Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2007

PropertyEasements

Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 528; [2007] HCA 45

A registered right of way ran from a Sydney street to one building’s ramp. Its owner then bought the neighbouring buildings and wanted traffic to pass through to them. Could the owner prove what the first parties had in mind?

Clarified by Theunissen v Barter [2025] NSWCA 50

In Theunissen v Barter the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Kirk JA, with whom Mitchelmore JA and Griffiths AJA agreed) read Westfield as not ruling out physical characteristics. Kirk JA said that Westfield did not address the issue in terms and that ‘The Court was not seeking exhaustively to list permissible materials’ ([63], [72]). His Honour held that when construing a registered easement it is permissible to take into account relevant physical characteristics of the servient and dominant tenements, and of the surrounding land, at the time of the grant which were reasonably ascertainable by a third party at that time ([108]). The characteristics that may be considered are the broad and reasonably enduring ones, not fine details; relevant sources generally include what can be observed from outside the properties and publicly available maps, but not material that could be obtained by freedom of information searches ([104]-[108]). That is a decision of an intermediate appellate court and does not bind the High Court, and it does not suggest that the intention or contemplation of the parties to the grant may be considered.

What happened?

Westfield Management Limited was the registered proprietor of the land on which stood the Skygarden building in the Sydney central business district, and Perpetual Trustee Company Limited was the registered proprietor of the neighbouring Glasshouse land, which fronts King Street ([1]-[2]). The Pitt Street Mall, a pedestrian precinct without vehicular access, abuts Skygarden, so access across the Glasshouse site to King Street mattered to it ([2]).

The easement was created on 26 April 1988 on registration of a deposited plan under s 88B of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), with an instrument setting out its terms ([6]). It gave a full and free right of carriageway “to go, pass and repass at all times and for all purposes with vehicles to and from” the lots benefited “across the lots burdened”, by a ramp under Glasshouse to the boundary of Skygarden ([7], [15]). When it was created, all four parcels were in separate ownership ([11]). Westfield later acquired the two adjoining developments, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and proposed to redevelop all three sites together and use the ramp for vehicular access from King Street ([11]).

Westfield sought a declaration that the easement allowed vehicles to continue across Skygarden to driveways, parking spaces and loading docks on the other two sites ([12]). Brereton J granted declaratory relief, and the Court of Appeal (Beazley, Hodgson and Tobias JJA) allowed Perpetual’s appeal ([13]). Westfield had led extensive evidence by affidavit about the parties’ intentions and expectations when the easement was created ([35]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs ([46]). Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ gave one joint judgment ([1]-[46]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Construction of a registered easement. The Court said that rules of evidence assisting the construction of contracts between the parties, of the kind explained in Codelfa, “did not apply to the construction of the Easement”, because of the operation of the Torrens system by registration with a publicly accessible register ([37]). The statement by McHugh J in Gallagher v Rainbow that the principles of construction applicable to an easement at common law are equally applicable to Torrens land is “too widely expressed” ([39]):

“The third party who inspects the Register cannot be expected, consistently with the scheme of the Torrens system, to look further for extrinsic material which might establish facts or circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the registered dealing and placing the third party (or any court later seized of a dispute) in the situation of the grantee.” ([39])

Evidence is admissible, in the absence of contrary argument, “to make sense of that which the Register identifies by the terms or expressions found therein”, such as the surveying terms and abbreviations on a plan ([44]), but nothing supported admitting evidence of the intention or contemplation of the parties to the grant ([45]). The primary judge had used what was contemplated at the time of the grant to guide, if not control, the construction of what appeared on the Register ([43]), and Hodgson JA was correct to see that as an error ([35]). The Court added that accepting that the use of a registered easement may change with the nature of the dominant tenement, if the terms are sufficiently broad, does no violence to Torrens principles ([42]).

The terms of this easement. The Court agreed with Hodgson JA that the words “to and from” tended to suggest that access to and from the dominant tenement was the purpose of the easement ([18]). The phrase “for all purposes” “encompasses all ends sought to be achieved by those utilising the Easement in accordance with its terms”, but the terms did not speak of passing across Skygarden as well as across Glasshouse ([30]). The statement in Gale on Easements that a right of way may only be used for access to the dominant tenement is not a rule of construction or substantive law but “a starting point” ([29]). The conditions about repair costs, insurance and indemnity were consistent with that construction ([31]-[34]). The Court did not decide whether a grant extending to other land would be appurtenant to Skygarden or only a personal advantage to its owner ([24]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [35] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab), [37] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab), [39] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [43] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [45] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

The joint judgment rejected the primary judge’s use of the original parties’ intentions to construe this registered easement. The publicly accessible Torrens register supplied the reason for excluding that evidence and rejecting the construction it had supported. These passages form the evidentiary ground of decision; the criticism of McHugh J’s formulation at [39] explains that ground rather than adopting the quoted formulation.

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [44] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

The joint judgment provisionally accepted, in the absence of contrary argument, evidence explaining terms or expressions on the Register, using surveying terminology as an example. That observation was unnecessary to reject the evidence of the parties’ intentions at [45]. It should not be presented as an exhaustively determined rule about all permissible extrinsic evidence.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [29] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [30] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

The joint judgment construed the actual grant as permitting passage to and from Skygarden, without passage across it to the other sites. Reading “for all purposes” within those terms was necessary to reject Westfield’s claimed extended use. The treatment of Gale’s statement as a starting point explains why this conclusion depends on the instrument rather than a universal prohibition on access to other land.

Classification unresolved · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)

The joint judgment expressly left undecided whether a grant permitting access to other parcels would be appurtenant to Skygarden or merely confer a personal advantage on Westfield. Its construction of this grant made that question unnecessary. This passage marks a limit of the decision and supplies no holding on the validity of such a wider grant.

Why does this case matter?

Questions about the scope of a registered easement are often answered with the methods used for ordinary contracts between the parties, and this is the decision an examiner expects a student to bring to such a question.

Exam and application relevance

Start from the terms of the grant as they appear on the Register: what land is benefited, what route is burdened, and what activities are described ([15]-[17], [30]). Then test any evidence a party wants to rely on against [37]-[45], saying what the evidence is offered to show. Where the problem concerns a later change in the use of the dominant land, consider the Court’s remarks at [42] and the statutory and equitable routes it mentions at [43].

Where the question is whether physical features of the land at the time of the grant may be considered, apply Theunissen ([93], [104]-[108]). Confine the construction to the terms of this instrument.

Check your understanding

1. What route did the easement take, and what two other parcels of land did Westfield want vehicles to reach ([7], [11])?

2. What did the primary judge treat as relevant to the construction of the easement, and what did Hodgson JA say about that ([28], [35])?

3. What did the Court say about the statement of McHugh J in Gallagher v Rainbow ([39])?

4. What kind of evidence did the Court say could be admitted to make sense of the Register ([44])?

5. Why did the Court say that “for all purposes” did not help Westfield ([30])?

6. How did the Court treat the statement in Gale on Easements ([29])?