Godecke v Kirwan
Godecke v Kirwan (1973) 129 CLR 629
A signed offer and acceptance for the sale of land said a formal contract would follow, with whatever extra terms the vendor’s solicitors “may reasonably require”. The vendor changed his mind. Was there a contract at all?
What happened?
On 22 November 1971 Robert Harold Godecke signed a document headed “Offer and Acceptance” offering to buy about 156 acres of vacant land in Western Australia for $110,000, with a deposit of $8,000, and the vendor signed his acceptance the next day (Walsh J). The terms provided that possession was to be given and taken, and a further $32,000 paid, “upon signing and execution of a formal contract of sale within 28 days of acceptance of this offer”. Clause 6 provided that “[i]f required by the Vendor/s I/we shall execute a further agreement to be prepared at my costs by his appointed Solicitors containing the foregoing and such other covenants and conditions as they may reasonably require”.
The vendor then decided that he wanted to get out of the sale, and on 17 December 1971 his solicitors wrote that he had decided not to proceed. R. H. Godecke Pty Ltd, the purchaser’s nominee, had lodged a caveat. The vendor applied under s 138 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) for its removal. The parties agreed that the questions were questions of law on the construction of the document, and Virtue J held that there was no binding contract.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal with costs. Walsh J and Gibbs J gave separate reasons, and Mason J agreed with the reasons of Walsh J. The orders set aside the order of the Supreme Court, dismissed the vendor’s summons, and declared that upon the vendor’s acceptance there was a binding contract for the sale and purchase of the land which ought to be specifically performed, with liberty to apply for further directions.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Walsh J held that the references to the signing of a formal contract in clause 3 and special condition 1 did not make execution of a formal contract a condition of the coming into existence of a binding agreement. The parties “made an agreement of which one term was that possession was to be given and taken upon the signing and execution of a formal contract of sale within twenty-eight days”, and “[f]rom these provisions there should be implied a promise by each of the parties that he would sign a formal contract within the twenty-eight days and would do everything necessary to enable this to be done within that time”.
Clause 6 did not change that: it “should be construed as limited to permitting the insertion of covenants and conditions not inconsistent with those contained in the offer”, and the reference to what the solicitors “may reasonably require” meant that what is required “must be reasonable in an objective sense, and in case of dispute this is a matter which the court can decide”, so that clause 6 did not mean “that the purchaser is making an agreement to agree later upon additional provisions to govern the bargain”.
Walsh J added that he agreed with Bray CJ that, subject to the qualifications Bray CJ identified, “there is no reason in principle for holding that there cannot be any binding contract if some matter is left to be determined by one of the contracting parties”.
Gibbs J, who also held that the document was a binding contract, said that the execution of a formal contract “was not a condition of agreement, but was a condition of the obligation to give and take possession and of the obligation to pay part of the purchase price”. On clause 6 he said that “the parties to a contract may leave terms - even essential terms - to be determined by a third person” and that “[i]t is no objection that the power to determine the terms and conditions to be incorporated in the contract is left to the solicitors for one of the parties”.
He added that “it does not necessarily follow from what I have said that an agreement which left further terms to be settled by one of the parties, rather than by his solicitors, would be treated as a concluded contract”, and found it “unnecessary to express any concluded opinion on these matters” because the further terms were left to persons who were not parties.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Walsh J, with Mason J agreeing
Read judgment: pp 641–643 (opens in a new tab)
Walsh J treated the formal contract as a step in performing an existing bargain and construed the additional terms as objectively reasonable and consistent with it. Mason J adopted his reasons. The conclusion on this clause was necessary to the result; the broader agreement with Bray CJ about terms left to a contracting party should be distinguished from these facts, which involved solicitors.
Separate reasoning · Gibbs J
Read judgment: pp 644–646 (opens in a new tab), p 648 (opens in a new tab)
Gibbs J also found a binding agreement: execution of a formal contract was a condition of performance, and the further terms were entrusted to third persons, the solicitors. Those were grounds of his own judgment. They do not establish agreement with Walsh J’s broader comments about determination by a contracting party.
Obiter · Gibbs J
Read judgment: pp 646–647 (opens in a new tab)
Gibbs J’s reservations concern terms left to a contracting party, rather than his necessary reasoning about solicitors as third persons. Those reservations went beyond the arrangement before the Court. He expressly found it unnecessary to express a concluded opinion on the broader situations.
Why does this case matter?
A problem that mentions both a formal contract to follow and a term to be settled later invites two questions, and the case is useful for keeping them apart.
Exam and application relevance
Identify what is to settle the further terms, whether the person settling them is a party to the contract, and whether the document limits the power, by consistency with the agreed terms or by an objective standard. Say which Justice you rely on, since Gibbs J and Walsh J expressed different degrees of support for a term left to one of the contracting parties.
The case was decided in 1973 on a Western Australian contract for the sale of land; check for later authority before relying on it for a current problem.
Check your understanding
1. What did clause 6 of the document say, and who was to prepare the further agreement?
2. According to Walsh J, what did the references to a formal contract in clause 3 and special condition 1 add to the parties’ agreement?
3. How did Walsh J say clause 6 was limited?
4. What did Gibbs J say about a term left to the vendor’s solicitors, and what did he say about a term left to one of the parties?