Dishonesty and claim of right in property offences

What ‘dishonestly’ and ‘fraudulently’ mean in property offences, how the High Court treated dishonesty and claim of right in Macleod, and how the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland texts differ.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
nsw, vic, qld
Subjects
criminal-law-and-procedure
Topics
offences-against-property

Learning outcomes

  • State how the High Court in Macleod directed that dishonesty be decided, and what it said about the accused’s own appreciation of dishonesty.
  • Explain claim of right as an honest claim to a civil entitlement and say who bears the evidential and persuasive burdens.
  • Apply the definition or carve-outs of dishonesty in the New South Wales, Victorian or Queensland statute to a set of facts.

Several of the central property offences in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, theft, stealing and fraud among them, turn on a word of moral quality: “dishonestly” or “fraudulently”. Before asking whether property was taken, a student must ask what the statute means by that word, because the answer decides whether an honest belief in a right to the property is a defence, whether the accused must have known the conduct was dishonest, and who has to prove what. This article takes the High Court’s discussion in Macleod v The Queen [2003] HCA 24 and sets it against the current provisions of the three States. It does not restate the elements of the offences, which are in Offences against property, and it does not state the law of any other jurisdiction.

What the High Court said about “fraudulently”

Mr Macleod, a company director, applied more than $2 million of investors’ funds, held by the company on trust for film production, to his own use. He was charged under s 173 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as it stood in the 1990s, with fraudulently applying company property for his own use or benefit or for a purpose other than the company’s. The High Court dismissed his appeal1.

Three points in the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ matter here. First, the “consent” of a sole shareholder did not answer the charge, because a self-interested consent given in furtherance of a crime against the company is not the consent of the company. Second, the Court treated “fraudulently” in s 173 as interchangeable with “dishonestly”, but warned that statements about other statutory or common law offences must not be applied without attending to the terms, scope and purpose of the section in hand. Third, the Court adopted the approach of Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 4932: the trial judge identifies the knowledge, belief or intent said to make the conduct dishonest, directs the jury to decide whether the accused had it and, if so, whether on that account the act was dishonest, and where the question is dishonesty according to ordinary notions it is enough to say that it is decided by the standards of ordinary, decent people. McHugh J, in separate reasons, stated the same three steps.

The joint reasons added that, on that approach, “there is no requirement that the appellant must have realised that the acts in question were dishonest by current standards of ordinary, decent people”. Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Peters had rejected the extra step of the English R v Ghosh, under which an accused must also have realised that ordinary people would see the conduct as dishonest. In Peters the Justices gave separate reasons and divided on the test; Kirby J said he preferred his own opinions but, for the purpose of procuring a holding, concurred in the opinions of Toohey and Gaudron JJ on the point of difference between them and McHugh and Gummow JJ. The point was decided in Macleod on s 173, not on the provisions below.

Claim of right

Macleod treated claim of right as one expression of a general principle: the prosecution must prove the intent that is an ingredient of the crime, and an honestly held belief, reasonable or not, inconsistent with that intent affords a defence. The joint reasons made three points. The claim must be to an entitlement in or to the property under the civil law; ignorance of the criminal law is not a claim of right. The claim must be honest, though it may be unreasonable and unfounded, in which case it is less likely to raise a reasonable doubt. And the evidential burden is on the accused while the persuasive burden of rebutting it is on the prosecution, a statement of Glanville Williams that the joint reasons set out as following from that principle. Where “fraudulently” requires dishonesty by ordinary notions, the Court said, a claim made honestly and in good faith is inconsistent with the fraud, and no separate direction on a “subjective” claim of right was needed on the facts.

What each State’s text does with the word

New South Wales defines the word. Section 4B of the Crimes Act 1900 provides that, in the Act, “dishonest” means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to those standards, and that dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact3. Fraud under s 192E is committed by a person who, by any deception, dishonestly obtains property belonging to another or obtains a financial advantage or causes a financial disadvantage, and s 192E(2) adds that obtaining may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay. The second limb of s 4B is the step the joint reasons in Macleod said s 173 did not require. That comparison is this article’s, not a holding: Macleod predates s 4B and does not interpret it.

Victoria states theft in s 72(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 as dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it, and s 73 then says what is not dishonest4. An appropriation is not to be regarded as dishonest if the person appropriates in the belief that they have in law the right to deprive the other of it, or that they would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it, or (except where the property came to them as trustee or personal representative) that the owner cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. Section 73(3) says an appropriation may be dishonest although the person is willing to pay.

Queensland uses two words. Stealing under s 391(1) of the Criminal Code 1899 is fraudulently taking or converting, and s 391(2) deems a taking or conversion fraudulent if done with any of a list of intents, beginning with an intent to permanently deprive the owner5. Fraud under s 408C(1) is committed by a person who “dishonestly” does one of the listed things; s 408C(3) provides that conduct may be dishonest even though the person is willing to pay, intends to restore the property, or the owner consents, and is not taken to be dishonest where the person does not know to whom the property belongs and believes on reasonable grounds that the owner cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps, unless the property came into their possession or control as trustee or personal representative. Separately, s 22(2) provides that a person is not criminally responsible, as for an offence relating to property, for an act done in the exercise of an honest claim of right and without intention to defraud.

None of the Victorian or Queensland provisions is interpreted in Macleod or in Peters. Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Peters noted that decisions on dishonestly obtaining by deception in Victoria and New South Wales had treated “dishonestly” in a special statutory sense tied to a belief in a legal right, and said a direction must then explain that sense; they did not decide those provisions.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Name the State and the offence, then find the word the section uses: “dishonestly”, “fraudulently” or a defined term.
  2. State whether the statute defines it. In New South Wales go to s 4B; in Victoria, to s 73; in Queensland, to ss 391, 408C(3) and 22(2).
  3. Identify the facts said to show the accused’s knowledge, belief or intent, and separate them from the characterisation of those facts as dishonest.
  4. If the accused claims an entitlement to the property, ask whether it is a claim to a civil right, whether it was honestly held, and which provision gives it effect; then say who bears the evidential burden and who the persuasive burden.
  5. Say whether willingness to pay, intent to restore or the owner’s consent answers the charge under the provision, rather than assuming it does.
  6. State that Macleod decided the position under s 173 and is a guide, not a ruling, on the current State provisions.

Self-check

  • Have I said that the High Court’s statements in Macleod concern s 173 and adopted the reasoning of Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Peters, on which the Justices in Peters divided?
  • Have I used the definition in the Act of the State in question, and not borrowed another State’s?
  • Have I treated claim of right as an honest claim to a civil entitlement, and said who bears each burden?
  • Have I avoided stating that the New South Wales definition overrules, or is governed by, Macleod?

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