Peters v The Queen
Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493
A solicitor was convicted after the judge told the jury to ask whether he must have realised honest people would regard his conduct as dishonest. Was that the right test?
Affirmed by Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16
In Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16, a single joint judgment of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ described Toohey and Gaudron JJ’s holding in Peters at [18]: to decide whether an act is dishonest in the ordinary sense the state of mind said to make it dishonest is identified first and the conduct is then assessed against the standards of ordinary, decent people, and Toohey and Gaudron JJ’s rejection of the Ghosh requirement that the person also realised the act was dishonest by those standards ([57]-[58]). The Court added that the ordinary meaning of dishonesty had been unanimously endorsed in Macleod and that it requires a focus on the person’s state of mind ([58]).
Qualified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 22 February 2010
Since 22 February 2010, s 4B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) has defined dishonest for the whole Act as dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to those standards, and has made dishonesty a matter for the trier of fact. That definition includes the second step that Toohey and Gaudron JJ rejected in Peters as a requirement of the general law. So for an offence in that Act that turns on dishonesty, begin with s 4B. Peters remains the High Court’s reasoning on the ordinary meaning of dishonesty where no statutory definition applies.
What happened?
Philip Peters, a solicitor, was tried in the County Court of Victoria on a charge of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth under ss 86(1)(e) and 86A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), and a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. He was acquitted of the second and convicted of the first ([1]). The prosecution case was that he was party to an agreement to conceal the true amount of a client’s income by sham mortgage transactions, and so to deprive the Commissioner of Taxation of tax payable on it ([2]-[4]). His defence was that he did not take part in any such agreement and acted only as the client’s solicitor ([4]).
The trial judge told the jury that the prosecution had to prove that the appellant was dishonest, and directed them in line with the English Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Ghosh: that what he agreed to do was dishonest by the current standards of ordinary and reasonable honest people and, if it was, that he must have realised that it was dishonest by those standards ([5]). The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria dismissed his appeal against conviction, and he appealed to the High Court ([1]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed. Five Justices sat and gave three sets of reasons: Toohey and Gaudron JJ jointly ([1]-[38]); McHugh J, with whom Gummow J agreed ([39]-[93]); and Kirby J ([94]-[146]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Toohey and Gaudron JJ said that, in a case where a jury must decide whether an act is dishonest, the proper course is for the trial judge to identify the knowledge, belief or intent said to make it dishonest and to direct the jury to decide whether the accused had that knowledge, belief or intent and, if so, to determine whether on that account the act was dishonest. Where the question is whether the act was dishonest according to ordinary notions, it is sufficient to tell the jury that this is decided by the standards of ordinary, decent people ([18]).
They rejected the Ghosh direction. They regarded as incongruous a test that asks whether the accused must have realised that the act was dishonest by those standards, because ordinary people judge dishonesty from the person’s knowledge, belief or intent, and they said that in the ordinary case the test distracts from the factual issue and in the unusual case runs two separate questions together ([15]-[17], [19]). A statute may use “dishonestly” in its ordinary meaning or in a special sense, such as the sense in which an absence of belief in a legal right was held to be required in R v Salvo, and in either case it will ordinarily be necessary for the judge to explain precisely what the legislation requires ([12], [18], [34]).
The Justices divided. McHugh J held that dishonesty is not an element of conspiracy to defraud and that it is for the judge to decide whether the facts alleged amount to an agreement to use dishonest means ([39], [83]-[86]). Kirby J regarded dishonesty as an element of the offence, to be judged by what the accused in fact believed ([114], [137]-[140]). He said that, because the Court was evenly divided on the applicable test and it was essential to give clear instruction to trial judges, he withdrew his own opinions and concurred, for the purpose of procuring a holding, in the opinions of Toohey and Gaudron JJ on the point of difference between them and McHugh and Gummow JJ ([145]). That difference was whether the question whether the agreed means are dishonest is, in a borderline case, left to the jury ([29], [34]).
The joint reasons in Macleod v The Queen adopted the passage at [18] for s 173 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Toohey and Gaudron JJ
Read judgment: [19] (opens in a new tab), [35]–[37] (opens in a new tab)
Rejecting the Ghosh direction was part of the reasoning used to dispose of the complaint about the trial directions. On the issues actually raised, the jury had adequately been directed about the sham transactions and intended prejudice to the Commissioner; requiring it also to find that Peters knew his conduct was dishonest by ordinary standards gave him an unwarranted forensic advantage. That explains why the erroneous direction caused no miscarriage of justice and the appeal failed.
Classification unresolved · Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Kirby J concurring on the point of difference
Read judgment: [18] (opens in a new tab), [29] (opens in a new tab), [34] (opens in a new tab), [145] (opens in a new tab)
The general direction at [18] must be distinguished from the ground on which these facts were resolved. In discussing a borderline dispute about characterising the agreed means as dishonest, Toohey and Gaudron JJ favoured leaving that question to the jury, but expressly said at [29] that these issues need not be pursued in this case. Kirby J nevertheless withdrew his competing opinions and concurred on the point of difference to procure a holding. This gives the guidance special authority, while making an unqualified description of every part of it as reasoning necessary to dismiss this appeal misleading.
Separate reasoning · McHugh J, with Gummow J agreeing
Read judgment: [83]–[87] (opens in a new tab), [91] (opens in a new tab), [93] (opens in a new tab)
McHugh J concurred in dismissing the appeal by a distinct route: dishonesty was not a separate element of this conspiracy offence, and the judge determined whether the alleged facts constituted dishonest means, leaving proof of those facts to the jury. Requiring the additional Ghosh findings therefore favoured Peters. Gummow J adopted McHugh J’s reasons at [93]. Their agreement in the result did not adopt the joint reasons’ position on who decides a borderline characterisation.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [137]–[140] (opens in a new tab), [141]–[146] (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J initially reasoned that the jury should focus on Peters’ actual beliefs and that the objective Ghosh criterion was erroneous. On that approach he would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, rather than applying the proviso. These were reasons for a dissenting result, but he expressly withdrew his opinions at [145] and finally concurred in the joint reasons on their point of difference with McHugh and Gummow JJ, accepting dismissal at [146]. His preferred subjective test must therefore not be presented as the Court’s adopted test or as a final dissent in the orders.
Why does this case matter?
The appeal failed although the direction at trial included a step that favoured the appellant. Toohey and Gaudron JJ and McHugh J each said that it gave him a forensic advantage to which he was not entitled ([37], [87], [91]), so a departure from the preferred direction did not by itself lead to a new trial.
Exam and application relevance
Attribute the direction to Toohey and Gaudron JJ, with Kirby J’s concurrence on the point of difference, and say that McHugh and Gummow JJ gave separate reasons. Then ask whether the statute in the problem uses dishonestly in its ordinary meaning, defines the word, or uses it in a special sense.
In New South Wales, begin with the statutory definition in s 4B if the offence is in the Crimes Act, and say that it is later than Peters. Where the offence is a Commonwealth offence or one under another jurisdiction’s law, check that jurisdiction’s current statute before relying on Peters.
Check your understanding
1. Whose reasons contain the direction on dishonesty at [18], and how did Kirby J come to concur in them?
2. What did Toohey and Gaudron JJ say about the Ghosh requirement that the accused must have realised the act was dishonest by ordinary standards?
3. On McHugh J’s reasons, who decides whether the agreed means are dishonest, and what follows about the status of dishonesty in the offence?