Wakim v Senworth Capital Pty Ltd

Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal · 2024

ContractVitiating Factors

Wakim v Senworth Capital Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 102

A woman guarantees a loan to her husband’s companies, and the lender obtains judgment against her by default. She applies to set it aside, saying the lender exploited her position. How strong must her defence look at that stage?

What happened?

Mrs Anna Wakim and her husband, Mr Simon Wakim, were guarantors of a short-term advance of $2,058,000 that the lender, Senworth Capital Pty Ltd as trustee for The Car Loan Security Trust, made to two companies associated with Mr Wakim ([9], [14]). Both signed the deed of guarantee on 5 March 2020, and their signatures were witnessed by a solicitor who had signed a certificate, dated 4 March 2020, that he was instructed independently of the lender and had explained the guarantee ([14]). Mr Wakim gave evidence that he was in the room when the deed was signed ([22]). Mrs Wakim’s evidence was that, because of her culture and upbringing, she had always understood that she had to do whatever her husband told her to do, including signing documents, and that she did not want to sign the guarantee but did so because he told her to ([13], [17]).

Proceedings to enforce the guarantee were commenced in December 2021, and default judgment against Mrs Wakim for $3,627,343.97 was entered on 10 November 2022 ([9], [17]). Mrs Wakim said that she did not recall receiving the statement of claim that was posted to her previous address and that, if she had, she would most likely have passed it to her husband, who had told her that he would take care of such matters ([17]). She said that she first realised in early May 2023 that judgment had been obtained against her, consulted a lawyer in June 2023 without her husband, and then sought to have the default judgment set aside ([18]-[21]).

Her proposed defence relied on equitable unconscionable conduct and, alternatively, on the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) ([15]-[16]). The lender relied on an affidavit of an executive director of a firm that introduced borrowers to private lenders, who said that in 2019 Mrs Wakim had told him that she and her husband conducted a business of importing exotic cars, and on a detailed email of 30 July 2020 ([23]-[24], [36]-[38]).

Campbell J, in an ex tempore judgment on 16 August 2023, said that he would take Mrs Wakim’s evidence at its highest ([28]). He relied on Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd for the principles on equitable unconscionability, and he did not refer to Thorne v Kennedy, Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd or Nitopi v Nitopi ([35], [50]). He was not satisfied that a case had been established for setting aside the default judgment and dismissed the application ([42]). Mrs Wakim applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal ([9]).

What did the Court decide?

On 10 May 2024 the Court of Appeal (White JA, Basten AJA and Griffiths AJA) granted leave to appeal, upheld the appeal, set aside the orders of 16 August 2023 and, in their place, set aside the default judgment entered on 10 November 2022 ([81]). It remitted the matter to the Common Law Division, ordered that Mrs Wakim bear her own costs of the notice of motion below and that the costs of the hearing of the motion be the plaintiff’s costs in the cause on the remitted trial, and ordered the respondent to pay her costs in the Court of Appeal ([81]). Griffiths AJA gave the principal reasons ([9]-[81]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Griffiths AJA, with whom White JA and Basten AJA agreed ([1], [8]), held that the primary judge erred in rejecting Mrs Wakim’s proposed defence of equitable unconscionability as not reasonably arguable, because he proceeded on the basis that Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd alone contained the relevant principles ([45], [50], [69]). The primary judge had drawn from Kakavas at [161] that the plaintiff’s benefit of the bargain had to be procured by unfair exploitation of the other party’s weakness, which may require proof of a predatory state of mind, and that the principle is not engaged by mere inadvertence or even indifference ([50]).

Griffiths AJA identified several difficulties with reliance on Kakavas alone ([51]). First, its propositions reflect a dealing between a problem gambler and a casino company and it did not involve a third party, whereas here there were three relevant parties: Mrs Wakim, her husband and the financier ([51]). Second, he noted that the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy had said at [38] that it is generally necessary that the other party knew or ought to have known of the existence and effect of the special disadvantage, and that the plurality in Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd had said at [44] that an unequivocal finding of actual knowledge was not essential to the claimant’s case for relief, so that both suggest that the propositions in Kakavas at [161] may require some modification ([52]-[53]).

He added that in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio Mason J and Deane J had acknowledged that unconscionability may be established where the stronger party does not have actual knowledge but should have made appropriate inquiries ([54]), and he set out how members of the Court of Appeal had discussed the tension between the High Court authorities in Nitopi v Nitopi (Bell CJ at [9], Ward P at [121], White JA at [199]) without himself choosing between their approaches ([55]-[58]).

He said that the tension concerns, among other things, the distinction between knowledge and notice of the weaker party’s disadvantage, whether mere inadvertence or indifference is sufficient as opposed to exploitative or predatory conduct, and the relevance of the distinction between active and passive conduct, and that this tension “needs to be acknowledged” on an application to set aside a default judgment ([45]). The primary judge’s decision to proceed without reference to Thorne, Stubbings or Nitopi was, he said, “perhaps understandable” because neither party had drawn them to his attention, but “led his Honour into error because he failed to appreciate that the law was not as settled by Kakavas as he believed” ([59]).

The correct legal position “may not be as clear or absolute as his Honour believed”, and the tension in the authorities is an important consideration in deciding whether an applicant has a reasonably arguable defence ([62]). Griffiths AJA also said that there was reason to doubt that Mrs Wakim’s evidence had been taken at its highest ([64]), that the primary judge did not consider that “where the state of mind of a defendant is relevant, it may be desirable to permit the matter to go to trial” ([65]), and that the primary judge’s statements “appear to overstate the need for the applicant to demonstrate predatory or exploitative conduct” ([67]-[68]). The effect of upholding the grounds was that the proposed defence should be permitted to go to trial ([72]); the Court did not decide whether it would succeed.

