Frustration: supervening events, risk and consequences
A supervening event, or a mistake?
Codelfa agreed with the Commissioner for Railways to dig tunnels for the Eastern Suburbs Railway within a set time, working three shifts a day. Both sides believed no court could stop the noisy work with an injunction (an injunction is a court order stopping someone doing something). Courts granted injunctions anyway, including one banning night work. Codelfa argued the contract was frustrated, as a backup argument to its claim about an implied term. Frustration means a contract automatically ends because an unforeseen event makes performance radically different from what was agreed.
The judges split on whether the injunction counted as a genuine “supervening event” (an unexpected new circumstance), or whether it was just the correction of an existing mistake.
Mason J held that a shared wrong assumption about the law did not stop frustration applying. He said the injunction was still a supervening event, even though no law had changed. He accepted it would be harder here to show the injunction was unforeseeable, but said frustration could still apply if that was shown. Aickin J agreed frustration occurred, because the injunction made it unlawful to do the work the way the contract required. Stephen J and Wilson J adopted this reasoning.
Brennan J dissented. He reasoned that the injunction created nothing new; it only corrected the parties’ shared legal mistake. He distinguished discovering a mistake about an existing legal limit from a true supervening event. In his view, the injunction merely enforced a restriction Codelfa was already bound by.
The 1982 orders did not actually declare the contract frustrated. They sent that question to the arbitrator and struck out the separate court claim for lack of jurisdiction. Mason J said the arbitrator’s findings went “a long way” toward frustration, but left the final decision to the arbitrator. Wilson J similarly said the injunction “may well have” frustrated the contract. Later in 1982, in State Rail Authority of NSW v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd, Mason and Wilson JJ revisited this point.
Reading the contract’s own risk allocation
Mason J looked at older frustration cases. In those cases, both parties assumed something essential would continue to exist. Neither party had promised to bear the risk if it didn’t. When that assumption failed, the contract was frustrated.
But the article draws out a further point, not stated by Mason J himself. If a contract does allocate a risk to one party, the question changes. You then ask whether the clause covers this new situation.
Mason J applied this to a specification clause. The clause required the contractor to avoid nuisance, allowed limits on working hours, and denied extra payment for measures the Engineer required. He held this clause was not wide enough to displace the agreed method of work.
The lesson is general: a broad risk clause doesn’t automatically defeat a frustration argument. Courts must read the clause closely against the actual event that occurred.
What frustration does
Frustration ends a contract automatically, by operation of law. It is not something either party chooses, as Lord Reid’s phrase shows.
The article on discharge covers other ways contracts can end. Here, the focus is on money and other adjustments after frustration.
In New South Wales, the Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 governs this. The Act doesn’t set its own test for frustration, beyond an inclusive definition in s 5(1), so whether frustration occurred is still decided under the common law rules.
Once frustration is established, the Act makes several things happen. Promises not yet performed, due before frustration, are discharged. An exception applies: discharge doesn’t prevent a damages claim for breach that happened before frustration, and s 7(2) preserves a promise that would have survived anyway had it fallen due later (s 7).
Money paid as part of the agreed return for performance must be repaid. This applies whether or not the other party actually performed (s 12).
Where performance was received, payment is worked out under Division 1. If the whole performance was received, the agreed value is paid (s 10); if only part was received, s 11 sets the amount. Division 1 doesn’t cover a promise to pay money, or a condition requiring payment (s 9).
Where performance wasn’t received, the performing party gets half of fair compensation for detriment reasonably suffered (s 13(1)). If that party gained property or an improvement to property from their efforts, they must pay the other party half its value (s 13(2)).
A court may depart from Divisions 1 and 2 if they are manifestly inadequate, inappropriate, or would cause manifest injustice or excessive difficulty or expense (s 15(1)). The Local Court can only give judgment under this section for payment of money (s 15(8)).
The Act doesn’t apply to contracts made before it commenced, to insurance contracts, to charter-parties (except time charter-parties and demise charter-parties), or to sea carriage contracts other than charter-parties. It also doesn’t apply where the parties have agreed it won’t (s 6(1)). Whether other States or Territories reach the same result isn’t addressed here.
Applying this in a problem question
First, identify the supervening event (something unexpected that happens after the contract is made) and when it occurred. Check the contract’s own risk clauses before arguing frustration (a doctrine ending a contract when performance becomes radically different from what was agreed).
Next, apply the test from Codelfa, as Mason J stated it, adopting Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe’s approach. This means comparing what the contract originally contemplated with what has actually happened.
If the event is a legal restriction the parties misunderstood when contracting, discuss both views in Codelfa. Explain the majority’s reasoning that the contract was frustrated, and Brennan J’s dissenting view. Note the majority treated the contract as frustrated, but the actual finding was sent back to the arbitrator to decide.
If performance is still possible but its purpose is gone, consider Group Projects. This reasoning comes from Stephen J, with Murphy J agreeing, and depends heavily on its own facts.
For consequences in New South Wales, work out whether ss 7 or 10 to 15 of the Act apply, and whether s 6(1) excludes the contract from its operation. In any other jurisdiction, check that jurisdiction’s own law instead.
Self-check
Before moving on, check a few things.
Know which parts of the law come from the High Court itself. Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe gave their approach in English cases. Mason J then adopted that approach for Australia. Keep these sources separate.
Get the judges right in Codelfa. Reasoning in that case belongs to Mason J, Aickin J or Brennan J, depending on which point you are discussing. Remember the majority thought the contract was frustrated, but the final decision on that point went back to the arbitrator.
Treat Group Projects correctly too. It is the reasoning of Stephen J, with Murphy J agreeing. It is not a ruling made by the whole Court.
Finally, be careful with rules on adjusting losses after frustration. Only make statements about New South Wales law, unless you have actually read the legislation of another state.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.