Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1938

ContractDischarge And Remedies

Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 286

An amusement park paid for advertising boards on tram roofs, with a promise that they would be on the tracks “at least eight hours per day”. They were not. Could it walk away from the contract?

What happened?

On 10 December 1935 Luna Park (NSW) Ltd, which conducted an amusement enterprise in Sydney, made a contract with Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd to advertise its entertainments on fifty-three boards carried on the roofs of Sydney tram-cars, for three seasons. A memorandum added to the preliminary letter read: “We guarantee that these boards will be on the tracks at least eight hours per day throughout your season.” Luna Park was to pay £20 a week from the date of the first appearance of the complete number of boards (Latham CJ).

After the second season Luna Park complained that it had never had the service for which it contracted. It was admitted that each board had not been displayed for eight hours on every day. On 16 November 1937 Luna Park wrote that it no longer considered itself bound by the contract. Tramways Advertising nevertheless displayed all fifty-three boards from 6 January 1938 and sued in the District Court for payment for one month. Luna Park defended and cross-claimed for damages for breach, and the District Court judge dismissed the claim and gave judgment for Luna Park on the cross-claim. A majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales reversed that outcome, and Luna Park appealed to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal with costs by a majority of Latham CJ, Rich J and McTiernan J, with Dixon J dissenting; the claim of Tramways Advertising was dismissed. The judgment for Luna Park on the cross-claim was reduced to one shilling in nominal damages, because the evidence did not show the extent of the breach.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Latham CJ held that the guarantee clause was “a condition and not a warranty”: “a term of the contract which went so directly to the substance of the contract or was so ‘essential to its very nature that its non-performance may fairly be considered by the other party as a substantial failure to perform the contract at all’”. He relied on the words “we guarantee”, on the provision that payment of £20 a week was not to begin until the complete number of boards was displayed, and on the advertising company’s own emphasis on continuous display, and said that the breach of such a term “entitles the other party not only to obtain damages but also to refuse to perform any of the obligations resting upon him”. He read “at least eight hours per day” as meaning “substantially eight hours per day”, so that the clause “would not ... be broken by small occasional deficiencies”.

He held that the defendant was entitled to determine the contract for two reasons: “the plaintiff’s actual breaches of the contract”, and “the plaintiff’s evident intention (notwithstanding the challenge by the defendant) to continue to perform the contract in the future in the same manner as in the past”, so that the plaintiff “must be regarded as renouncing the contract which it had in fact made”. McTiernan J agreed with the Chief Justice “that this was an essential condition of the contract” and that its repudiation justified the appellant in terminating it.

Why does this case matter?

A question that turns on a promise about how often or for how long something will be done is the usual setting for the case. It is often learned for the classification of a term alone, but the second ground for ending the contract and the outcome on damages are what a question about remedies after termination draws on.

Exam and application relevance

Say whose reasons you are using, since the four Justices wrote separately. Separate the construction of the clause from its classification, and the classification from the right to end the contract.

Latham CJ’s reasoning predates the recognition of intermediate terms in Koompahtoo ([2007] HCA 61), and for a term that is not found to be essential that later case supplies a further route to termination.

Check your understanding

1. What did the guarantee clause say, and what did Tramways Advertising admit about its performance?

2. Which features of the contract did Latham CJ rely on to treat the clause as a condition?

3. What were the two reasons Latham CJ gave for holding that Luna Park was entitled to determine the contract?

4. What did McTiernan J agree with, and what did Dixon J say about the appeal?