Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26; [1961] EWCA Civ 7
A ship handed over with an incompetent engine-room crew reached Japan long after the planned date and needed major repairs. Could the charterers cancel the charter, and on what test?
Affirmed by Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 61
In Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 61, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ, in joint reasons, described Hongkong Fir as long since part of the mainstream law of contract as understood and practised in Australia ([50]). They accepted that it may be true that the High Court had not yet accepted it as an essential element in the grounds for a decision in any case, referred to the evident approval given to it in Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd ([51]), and rested their decision on the doctrine respecting intermediate terms ([53]). Kirby J could not agree in the result that the joint reasons endorse the Hongkong Fir doctrine as part of Australian common law, and offered a different expression of the governing rule ([116]). A student answering on Australian law should cite Koompahtoo for the Australian position and mention Kirby J’s disagreement.
What happened?
The Hong Kong Fir Shipping Company owned a 25-year-old vessel, formerly the Antrim, which it renamed the Hong Kong Fir (Sellers LJ). By a time charter-party dated at Tokyo on 26 December 1956, on the Baltic and International Maritime Conference’s uniform time charter form, the ship was chartered to Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd, a company in Japan (Sellers LJ). She was delivered at Liverpool on 13 February 1957, on her first charter under the new owners, and set out in ballast for a port in Virginia and then through the Panama Canal to Osaka, which she was expected to reach in about two months (Sellers LJ).
Sellers LJ recorded that, because of delays which Salmon J had found were due to the owners’ breaches of contract, Osaka was not reached until 25 May 1957, and that very extensive repairs to the main engines and auxiliaries there meant she could not put to sea again until 15 September. It was held at trial, and not challenged by the owners on the appeal, that the engine-room staff was incompetent and insufficient, so that the vessel was unseaworthy when handed over and throughout the voyage to Osaka, where she was re-staffed.
She had five engineers, three fitters and seven greasers, where the previous owners had employed seven engineers and eight ratings, and the chief engineer was addicted to drink and repeatedly neglected his duties (Sellers LJ). Salmon J held the owners in breach of clause 1 of the charter, under which the ship was to be delivered “in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service”, and of clause 3, the obligation to maintain her in a thoroughly efficient state in hull and machinery, and held that they could not escape liability under clause 13, the due diligence clause (Sellers LJ).
On 6 June 1957 the charterers wrote to the owners cancelling the charter because of the delay, which they attributed to the unseaworthiness of the vessel. On 8 August the owners said the cancellation was unjustifiable and that they would treat it as a wrongful repudiation. The ship was offered as available to come on hire after the repairs in early September, but the charterers maintained their refusal, and by 13 September 1957, if not before, the charter was at an end (Sellers LJ). Salmon J held the charterers’ refusal wrongful and gave judgment for the owners for damages, the freight market having fallen steeply during the charter. He rejected the charterers’ contention that the delays frustrated the commercial purpose of the contract, and that contention was not pressed in the Court of Appeal (Sellers LJ).
Sellers LJ recorded that counsel for the appellant charterers formulated two issues of law: first, whether the seaworthiness obligation is a condition, the breach of which entitles the charterers to treat the contract as repudiated; and secondly, where a party in breach of contract fails to perform, by what standard the ensuing delay is to be measured in deciding whether the innocent party may treat the contract as repudiated. The second issue was put as a choice between such delay as is necessary to frustrate the contract, which was the standard Salmon J held applicable, and unreasonable delay, that is, longer than it would be reasonable in all the circumstances for a charterer to wait.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Sellers, Upjohn and Diplock LJJ) dismissed the charterers’ appeal with costs. It made no order on the respondents’ cross-notice and refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords, with a stay of execution until 19 January 1962 to enable the defendants to apply to the House of Lords for leave. Each of the three Lords Justices gave a judgment.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Sellers LJ treated the question whether a stipulation is a condition or a warranty as one to be answered on the contract and its surroundings: the formula is “well recognised; the difficulty is in its application”. He quoted Bowen LJ in Bentsen v Taylor Sons & Co that there is “no way of deciding that question except by looking at the contract in the light of the surrounding circumstances”, and then deciding whether the intention of the parties will best be carried out by treating the promise as a warranty sounding only in damages or as a condition precedent.
He said: “It would be unthinkable that all the relatively trivial matters which have been held to be unseaworthiness could be regarded as conditions of the contract”. He concluded that there was “no breach of a condition which entitled the charterers to accept it as repudiation and to withdraw from the charter”. On delay, he said the charterer “may rightly terminate the engagement if the delay in remedying any breach is so long in fact”, or likely to be so long, “that the commercial purpose of the contract would be frustrated”, and he agreed with Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation v Citati that frustrating delay is the yardstick that a long line of authorities has settled.
