Frustration: supervening events, risk and consequences

How the High Court framed the frustration test in Codelfa and Group Projects, where the Justices divided, and what the Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW) does to the parties’ positions.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw
Subjects
contract
Topics
discharge-and-remedies

Learning outcomes

  • State the frustration test as Mason J framed it in Codelfa, adopting the approach of Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe, and say what the English speeches contribute and what they do not.
  • Explain the division in Codelfa between the majority and Brennan J on a legal restriction the parties misunderstood, without saying the High Court finally held the contract frustrated.
  • Describe Group Projects as Stephen J’s reasoning with Murphy J agreeing, and say what the New South Wales Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 provides on money paid and performance received, without extending it to other jurisdictions.

Discharge gives the four routes by which a contract ends and states the frustration test in a sentence. This article takes frustration further: how the High Court has framed the test, why a mistaken legal assumption is not the same as a supervening event, how a contract’s own risk clauses are read, whether frustration can occur when performance is still possible, and what frustration does to the parties’ positions. The case law is the common law of Australia, applied in the High Court. The statute is the Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW), as shown in the current version on the NSW legislation site in October 2026; the position in other States and Territories is not stated here.

The test the High Court has adopted

In Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337,1 Mason J accepted, as Stephen J had in Brisbane City Council v Group Projects Pty Ltd, the approach of Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe in the House of Lords decision in Davis Contractors. Those English speeches are persuasive in Australia; their weight here comes from Mason J’s adoption of them. On Lord Reid’s approach the court asks, on the true construction of the contract read with its nature and the surrounding circumstances, whether the contract the parties made is, in the words Mason J quoted from Lord Reid, “wide enough to apply to the new situation”, and Mason J also quoted Lord Reid describing frustration as “the termination of the contract by operation of law on the emergence of a fundamentally different situation” (at 357). Mason J also quoted Lord Radcliffe’s formulation, which asks whether performance in the circumstances that have arisen would be “radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract” (at 357).

Two features of that framing matter for a problem question. It is a question of construction and comparison: what the contract, properly read, contemplated against what has happened. And the changed situation must be one for which the contract makes no sufficient provision, which is why express risk clauses are the first thing to read: the question is whether a clause reaches the new situation, not whether the contract mentions the subject at all.

A supervening event, or a mistake?

Codelfa contracted with the Commissioner for Railways, the constructing authority for the Eastern Suburbs Railway, to excavate tunnels within a fixed time, on a programme of three continuous shifts (Brennan J, at 394). The parties had accepted advice that no injunction could restrain the noise of the work. Injunctions were nonetheless granted, including an interim injunction restraining work between 10 pm and 6 am (Brennan J, at 396). Codelfa claimed, as an alternative to an implied term, that the contract was frustrated.

The Justices divided on a point that is easy to miss. Mason J held that a common assumption about whether an injunction could be granted, even if it was a mistake of law, did not prevent frustration, and that an injunction is “a supervening event though it does not stem from any alteration in the law” (at 359-360). He accepted that it would be harder to show in such a case that the grant of the injunction could not reasonably have been foreseen, but said that if it could be shown the doctrine applies (at 359). Aickin J thought the grant of the injunction “produced frustration in the true sense of that term”, because it had become unlawful to perform the work in the manner the contract required (at 383). Stephen J agreed with the reasons of both on frustration (at 345) and Wilson J adopted them (at 392).

Brennan J dissented on this issue. He said that the injunction produced no new situation, because the parties’ common legal error was merely corrected: “The discovery of a mistake as to a legal restriction which at all material times affects the manner in which a contract might be performed is a different thing from a supervening circumstance which arises in the course of its performance” (at 407). In his view the injunction only enforced a limit by which Codelfa was already bound (at 409).

The orders in the 1982 judgment remitted the frustration question to the arbitrator and struck out the separate frustration action for want of jurisdiction, so they contain no declaration that the contract was frustrated. Mason J’s own words were that the arbitrator’s findings went “a long way towards a conclusion that the contract has been frustrated” and that the final question remained for the arbitrator (at 366), and Wilson J said the injunction “may well have frustrated the contract” (at 392). Later in 1982, however, when the Authority applied to vacate the orders in State Rail Authority of NSW v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29,4 Mason and Wilson JJ said that a reading of the judgments “makes it plain that the majority thought that, on the findings made by the Arbitrator, frustration had actually occurred” (at 40), and described the remission as “a procedural order giving effect to a substantive decision of the Court” (at 41). So Codelfa is authority for the framing of the test and for the majority’s view that the contract was frustrated, but the formal finding was left to the arbitrator; Brennan J remained in dissent.

Reading the contract’s own risk allocation

Mason J described the older cases as illustrations of a contract being frustrated where the parties contract on the common assumption that some thing or state of affairs essential to performance will continue to exist, “neither party undertaking responsibility in that regard”, and the assumption proves mistaken (at 357). A practical corollary, which is this article’s inference and not a quoted holding, is that where the contract does take responsibility for a risk, the question becomes whether the clause reaches the new situation.

