the court. On that construction, if the contractual machinery failed the court would fix the rental, and there was no uncertainty to prevent specific performance. Brennan J also observed that contracts for the sale of property may stand on a different footing where the obligation to convey would not arise until the price was fixed, and he referred to Hall v Busst.

A student should therefore not state Booker as holding that a court will fix a rent when the agreed machinery fails. That is the reasoning of Brennan J. The joint reasons proceeded on the assumption that the renewal could not be effected.

An objective standard instead of a figure

Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 2063 shows the High Court divided on whether a price formula built on “value” and “reasonable” amounts supplies enough. A purchaser of an island took it under a contract and a deed. The deed contained a covenant against alienation without the vendor’s consent and gave the vendor a first option to buy the land back at the original price, plus “the value of all additions and improvements”, less “the value of all deficiencies of chattel property and a reasonable sum to cover depreciation”. The purchaser sold the land without obtaining the vendor’s consent or giving the notice the deed required. The vendor sued for damages, and the purchaser argued that the option price was too uncertain to found an enforceable option. The High Court allowed the purchaser’s appeal, three Justices to two, and answered the questions in the case stated in the negative.

On the question of certainty the Justices divided as follows.

  • Dixon CJ held that “the price described in cl. 5 is unascertained and is too uncertain to be the basis of an enforceable contract”. He said there could be no external standard of value for additions and improvements to the island, “no standard yielding a figure reasonably fixed or ascertainable”. He also said that “it is not a price consisting of the fair value of land that we are dealing with”, so his reasons concern the composite formula before the Court and do not rest on a general rule about land prices.
  • Fullagar J accepted that the word “value” is not meaningless and that courts daily decide questions of value. He nonetheless held that, in a sale of land, the three essential elements are the parties, the subject matter and the price, and that it is “not ... sufficient if the sale is expressed to be ‘for the value of the land’ or ‘for the fair value of the land’ or ‘for a reasonable price’”, because the price could then be reached only by further agreement or by the court.
  • Menzies J agreed that the option provisions were uncertain, because he did not think the sums to be added or subtracted were susceptible of calculation or other determination without further agreement. He added that the rule, so far as it exists, that a contract of sale of goods at a reasonable price is not too uncertain to enforce does not apply to the sale of a particular piece of land.
  • Kitto J, dissenting in the result, held that the meaning of the provisions was not uncertain. He said the standard of reasonableness “has never, so far as I am aware” been found “too vague to apply as a criterion of rights, duties and liabilities”, and that he had found no case in which an agreement for the sale of property at its value, or one framed by reference to reasonableness, had been held too uncertain to be a binding contract.
  • Windeyer J, also in dissent in the result, held that “an agreement for the sale of any property at its fair value, or reasonable price, is to-day a valid contract”.

The same three Justices who found the option uncertain also held the covenant against alienation void as a restraint on alienation, which is a separate question and is not covered here. The decision therefore establishes that this particular option-price formula was held unenforceable by a majority of three Justices, two others considering it sufficiently certain. Fullagar J’s wider proposition, that a sale of land at “value”, “fair value” or a “reasonable price” is not enough, was stated in his own reasons, and Dixon CJ’s reasons rest on the absence of an ascertainable external standard in this transaction. A student should not extend the majority’s decision to every land-price clause that refers to value or reasonableness. No later decision on the point is cited in this article, so a student relying on it should check for one.

One party to decide

Godecke contains a reserved question as well. Gibbs J confined his decision to terms left to persons who are not parties. He added that it did not necessarily follow that an agreement leaving further terms to be settled by one of the parties, rather than by that party’s solicitors, would be a concluded contract. He suggested that an earlier decision, that an option for renewal “at a rental to be agreed upon by the lessor” created no obligation, might be explained on the footing that “there can be no concluded bargain if a vital matter (such as price or rental) has been left to the determination of one of the parties”, and he added: “Perhaps it may be different where agreement has been reached on all essential terms but the determination of subsidiary matters has been left to one of the parties.”

Walsh J, with whose reasons Mason J agreed, took a more open view. He agreed with the view of Bray CJ in Powell v Jones that, subject to the qualifications that Chief Justice identified, there is no reason in principle for holding that there cannot be any binding contract if some matter is left to be determined by one of the contracting parties. On clause 6, Walsh J held that the clause did not allow anything the solicitors thought reasonable. It meant that “what is required must be reasonable in an objective sense, and in case of dispute this is a matter which the court can decide”. The purchaser was therefore agreeing presently to accept additional provisions that were consistent with the other terms and objectively reasonable, rather than agreeing to agree.

Neither judge needed to decide whether a contract is concluded where one party alone fixes an essential term, because on the facts the matter was left to solicitors under an objective limit. Treat it as unsettled on these materials.

Conditions of satisfaction

Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 5714 concerned a contract for the sale of land in Queensland on which an oil refinery stood. The contract was expressed to be subject to the purchaser or his nominee entering into a “satisfactory” arrangement with a named supplier for crude oil and “receiving approval for finance on satisfactory terms and conditions in an amount sufficient to complete the purchase”. The primary judge and a majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland held the finance condition void for uncertainty. All four Justices who delivered reasons held that it was not (Aickin J had also heard the appeal but died before judgment), and the appeal was allowed with an order for specific performance. Each gave separate reasons.