White JA added observations on the proposed defence as a claim of actual undue influence by a husband over his wife, and Basten AJA agreed with White JA’s further reasons ([8]). White JA noted that the majority in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd had held that the reasons of Dixon J in Yerkey v Jones were particular applications of accepted equitable principles that apply today ([3]), and that Dixon J had said that, where the wife’s undertaking to become her husband’s surety is procured by his undue influence, nothing but independent advice or relief from his ascendancy over her judgment and will would suffice ([4]).

He held that Mrs Wakim’s evidence, if accepted at trial, could plausibly establish a relation of actual undue influence, and that there was a triable issue whether she had adequate independent advice, because the same solicitor gave certificates of advice to Mrs Wakim and her husband and the certificates did not state that she had been advised to receive separate advice ([6]). He said that, contrary to the primary judge’s findings at [25]-[27] of the primary judgment, Mrs Wakim may be entitled to relief under the principles in Yerkey v Jones and Garcia “whether or not her guarantee was procured by unfair exploitation or predatory conduct on the part of the respondent, or the respondent had actual or constructive knowledge of her vulnerability and sought unfairly to exploit it” ([7]).

On the alternative defence under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), Griffiths AJA held that ground 4 of the draft notice of appeal should be upheld ([71]). He accepted that the primary judge’s observation that both claims relied essentially on the same facts was literally correct on the terms of the proposed defence, but said that there was one important difference which needed to be explored at a full trial: whether the unjustness of a contract can be established for the purpose of that Act by reference to matters of which the counterparty was ignorant when the contract was entered into ([70]).

He said that knowledge of the other party’s special disadvantage may not be an essential factor in establishing unjustness even though lack of knowledge may be relevant to relief ([70]), and that, unlike the position with equitable unconscionability, whether actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the stronger party is a necessary factor raised a question of general principle, having regard to St George Bank Ltd v Trimarchi and Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Khoshaba ([46]). The Court did not decide that question.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing)

Read judgment: [50]–[54] (opens in a new tab), [59] (opens in a new tab), [62] (opens in a new tab), [64]–[69] (opens in a new tab)

Grounds 1 to 3 were upheld because the primary judge relied on Kakavas at [161] alone and so misjudged whether the proposed defence was reasonably arguable ([59], [62], [69]); that error, with the way the evidence was assessed, is why the default judgment was set aside and the matter remitted ([72], [81]). The statements at [67]-[68] are framed as appearing to overstate the need to show predatory or exploitative conduct, in an interlocutory assessment of arguability.

Classification unresolved · Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing)

Read judgment: [55]–[58] (opens in a new tab)

Griffiths AJA sets out the discussion of the High Court authorities in Nitopi v Nitopi without choosing between the approaches taken there. He does not resolve or adopt a substantive approach, but he relies on the tension between those authorities in deciding that the primary judge’s reliance on Kakavas alone was an error and that the defence was reasonably arguable. The passages therefore support the ground of decision on arguability without settling which approach is correct, and the substantive approaches themselves were not decided.

Proposition 2

Separate reasoning · White JA (Basten AJA agreeing with his further reasons)

Read judgment: [2]–[8] (opens in a new tab)

White JA agreed with Griffiths AJA’s reasons and orders and gave a further, distinct route: the proposed defence, framed as actual undue influence, was arguable under Yerkey v Jones and Garcia whether or not predatory conduct or knowledge was shown. Basten AJA agreed with those further reasons, so two of the three Justices adopted them. It is expressed as what Mrs Wakim may be entitled to, an arguability finding, and was not necessary to the orders given Griffiths AJA’s reasons.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing)

Read judgment: [46] (opens in a new tab), [70]–[71] (opens in a new tab)

Ground 4 was upheld because the difference between the statutory and equitable claims on the role of knowledge needed to be explored at a full trial, so the statutory defence was reasonably arguable. The question of principle itself was not decided; what is ratio is the conclusion that the point made the defence arguable.

Why does this case matter?

Guarantee facts involving a dominant spouse are a familiar setting for an unconscionability problem, and examiners often add a procedural step, such as an application to set aside a judgment or to strike out a defence. Students commonly answer the merits question and skip the threshold one: what the applicant has to show at that stage.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a guarantee or another dealing between a stronger and a weaker party, identify each party, including any third party, what the stronger party knew or should have known, and whether the question is put at a final hearing or on an interlocutory application about whether a defence is reasonably arguable. Name the High Court decisions on special disadvantage and knowledge, and the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s discussion of them in Nitopi, and attribute each statement to its court and judge.

This decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal binds New South Wales courts below it, is persuasive elsewhere, and does not bind the High Court. It was made on an interlocutory application about whether the proposed defences were reasonably arguable. Check for later decisions on knowledge and notice in unconscionability, and for the current text of the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), before relying on the statutory point.

Check your understanding

1. What did the lender advance, to whom, and what did Mrs Wakim sign in connection with the advance ([9], [14])?

2. What did Campbell J say about the basis on which he would treat Mrs Wakim’s evidence, and which High Court decision did he rely on for the test ([28], [35], [50])?

3. Which later authorities did the primary judge not refer to, and why did Griffiths AJA think that was understandable ([35], [59])?

4. In what way did Griffiths AJA say Kakavas differed factually from the dealing in this case ([51])?

5. Which Justice added observations about Yerkey v Jones and Garcia, who agreed with his further reasons, and what did he say Mrs Wakim’s evidence could plausibly establish ([6]-[8])?

6. What orders did the Court make on 10 May 2024 ([81])?