Mason J did so with a specification clause that required the contractor to avoid nuisance, contemplated restrictions on working hours and denied extra payment for measures the Engineer required. He did not think that clause had such a wide-ranging effect that it displaced the contemplated method of work (at 362). The point to carry over is that a general risk clause does not automatically answer a frustration argument; the clause is construed against the event.

Frustration without impossibility

In Brisbane City Council v Group Projects Pty Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 1432 the Council had agreed to apply for rezoning of Group Projects’ land, and Group Projects had agreed to carry out and pay for substantial works if the application was approved. Before the rezoning took effect the Crown resumed the whole of the land for a school. Stephen J accepted that most of the contracted works could still be done, at no greater cost or difficulty (at 157), but held that the acquisition had destroyed Group Projects’ purpose in undertaking the obligations, because the obligations “owe their very existence” to the proposed subdivision (at 159). He held the deed frustrated and, since the acquisition was what had changed the situation, treated it as having come to an end at the date of acquisition (at 162). Murphy J agreed that the resumption frustrated the contract for the reasons Stephen J gave (at 164).

Two cautions apply. First, this is the reasoning of a single Justice, with Murphy J agreeing. Wilson J decided the appeal on a different ground and said it was unnecessary to consider the frustration argument (at 171), so the case cannot be cited as a majority holding on frustration. The position of the other Justices is not stated here. Second, Stephen J emphasised features of the case: the Council was a public body, whose interest was in the amenity of a residential subdivision, not its own commercial gain (at 157), and he read clause 7, which kept Group Projects’ obligations in force if it was precluded from benefiting from the rezoning, as not directed at a situation like this one (at 159). A student should not read the case as showing that loss of a party’s purpose always frustrates a contract.

What frustration does

At common law the contract is treated as ending as a matter of law, not by election, as Lord Reid’s phrase quoted by Mason J indicates. The article on discharge deals with the other routes; the point to add here is that the parties’ financial adjustment is then governed, in New South Wales, by the Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW).3 In the current version, the Act does not state a test for frustration beyond an inclusive definition in s 5(1), so whether a contract is frustrated is decided as above. Once it is, the Act does the following:

  • Promises not yet performed that were due before frustration are discharged, except to the extent needed to support a damages claim for breach before frustration; s 7(2) preserves a promise that would not have been discharged had it fallen due after frustration (s 7).
  • Money paid as, or as part of, an agreed return for the other party’s performance must be repaid, whether or not that party had performed (s 12).
  • Performance received is paid for under Division 1: the value of the agreed return where the whole performance was received (s 10), or, where only part was received, an amount calculated under s 11. Division 1 does not cover performance of a promise to pay money or fulfilment of a condition that money be paid (s 9).
  • Costs of performance not received give the performing party one-half of fair compensation for the detriment reasonably suffered (s 13(1)); a performing party who has acquired property or an improvement to property as a consequence must pay the other party one-half of its value (s 13(2)).
  • A court may depart from Divisions 1 and 2 where they are manifestly inadequate or inappropriate, would cause manifest injustice, or would be excessively difficult or expensive (s 15(1)); the Local Court cannot give a judgment under the section otherwise than for the payment of money (s 15(8)).

The Act does not apply to a contract made before its commencement, to contracts of insurance, to charter-parties other than time charter-parties and charter-parties by way of demise, to contracts (other than charter-parties) for the carriage of goods by sea, or to the extent the parties have agreed that it does not apply (s 6(1)). Whether another State’s or Territory’s legislation produces the same result is not stated here.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the event and when it happened, and read the contract’s own clauses for the risk before relying on frustration.
  2. State the test as framed in Codelfa (Mason J, adopting Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe) and compare what the contract contemplated with what has occurred.
  3. If the event is a legal restriction the parties misunderstood at the outset, deal with both views in Codelfa: the majority’s supervening-event reasoning and Brennan J’s dissent. Say that the majority regarded the contract as frustrated but that the formal finding was remitted to the arbitrator.
  4. If performance remains possible but the purpose has gone, consider Group Projects, noting that it is Stephen J’s reasoning, with Murphy J agreeing, and turns on its facts.
  5. For consequences in New South Wales, identify which of ss 7 and 10 to 15 of the Act applies and whether s 6(1) excludes the contract. For any other jurisdiction, say that its law must be checked.

Self-check

  • Have I distinguished what the High Court adopted (Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe’s approach, through Mason J) from what is only English authority?
  • Have I attributed the Codelfa reasoning to Mason J, Aickin J or Brennan J as the case requires, and recorded that the majority regarded the contract as frustrated while the formal finding was remitted to the arbitrator?
  • Have I treated Group Projects as the reasoning of Stephen J with Murphy J agreeing, rather than a decision of the Court?
  • Have I limited statements about the adjustment of losses to New South Wales unless I have read the other jurisdiction’s Act?

Where the authority sits

The test is common law, stated by the High Court in Codelfa and applied in Stephen J’s reasons in Group Projects. The consequences of frustration in New South Wales are governed by the Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW). The position in other States and Territories is not stated here and must be checked.

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