Wakim v Senworth Capital Pty Ltd
Wakim v Senworth Capital Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 102
A woman guarantees a loan to her husband’s companies, and the lender obtains judgment against her by default. She applies to set it aside, saying the lender exploited her position. How strong must her defence look at that stage?
What happened?
Mrs Anna Wakim and her husband guaranteed a $2,058,000 loan from Senworth Capital to companies linked to Mr Wakim. Both signed the guarantee on 5 March 2020, witnessed by a solicitor who certified he had independently explained it.
Mrs Wakim later said she signed only because her husband told her to, reflecting her upbringing. She said she did not recall receiving the statement of claim, and would have passed it to her husband if she had.
Default judgment of over $3.6 million was entered against her in November 2022. She learned of it in May 2023, got independent legal advice, and sought to set the judgment aside. Her proposed defence relied on equitable unconscionable conduct and, alternatively, the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).
The primary judge, relying on Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd, dismissed her application. She sought leave to appeal.
What did the Court decide?
NSW Court of Appeal granted leave, allowed the appeal, set aside the default judgment and remitted the matter for trial. It made costs orders below and ordered the respondent pay Mrs Wakim’s appeal costs.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing) held the primary judge erred. He rejected Mrs Wakim’s defence of equitable unconscionability as not reasonably arguable. The error was treating Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd as containing all the relevant principles.
The primary judge had read Kakavas at [161] to require unfair exploitation of weakness, possibly needing a predatory state of mind. Mere inadvertence or indifference would not be enough on that view.
Griffiths AJA identified problems with relying on Kakavas alone. Kakavas involved a problem gambler and a casino, with only two parties. This case involved three parties: Mrs Wakim, her husband, and the financier.
He noted Thorne v Kennedy said the other party generally must know or ought to know of the special disadvantage. Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd said actual knowledge need not be unequivocally found. Both suggest Kakavas’s propositions may need modification.
He also noted that in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, Mason J and Deane J accepted unconscionability can arise without actual knowledge, where appropriate inquiries should have been made.
Griffiths AJA described how Court of Appeal members in Nitopi v Nitopi (Bell CJ, Ward P, White JA) discussed tension between these High Court authorities. He did not choose between their approaches.
The tension concerns several things: the difference between knowledge and notice of the weaker party’s disadvantage; whether inadvertence or indifference suffices, as opposed to exploitative or predatory conduct; and the relevance of active versus passive conduct.
This tension, he said, “needs to be acknowledged” when deciding an application to set aside a default judgment.
The primary judge’s failure to consider Thorne, Stubbings or Nitopi was “perhaps understandable,” since neither party raised them. But this omission led him into error, because he did not appreciate the unsettled state of the law.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing)
Read judgment: [50]–[54] (opens in a new tab), [59] (opens in a new tab), [62] (opens in a new tab), [64]–[69] (opens in a new tab)
Grounds 1 to 3 were upheld because the primary judge relied on Kakavas at [161] alone and so misjudged whether the proposed defence was reasonably arguable ([59], [62], [69]); that error, with the way the evidence was assessed, is why the default judgment was set aside and the matter remitted ([72], [81]). The statements at [67]-[68] are framed as appearing to overstate the need to show predatory or exploitative conduct, in an interlocutory assessment of arguability.
Classification unresolved · Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing)
Read judgment: [55]–[58] (opens in a new tab)
Griffiths AJA sets out the discussion of the High Court authorities in Nitopi v Nitopi without choosing between the approaches taken there. He does not resolve or adopt a substantive approach, but he relies on the tension between those authorities in deciding that the primary judge’s reliance on Kakavas alone was an error and that the defence was reasonably arguable. The passages therefore support the ground of decision on arguability without settling which approach is correct, and the substantive approaches themselves were not decided.
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · White JA (Basten AJA agreeing with his further reasons)
Read judgment: [2]–[8] (opens in a new tab)
White JA agreed with Griffiths AJA’s reasons and orders and gave a further, distinct route: the proposed defence, framed as actual undue influence, was arguable under Yerkey v Jones and Garcia whether or not predatory conduct or knowledge was shown. Basten AJA agreed with those further reasons, so two of the three Justices adopted them. It is expressed as what Mrs Wakim may be entitled to, an arguability finding, and was not necessary to the orders given Griffiths AJA’s reasons.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Griffiths AJA (White JA and Basten AJA agreeing)
Read judgment: [46] (opens in a new tab), [70]–[71] (opens in a new tab)
Ground 4 was upheld because the difference between the statutory and equitable claims on the role of knowledge needed to be explored at a full trial, so the statutory defence was reasonably arguable. The question of principle itself was not decided; what is ratio is the conclusion that the point made the defence arguable.
Why does this case matter?
Guarantee facts involving a dominant spouse are a familiar setting for an unconscionability problem, and examiners often add a procedural step, such as an application to set aside a judgment or to strike out a defence. Students commonly answer the merits question and skip the threshold one: what the applicant has to show at that stage.
Exam and application relevance
In a guarantee problem, identify each party, including any third party, and what the stronger party knew or should have known. Final hearing, or interlocutory arguability?
This NSW Court of Appeal decision binds lower NSW courts, persuades elsewhere, and does not bind the High Court. Check the current Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).
Check your understanding
What did Mrs Wakim sign ([14])?
How did Campbell J treat her evidence, and on which High Court test ([28], [50])?
Which later authorities did he miss, and why understandably ([59])?
What orders followed ([81])?