Wheeldon v Burrows

Court of Appeal of England and Wales · 1879

PropertyEasements

Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31

A vendor sold a vacant plot by deed that said nothing about the light reaching his workshop windows across it, and a month later agreed to sell the workshop. Could the workshop’s buyer stop the plot owner building against them?

Qualified by McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; [2006] NSWCA 180

In McGrath v Campbell [2006] NSWCA 180, Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing with the orders and substantially with the reasons) described Thesiger LJ’s rules and the extension of the first rule in Aldridge v Wright to simultaneous transfers by a common owner ([33]-[45]). On land under the Torrens system in New South Wales, a Wheeldon v Burrows easement not noted on the servient tenement’s certificate of title has generally been accepted as enforceable against the registered proprietor who created it but not against that proprietor’s successors in title ([7]). Simultaneous transfers by the common owner, known to each purchaser, did not give rise to a personal equity binding the transferee of the servient lot who had not contributed to the easement or acted unconscionably, even though that transferee knew of the earlier use of the driveway ([108]-[109], [119]). Tobias JA said there was much force in the view that if prescriptive easements are defeated by the indefeasibility provisions of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), implied easements of the Wheeldon v Burrows type should be too, but found it unnecessary to reach a concluded view ([118]-[119]). The English rule stated by Thesiger LJ therefore does not by itself decide whether such an easement binds a registered proprietor in New South Wales.

Affirmed by Kitching v Phillips [2011] WASCA 19

In Kitching v Phillips [2011] WASCA 19 at [56], Murphy JA (Pullin JA and Newnes JA agreeing) said that implied easements in respect of continuous and apparent easements, or quasi-easements, existing at the time land is severed by a grant, which are recognised by the law in accordance with the principle enunciated by Thesiger LJ in Wheeldon v Burrows (at 49), are also based on the maxim of non-derogation of grant.

What happened?

Samuel Tetley owned property in Derby that included a piece of vacant land fronting the street and, at the rear, a silk manufactory and workshops, one of which had windows opening on to that land (Thesiger LJ). An earlier owner of the whole property, Allen, had built the shed in 1858 and in 1861 inserted windows in its raised wall (statement of facts in the report). Tetley put the property up for sale by auction in lots in 1875, and on 9 November 1875 William Wheeldon bought the vacant land, but the lot containing the silk mill and the workshop was not sold at the auction (report; Thesiger LJ).

By a deed of 6 January 1876 Tetley conveyed the vacant land to Wheeldon with general words including lights, easements and appurtenances, and the conveyance did not reserve in express terms any right to Tetley over the land (Thesiger LJ). On 18 February 1876 Tetley contracted to sell the mill and workshop to Burrows, and he conveyed them by an indenture of 7 April 1876 (report; Thesiger LJ).

In January 1878 Wheeldon’s widow and devisee, who owned the vacant land, put up boardings near its edge facing the workshop windows, and Burrows knocked them down, claiming a right to the access of light through the windows (report). She sued to restrain him as a trespasser. Burrows did not claim the lights as ancient lights (report of argument). He pleaded that the windows were apparent and continuous easements necessary to the convenient enjoyment of the buildings, and that the right to the light had been reserved to the vendor, expressly or by implication, and was now vested in him (report). Bacon VC held that no right in respect of the windows had been reserved, impliedly or expressly, gave judgment for the plaintiff, and granted an injunction and an inquiry as to damages (report; Thesiger LJ). Burrows appealed, and the appeal was heard on 17 June 1879.

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (James, Baggallay and Thesiger LJJ) dismissed the appeal with costs, so the injunction against Burrows stood. Thesiger LJ delivered the judgment of the Court. James LJ added a short remark about the ground on which Nicholas v Chamberlain proceeded, and Baggallay LJ concurred.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Thesiger LJ said that two propositions may be stated “as what I may call the general rules governing cases of this kind”. The first is that on the grant by the owner of a tenement of part of that tenement as it is then used and enjoyed, there will pass to the grantee all those continuous and apparent easements (which he said he meant as quasi easements), or in other words all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, and which have been and are at the time of the grant used by the owners of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted.

The second is that “if the grantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant” (at 49). The second rule is subject to exceptions, one of them “the well-known exception which attaches to cases of what are called ways of necessity”, and he did not dispute that there “probably are, certain other exceptions”. Both rules, he said, are founded upon the maxim “that a grantor shall not derogate from his grant” (at 49).

