Terms left to be fixed later: standards, third parties and conditions of satisfaction

Four ways of leaving a term open

There are four ways parties can leave a term open. This is just a way of organising the cases. No court has actually adopted it as a classification.

The first way is a further agreement between the parties. This is the “agreement to agree”, covered elsewhere.

The second way names a person outside the contract, like an arbitrator or solicitor, to settle the matter.

The third way uses an objective standard. The parties use words like “reasonable” or “fair”, leaving a court to apply that standard.

The fourth way leaves the matter to one party’s decision or satisfaction. That party decides, or the contract depends on their being satisfied.

The cases treat these four differently. The first is the weakest ground for enforcing the term. The others are contested to varying degrees. The High Court itself was divided on one of them.

When the machinery fails

The joint reasons in Booker considered what happens if the machinery breaks down. If the nominating officer refused to act, or the nominee refused to fix a rental, “the renewal cannot be effected”. This did not make the agreement uncertain. It only meant the tenant could not yet get an order forcing the landlord to grant a new lease.

The actual order rested on an implied term. To give the renewal and arbitration clauses business efficacy (make them workable), the Court implied a duty: both parties must do all reasonably necessary to get an arbitrator nominated. This supported a limited specific performance order (compelling performance), with the lease granted once rental was fixed.

Brennan J also found for specific performance, but differently. He read the clause as requiring a fair rental, not one based on an arbitrator’s personal view, to be fixed by the arbitrator or, failing that, by the court itself. On this construction, if the machinery failed, the court would fix the rental, removing any uncertainty. He distinguished sale-of-property contracts, which may differ since the duty to convey might not arise until price is fixed, citing Hall v Busst.

Students should not state that Booker holds courts will fix rent when machinery fails. That is only Brennan J’s reasoning. The joint reasons assumed instead that renewal simply could not occur.

One party to decide

This is a Quick Read version of a point left open in Godecke.

Gibbs J only decided the question of terms left to non-parties. He did not decide whether a term left to one of the parties themselves (not their solicitors) could still make a binding contract.

Gibbs J suggested an older case (about rent “to be agreed by the lessor”) might be explained this way: there is no concluded contract if a vital matter, like price, is left to one party’s own decision. But he left open whether this differs where the main terms are already agreed, and only minor matters are left to one party.

Walsh J (Mason J agreeing) took a broader view. He agreed that, subject to some qualifications, a contract is not necessarily invalid just because one party decides a term later. Looking at clause 6, he said it did not let solicitors decide whatever they personally thought reasonable. Instead, it required an objectively reasonable standard, one a court could assess if disputed. So the buyer was agreeing now to accept reasonable extra terms, not just agreeing to agree later.

Neither judge needed to resolve the open question. Here, solicitors (not a party) decided the term, and an objective standard applied. So whether one party alone can validly fix an essential term remains unsettled.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by naming the open matter and what will fix it: a further agreement, a third party, an objective standard, or one party’s own decision or satisfaction. Do not just label the term “uncertain” and stop there.

Construe the clause first. In Meehan v Jones, Gibbs CJ said a clause is only uncertain if the court can find no definite meaning in it. Mason J added that courts should lean towards upholding the contract’s validity.

If a third party or mechanism is named, ask whether the contract itself gives everything needed, with no further agreement required. The joint reasons in Booker treated the renewal clause this way. Separately, consider what happens if that machinery fails: the joint reasons assumed failure would stop the renewal working, but Brennan J would have had the court set a fair rental instead. State which approach you adopt and why.

Where price depends on “value” or what is “reasonable”, and the contract concerns land, note Hall v Busst. This was a three-to-two decision that the specific option-price formula there was unenforceable. Separate Fullagar J’s broader statement about land-price clauses generally from Dixon CJ’s narrower reasoning, and from the dissents of Kitto J and Windeyer J. Do not assume the decision applies to every value-based land-price clause.

If one party is to decide the matter, remember Godecke v Kirwan. Gibbs J left this question open, while Walsh J was more willing to allow it, subject to qualifications. Ask whether that party’s discretion is limited by an objective standard like reasonableness, and whether the term is essential or merely subsidiary to the contract.

Where the contract depends on a party’s “satisfaction”, identify whose satisfaction is required and the clause’s purpose. In Meehan v Jones, the clause was a finance condition protecting the purchaser. The Justices disagreed on whether honesty alone limits that discretion, and on whether a duty to make reasonable efforts is implied. Note these disagreements, and that the outcome turned on the specific clause before the Court.

Finally, remember these cases decide particular clauses, not general rules. Always check later authority and your problem’s actual wording before applying them.

Self-check

Before moving on, check a few things.

Say exactly what will fix the open term. Do not just call it uncertain.

Keep terms left to a third party separate from terms left to one of the parties.

Remember that in Booker, the different reasoning came from Brennan J alone, not the whole Court.

Keep Hall v Busst limited to its option-price formula. Treat Fullagar J’s broader proposition as a separate point.

State clearly what Meehan v Jones left open about honesty, reasonableness and reasonable efforts.

Where the authority sits

These four cases are High Court decisions. They came on appeal from Western Australia (Godecke) and Queensland (Booker, Hall and Meehan).

They state the common law, meaning judge-made law binding on lower courts across Australia. But the judges’ separate reasons differ, so you must work out exactly what each principle is.

Some legislation, like sale of goods or landlord and tenant laws, may change these rules in particular States. That legislation is not covered here.

The judges also discuss older or overseas cases. Those cases are not treated as authorities in this article. We only know what the High Court said about them.

No case after 1982 is included.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.

Read the full article →

Pop quiz

5 quick questions on this article, the authorities it cites and the articles it links to.

  • About 3 minutes, and no time limit.
  • You can only go forwards: each answer locks when you submit it.
  • After each question you see the right answer, why, and where to read more.
  • Free, and no account needed. Log in or create a free account to keep your scores.