Breach: classifying terms and the two senses of repudiation
How to decide whether a term is a condition, an intermediate term or a warranty, how the High Court treats intermediate terms in Koompahtoo, and the two senses in which repudiation is used.
Learning outcomes
- Explain how a court decides whether a term is a condition, an intermediate term or a warranty, and why that decides whether termination is available.
- State the Australian position on intermediate terms from Koompahtoo and say what Kirby J disagreed with.
- Distinguish repudiation as renunciation from repudiation as a breach that justifies termination, and say what Laurinda adds on conduct.
Breach gives the checklist for establishing a breach and says, in a step, to “classify the term”. This article does that step. It asks what kind of term was broken, and why the answer decides whether the innocent party has only a claim in damages or may also end the contract. The common law stated here comes from High Court authority. Terms classified by statute, such as in sale of goods and consumer legislation, are outside it. What termination involves once the right exists is the work of discharge, and what the innocent party recovers is the work of remedies.
Whether there is a breach is a question of construction
A breach is a failure to perform a promise that the contract contains, so the first question is what the promise was. In Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 286,2 an advertising company wrote “We guarantee that these boards will be on the tracks at least eight hours per day throughout your season.” Latham CJ read that as a promise about each board on each day, and Rich J and McTiernan J agreed on that reading. Dixon J preferred a reading under which each board’s eight hours was an average over the season. The reading decided whether there was a breach. Latham CJ also held, for this clause, that “eight hours per day” meant substantially eight hours, so that small occasional deficiencies would not break it.
A breach always supports a claim in damages. Latham CJ said so in Luna Park: the customer was entitled to at least nominal damages for the admitted past breaches, and that right did not depend on whether it was entitled to end the contract. The classification of the term matters for the second question.
Conditions and warranties
The classic Australian statement is that of Jordan CJ in the New South Wales Full Court in Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 632, at 641-642. The High Court reversed that decision on appeal, but in Associated Newspapers Ltd v Bancks (1951) 83 CLR 3221 the Court said his Honour’s statement of the law was not affected. The test sentence below appears in Bancks and is also quoted in the joint reasons in Koompahtoo, discussed later. The test of essentiality, Jordan CJ said, “is whether it appears from the general nature of the contract considered as a whole, or from some particular term or terms, that the promise is of such importance to the promisee that he would not have entered into the contract unless he had been assured of a strict or a substantial performance of the promise, as the case may be, and that this ought to have been apparent to the promisor.”
Koompahtoo adds a qualification. The joint reasons said that what Jordan CJ said about substantial performance and substantial breach “is now to be read in the light of later developments in the law”, and that what matters is the common intention of the parties, shown by the language of the contract in its context and commercial purpose, as to whether a term is essential, so that any breach will justify termination (at [48]).
On Jordan CJ’s account, where the broken promise is a condition, the innocent party may choose either to treat the contract as discharged and recover damages for loss of the contract, or to keep it on foot and recover damages for the particular breach. Where it is only a warranty, the second course alone is open. Absent an express provision, which can make a promise essential, the question is one of construction.
Bancks applied the test. The artist Bancks had agreed to supply a weekly full-page drawing of “Us Fellers”, whose principal character was Ginger Meggs, and the newspaper company had undertaken to present each drawing on the front page of the comic section. In three February issues the drawing appeared on the third page of the comic section, not the front page, and the Court held that this was not presentation on the front page. The Court, in a single judgment of five Justices, held that the company’s undertaking was a condition. The two promises were concurrent and correlative, and the Court found it “impossible to attach different values” to them. Because the undertaking was a condition, a substantial failure in performing it allowed the artist to treat the contract as at an end. The Court found him entitled to do so after three successive breaches. In Luna Park, Latham CJ likewise held the guarantee clause a condition, and McTiernan J agreed that it was an essential condition.
Intermediate terms
Some terms cannot sensibly be sorted into one of those two classes. In Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 (a decision of the English Court of Appeal and persuasive only in Australia),3 the shipowners’ vessel was unseaworthy on delivery because its engine-room staff was incompetent and insufficient, and long delays followed. The charterers cancelled the charter. They lost at trial, and their appeal was dismissed. Diplock LJ said that of many undertakings “all that can be predicated is that some breaches will and others will not give rise to an event which will deprive the party not in default of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from the contract”. For such an undertaking the legal consequences, unless the contract provides for them expressly, depend on the event to which the breach gives rise. They “do not follow automatically from a prior classification of the undertaking as a ‘condition’ or a ‘warranty’.”
In Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 614 the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ identified two circumstances in which a breach may entitle the other party to terminate. The first is breach of an obligation agreed to be essential. The second is a sufficiently serious breach of a non-essential term (at [47] and [49]). The joint reasons said that Hongkong Fir “has long since passed into the mainstream law of contract as understood and practised in Australia” (at [50]), and they rested their decision on the doctrine of intermediate terms (at [53]). They also said it might be true that the High Court had not yet accepted Hongkong Fir as an essential element in its grounds for decision in any case (at [51]). Kirby J agreed that the appeal must be allowed and agreed in part with the joint reasons, but he read them as endorsing the Hongkong Fir doctrine and said he could not agree in that result (at [77] and [116]). A student should cite Koompahtoo, not Hongkong Fir, for the Australian position, and should note Kirby J’s disagreement.
The joint reasons describe a breach that “goes to the root of the contract” as “a conclusory description”. It takes account of the nature of the contract and the relationship it creates, the nature of the term, the kind and degree of the breach, and its consequences for the other party. The adequacy of damages as a remedy “may be a material factor” (at [54]). The judgment about seriousness “rests primarily upon a construction of the contract” (at [55]). The joint reasons make the judgment about seriousness after considering the benefit to which the injured party is entitled under the contract.
Two senses of repudiation
The joint reasons in Koompahtoo observed that “repudiation” is used in different senses (at [44]). In the first it means conduct that shows an unwillingness or inability to render substantial performance, which they also called renunciation. The test is whether the conduct would convey to a reasonable person, in the position of the other party, renunciation of the contract as a whole or of a fundamental obligation. In the second sense it means any breach that justifies termination. They said it would be better to avoid using the word for termination itself (at [45]). This article uses “renunciation” for the first sense.
Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 6235 shows the first sense working through conduct, not through words. The lessor had delayed delivering a registrable lease. The appeal was allowed. Mason CJ held that the unjustified delay, accompanied by incorrect statements and unfulfilled assurances, sustained an inference of repudiation. Brennan J said repudiation is found in conduct and not in the party’s state of mind. He would not have inferred it from a further fortnight of delay alone, but found that the long and unexplained delay, ending with a solicitors’ letter seeking instructions, sufficed. Deane and Dawson JJ, in joint reasons, said that an issue of repudiation “turns upon objective acts and omissions and not upon uncommunicated intention”. They also accepted that Lord Wright’s warning, that repudiation is “a serious matter, not to be lightly found or inferred”, is a wise one.
Renunciation can also concern performance still to come. In Luna Park, Latham CJ held that Luna Park, the customer, was entitled to end the contract for two reasons. One was the advertising company’s past breaches of a condition. The other was its evident intention to go on performing in the same way, so that it “must be regarded as renouncing the contract which it had in fact made”, although it contended that it was performing properly. Luna Park was then entitled to claim damages for non-performance in the third season, whose performance period had not expired. That is the reasoning of one Justice. Koompahtoo left aside cases in which the alleged repudiation is an assertion of an erroneous interpretation of the contract (at [44]), so check the current authority before treating an honest but mistaken construction as renunciation.
Breach and the right to terminate
One way of organising these authorities, not a holding of any of them, is that every breach gives a claim in damages, and that the routes to a right to terminate are breach of an essential term, a sufficiently serious breach of an intermediate term, and renunciation, apart from any express termination clause, which is not covered here. Each route asks a different question, and a student should not answer one by running the test for another.
Applying this in a problem question
- Construe the promise and say what it required, because there is no breach until you know. Note where a clause may be read as requiring only substantial performance, as in Luna Park.
- Say that the breach supports a claim in damages, whatever the classification.
- If the client wants to terminate, ask first whether the term is essential, using the test Jordan CJ stated and Bancks applied. Look at the whole contract, the term’s importance to the promisee, and whether that should have been apparent to the promisor. Treat an express statement that a promise is essential as relevant to that question.
- If it is not essential, ask whether the breach is sufficiently serious, citing Koompahtoo and weighing the matters the joint reasons list at [54]. Say that Kirby J disagreed with endorsing the intermediate-term doctrine.
- Separately ask whether conduct amounts to renunciation, applying the reasonable-person test, and be cautious about delay alone.
- Stop there, and take the consequences of terminating, including the risks of terminating wrongly, to discharge and remedies.
Self-check
- Have I construed the promise before saying it was broken?
- Have I kept the claim in damages separate from the right to terminate?
- Have I said which sense of repudiation I mean?
- Have I cited Koompahtoo, not Hongkong Fir, for the Australian position, and noted Kirby J?