Breach: classifying terms and the two senses of repudiation
Whether there is a breach is a question of construction
First, work out what the contract actually promised. A breach is simply a failure to keep that promise.
In Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd, an advertising company promised boards would be on the tracks “at least eight hours per day.” The judges disagreed on what this meant. Latham CJ, Rich J and McTiernan J read it as a daily promise for each board. Dixon J thought it meant an average over the whole season. This disagreement over meaning decided whether a breach had occurred.
Latham CJ also said “eight hours per day” meant substantially eight hours. Small, occasional shortfalls would not count as breaking the promise.
A breach always allows a claim for damages. In Luna Park, Latham CJ held the customer could get at least nominal damages for past breaches already admitted. This right existed regardless of whether the customer could also end the contract. Whether a term is classified as a condition or something else matters for that separate question.
Conditions and warranties
Jordan CJ set out the classic Australian test for deciding whether a term is a condition. A condition is an essential term, meaning its breach lets the innocent party end the contract.
The High Court reversed his decision in Tramways Advertising v Luna Park on appeal. But in Associated Newspapers Ltd v Bancks, the High Court said his statement of the law still stood.
Jordan CJ’s test asks whether the term matters so much that the promisee would not have contracted without being sure of strict or substantial performance. It also asks whether this mattered importance should have been obvious to the other party.
Koompahtoo later qualified this. The joint reasons said Jordan CJ’s comments on substantial performance and substantial breach must now be read considering later legal developments.
What actually matters, Koompahtoo said, is the parties’ common intention. This is shown by the contract’s language, its context, and its commercial purpose, in deciding whether a term is essential.
Under Jordan CJ’s approach, breaching a condition gives the innocent party a choice. They may treat the contract as discharged and claim damages for losing the whole contract, or keep the contract alive and claim damages for just that breach.
If the term is only a warranty, only the second option is available. Unless the contract expressly makes a term essential, deciding which applies is a matter of interpreting the contract.
Bancks applied this test. The artist Bancks agreed to supply a weekly full-page drawing for a comic section; the newspaper agreed to place it on the front page.
In three February issues, the drawing appeared on page three instead. The Court held this breached the obligation to present it on the front page.
Five Justices, in a single joint judgment, held the newspaper’s promise was a condition. They found the two promises were linked and of equal importance, making it “impossible to attach different values” to them.
Because the publishing obligation was a condition, the newspaper’s substantial failure to perform it let the artist treat the contract as discharged.
Intermediate terms
Some terms are neither conditions nor warranties. They are called intermediate terms, because their legal effect depends on how serious the breach turns out to be.
In Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (an English case, persuasive only in Australia), the ship was unseaworthy and caused long delays. The charterers cancelled, but their case failed. Diplock LJ said some breaches will deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of the contract, and others will not. For these terms, the consequences depend on how serious the breach actually was, not on labelling the term a condition or warranty in advance.
In Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd, the High Court majority said a breach can justify termination in two situations. First, breach of a term the parties agreed was essential. Second, a sufficiently serious breach of a non-essential term.
The majority said Hongkong Fir is now part of mainstream Australian contract law, and based their decision on the intermediate terms doctrine. They noted the High Court had not previously relied on Hongkong Fir as essential to a decision. Kirby J agreed the appeal should succeed but disagreed with the majority’s endorsement of the Hongkong Fir doctrine.
Students should cite Koompahtoo, not Hongkong Fir, for the Australian position, and note Kirby J’s disagreement.
The majority described a breach “going to the root of the contract” as merely a conclusory label. Whether this applies depends on the contract’s nature, the term’s nature, the breach’s kind and degree, and its consequences. Whether damages would adequately compensate the loss may also be relevant.
Breach and the right to terminate
Every breach lets the innocent party claim damages. But a right to terminate the contract is different, and only arises in certain ways.
The main routes are: breach of an essential term, a sufficiently serious breach of an intermediate term, or renunciation (where one party shows they will not perform). There is also an express termination clause, but that is not covered here.
Each route asks its own question. A student must not apply the test for one route when answering a problem about another.
Applying this in a problem question
First, work out what the promise actually required. You cannot assess breach until you know this. Some clauses may only need substantial performance, as in Luna Park.
Next, note that a breach can support a damages claim, no matter how the term is classified.
If the client wants to terminate, first ask whether the term was essential. Apply Jordan CJ’s test, as used in Bancks. Consider the whole contract, how important the term was to the promisee, and whether this should have been clear to the promisor. An express statement calling a term essential is relevant, but not conclusive.
If the term is not essential, ask whether the breach is serious enough. Rely on Koompahtoo and weigh the factors the joint reasons list at [54]. Note that Kirby J disagreed with adopting the intermediate-term approach.
Separately, ask whether the conduct amounts to renunciation. This means conduct showing unwillingness to perform the contract. Apply the reasonable-person test, and be cautious about treating delay by itself as enough.
Finally, consider what follows from terminating, including the risk of terminating wrongly. These consequences are covered under discharge and remedies.
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