Uncertainty. Gibbs CJ said that the fact that opinions may differ as to the meaning of a clause “does not mean that the clause is uncertain”, and that “It is only if the court is unable to put any definite meaning on the contract that it can be said to be uncertain”. If the test of satisfaction is subjective, the question whether the purchaser is satisfied is “a simple question of fact”. If it is objective, a court with evidence of the purchaser’s position and prevailing lending conditions should not find it unduly difficult to decide what finance a reasonable person in that position would regard as satisfactory. Mason J described the traditional doctrine “that courts should be astute to adopt a construction which will preserve the validity of the contract”, and called a finding of uncertainty in such clauses a “draconian solution”.

Whose satisfaction. Gibbs CJ held that, unless a clause of this kind indicates the contrary, its natural effect is to leave it to the purchaser to decide whether available finance is satisfactory, and that “satisfactory terms and conditions” in its natural meaning requires that the purchaser be satisfied. Mason J likewise said that in a contract of this kind “satisfactory” ordinarily means satisfactory to the purchaser or his nominee, and that primarily the object of such a clause is to benefit or protect the purchaser.

Illusory promise. The vendors argued that a clause leaving satisfaction to the purchaser made the contract illusory. Gibbs CJ referred to the principle stated by Kitto J in Placer Development Ltd v The Commonwealth, that where a promisor has a discretion whether to carry out what purports to be a promise there is no contract. His Honour held that the principle does not apply where the discretion goes only to the fulfilment of a condition on which the contract depends. Once the condition is fulfilled within the time allowed, the contract becomes completely binding. Murphy J likewise held that such clauses do not make contracts illusory, describing them as conditional contracts in the nature of options to purchase.

How free is the purchaser’s judgment? The Justices did not give one answer. Gibbs CJ thought it might be implied that the purchaser will act honestly. Mason J said that the purchaser’s judgment is “not an unfettered discretion” and must be reached honestly, or honestly and reasonably, but did not decide which. Wilson J said that the weight of authority favoured implying no greater obligation than honesty and was inclined to think that view had force, but did not express a concluded view. Murphy J held that implying honesty adds nothing and that there is no justification for implying that the purchaser must act reasonably. The Justices also differed on a related implication. Gibbs CJ did not think it necessary, to give business efficacy to the contract, to imply that the purchaser will make reasonable efforts to obtain finance. Mason J reasoned that the purchaser would have an obligation to do all that was reasonable on his part to obtain the finance, and Wilson J said that “Clearly he must make reasonable efforts to secure finance.”

The decision turned on the words of the particular clause, and Gibbs CJ stressed that each case of this kind depends on its own words. A condition that specifies the finance more precisely, or states whose satisfaction counts, may produce a different result.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the open matter and say what is to settle it: a further agreement, a third party, an objective standard, or one party’s decision or satisfaction. Do not stop at calling the term uncertain.
  2. Construe the clause first. In Meehan v Jones Gibbs CJ said a clause is uncertain only if the court cannot put any definite meaning on it, and Mason J said courts should be astute to preserve the validity of the contract.
  3. If a third party or a mechanism is named, ask whether the contract itself supplies everything needed and requires no further agreement of the parties, as the joint reasons held of the renewal clause in Booker. Then deal with failure of the machinery separately. The joint reasons in Booker assumed that failure would leave the renewal unable to take effect, while Brennan J would have had the court fix a fair rental. Say which reasoning you rely on and why.
  4. If the price is fixed by reference to “value” or what is “reasonable” and the contract is for the sale of land, state the decision in Hall v Busst as a three to two decision that the particular option-price formula was unenforceable. Distinguish Fullagar J’s wider proposition about land prices from the reasoning of Dixon CJ, and the dissenting views of Kitto J and Windeyer J, and do not extend the decision to every value-based land-price clause.
  5. If one party is to decide the matter, note that in Godecke v Kirwan Gibbs J reserved the question and Walsh J was more receptive, subject to qualifications. Ask whether the decision is bounded by an objective limit such as reasonableness, and whether the matter is essential or subsidiary.
  6. If the contract is subject to a party’s satisfaction, ask whose satisfaction the words require and what the clause is for. In Meehan v Jones the clause was a finance condition that protected the purchaser, and the Justices did not agree on whether honesty is the only limit or on whether a reasonable-efforts obligation is implied. State those disagreements, and say the case turned on the clause before the Court.
  7. Remember that these are decisions on particular clauses. Check later authority and the wording of the clause in your problem before applying them.

Self-check

  • Have I said what is to settle the open term, instead of only that it is uncertain?
  • Have I separated a term left to a third party from a term left to one of the parties?
  • Have I attributed the different reasoning of Brennan J in Booker to him, and not to the Court?
  • Have I confined Hall v Busst to the option-price formula it decided, and kept Fullagar J’s wider proposition separate?
  • Have I stated what Meehan v Jones left open about honesty, reasonableness and reasonable efforts?

Where the authority sits

The four decisions are High Court decisions on appeal from the Supreme Courts of Western Australia (Godecke) and Queensland (Booker, Hall and Meehan). They state common law. The binding principles established by these decisions apply in lower courts throughout Australia; the separate reasons must be distinguished to identify those principles. Legislation in particular fields, such as sale of goods and landlord and tenant legislation, may affect these questions differently by jurisdiction. It is not stated here. The overseas and earlier decisions that the judges discuss are not among the authorities cited here and are reported only as the High Court describes them. No decision later than 1982 is cited.

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