Upjohn LJ said that the seaworthiness clause “is not in general treated as a condition for breach of which the charterer is at once entitled to repudiate”, because it is breached by the slightest failure to be fitted “in every way” for service, and it is “contrary to common sense” to suppose that the parties meant a trifling breach to end the contract. For a stipulation that is not “a condition strictly so called”, he said, “the remedies open to the innocent party ... depend entirely upon the nature of the breach and its foreseeable consequences”, and it would be “unsound and misleading to conclude that, being a warranty, damages is a sufficient remedy”.
Where the owner is unable, despite his efforts, to perform a stipulation precisely, the question is “does the breach of the stipulation go so much to the root of the contract that it makes further commercial performance of the contract impossible, or in other words is the whole contract frustrated?” If so, the innocent party may treat the contract as at an end; if not, his claim sounds in damages only. Applying that to the crew, he said the parties must have contemplated that the crew could be changed and augmented, so the unseaworthiness did not go to the root of the contract.
Diplock LJ put the test in a different form. Where an event occurs the occurrence of which neither the parties nor Parliament have expressly stated will discharge a party, it is for the court to decide whether it does, and the test is: “Does the occurrence of the event deprive the party who has further undertakings still to perform of substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that he should obtain as the consideration for performing those undertakings?”
He said the test is the same whether or not the event is the result of the other party’s breach, and that the question “cannot be answered by treating all contractual undertakings as falling into one of two separate categories”. Lawyers speak of the division into conditions and warranties as comprehensive, but “it is by no means true of contractual undertakings in general at common law”. Of the many undertakings of “more complex character”, he said, “all that can be predicated is that some breaches will and others will not give rise to an event which will deprive the party not in default of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from the contract”, and the legal consequences “do not follow automatically from a prior classification of the undertaking as a ‘condition’ or a ‘warranty’”.
Of the seaworthiness undertaking he said that “the true answer ... is that it is neither, but one of that large class of contractual undertakings one breach of which may have the same effect as that ascribed to a breach of ‘condition’ under the Sale of Goods Act and a different breach of which may have only the same effect as that ascribed to a breach of ‘warranty’ under that Act”.
Diplock LJ then applied the test. Clause 13, he said, “is in itself sufficient to show” that the mere occurrence of unseaworthiness, or of some delay caused by it, would not deprive the charterers of the whole benefit. The question for the judge was whether, when the charterers purported to rescind on 6 June 1957, or when the owners purported to accept the rescission on 8 August 1957, the delay that had occurred, the delay likely to occur in repairing the engines, and the owners’ conduct in taking steps to remedy those matters, were “when taken together, such as to deprive the charterers of substantially the whole benefit” the parties intended them to obtain from further use of the vessel. He said that Salmon J had taken into account all the relevant considerations and “arrived at the right answer for the right reasons”.
Why does this case matter?
Termination for breach is a standard problem-question topic, and the facts here (a defective ship, a long delay, a cancellation by the charterers) are the kind examiners adapt. Common weaknesses are to treat any late or defective performance as a ground for immediate cancellation because it was a breach, and to merge the three judgments as if they used identical words. Because this is an English Court of Appeal decision, how Australian courts have treated it is part of using it.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the term in dispute and the breach complained of, then ask what each of the Lords Justices would require before the innocent party could treat the contract as at an end. Attribute a formulation to the judge who gave it: Sellers LJ, Upjohn LJ and Diplock LJ each expressed the test in his own terms. Use the facts the judgments recount, such as the nature of the unseaworthiness, the effect of clause 13 and the dates of the purported cancellation and acceptance, to show how a test applies.
This is a decision of the English Court of Appeal, and in Australia it is persuasive rather than binding. State the Australian position through the High Court’s treatment of it, and check for later authority before you rely on any particular formulation.
Check your understanding
1. On what date did the charterers write cancelling the charter, and what reason did they give for the cancellation (Sellers LJ)?
2. What two issues of law did counsel for the charterers formulate, and which standard of delay did Salmon J apply (Sellers LJ)?
3. Which Lord Justice agreed with Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation v Citati, and what did he take that case to have settled?
4. How did Upjohn LJ explain why the seaworthiness clause is not in general treated as a condition, and what question did he ask for a stipulation that is not a condition strictly so called?
5. Which Lord Justice asked whether the event deprives the party of substantially the whole benefit, and what did he say clause 13 showed (Diplock LJ)?