Thesiger LJ traced the authorities to show that the distinction between implied grant and implied reservation is not a modern invention. Pyer v Carter “seems to break the hitherto unbroken current of authority upon this point”; he thought it possible that its actual decision was not exactly overruled, but its principles “were clearly and distinctly overruled” by the Court of Exchequer in White v Bass, which was followed by Lord Westbury’s decision in Suffield v Brown and confirmed by Lord Chelmsford in Crossley & Sons v Lightowler.

Watts v Kelson, in which the dominant tenement had been conveyed first, was no authority for overruling Suffield v Brown. He said the Court ought not to lay down as an absolute rule that decisions of Lord Chancellors sitting alone bind it, but that “the greatest weight ought to be given to such decisions” and that, unless shown to be manifestly wrong or manifestly contrary to the general current of authority, the Court should not overrule them. The defendant Burrows had bought the workshop after the vendor Tetley had conveyed the adjoining land to the plaintiff’s husband without reserving any right over it, and he claimed an implied reservation of the access of light to its windows.

Thesiger LJ was “of opinion, both upon principle and upon authority, that the Vice-Chancellor decided rightly”. The cases cited “in no way support the proposition for which the Appellant in this case contends”, but support the propositions that “in the case of a grant you may imply a grant of such continuous and apparent easements or such easements as are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property conveyed”, being easements that “have in fact been enjoyed during the unity of ownership”, but that, “with the exception which I have referred to of easements of necessity, you cannot imply a similar reservation in favour of the grantor of land” (at 58-59).

The defendant also argued that the case fell within the exception recognised in Swansborough v Coventry and Compton v Richards, because although the land and the workshop were not in fact conveyed at the same time, the conveyances were made as part and parcel of one intended sale by auction. Thesiger LJ said that proposition “cannot be supported for one moment”. The Court started with “an absolute conveyance in January, 1876” and had no right “to look back to any previous contract or to any previous arrangement between the parties”: parol negotiations cannot be used to construe a document, and the same rule applies “even more strongly in the case of a conveyance”.

In the cases cited, the conveyances “were founded upon transactions which in Equity were equivalent to conveyances between the parties at the time when the transactions were entered into”, at the same moment and as part of one transaction. Here “the sale by auction was abortive as regards the Defendant’s property”, the plaintiff’s property was conveyed in January without reservation, and “there was no contract of purchase on the part of the Defendant until more than a month after that conveyance had been complete”; he believed he expressed the view of the Court in saying that “under such circumstances there is no exception to the general rule”.

On the exceptions to the second rule, Thesiger LJ read Pinnington v Galland as put entirely on the footing that the way was a way of necessity, and Davies v Sear as decided on the same basis. He added, while saying it was “quite unnecessary for us to decide the point”, that Pyer v Carter and Richards v Rose might be supported without departing from the maxims on which the Court based its judgment, because a grantee who takes an easement exercised over the grantor’s land might reasonably be held to take it subject to a reciprocal and mutual easement, and that this seemed to him “worthy of consideration” in a later case.

Why does this case matter?

Problems about land divided between two buyers invite a quick list of the features of an easement and a conclusion. This case shows how much depends on who is making the claim, on the order and form of the transfers, and on what the deed itself does and does not say. Its facts are about light, but it is the decision a property examiner expects to see named when a landowner has parted with one of two connected parcels.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about land that has been divided, establish which parcel was transferred first, whether the transfers were separate or simultaneous, what each deed says about rights over the other parcel, and who is now claiming: the transferee of the part conveyed, or the transferor or someone claiming under the transferor who kept the rest. Keep the two general rules apart from the exceptions and from the argument about the auction, and say which of them the facts of the problem engage.

On land under the Torrens system, whether an easement of this kind can be enforced against a registered proprietor needs separate authority. McGrath v Campbell [2006] NSWCA 180 considers that question for New South Wales.

Check your understanding

1. What did Tetley’s deed of 6 January 1876 say about rights reserved to him over the land it conveyed, and when did Burrows contract to buy the mill and workshop?

2. What two propositions did Thesiger LJ call the general rules governing cases of this kind, and on what maxim did he say both are founded (at 49)?

3. How did Thesiger LJ describe the effect of White v Bass on Pyer v Carter, and what did he say about decisions of Lord Chancellors sitting alone?

4. Which exception to the second rule did Thesiger LJ say was well known, and how did he read Pinnington v Galland and Davies v Sear?

5. Why did Thesiger LJ say the argument based on Swansborough v Coventry and the auction could not be supported?

6. What did Tobias JA say in McGrath v Campbell about enforcing a Wheeldon v Burrows easement not noted on the certificate of title against the registered proprietor’s successors in title ([7])?