Macleod v The Queen
Macleod v The Queen [2003] HCA 24
A man who owned every share in a company took its investors’ money for himself. Could he say the company had consented, and what must a jury be told about dishonesty and a claimed right to the money?
Qualified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 22 February 2010
The offence Macleod construed, s 173 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), no longer appears in the Act as in force from 22 February 2010. From that date the fraud offence in s 192E applies, and s 4B defines dishonest for the whole Act as dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to those standards, with dishonesty a matter for the trier of fact. That definition includes the second step that Macleod, following Peters, held was not required. So for conduct from that date begin with ss 4B and 192E. Macleod remains the High Court’s reasoning on the ordinary meaning of dishonesty and on claim of right as it applied to s 173.
Affirmed by Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16
In Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16, a single joint judgment of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ said that the ordinary meaning of dishonesty that is usually intended was unanimously endorsed by the Court in Macleod, that as Callinan J explained in that case this ordinary meaning requires a focus on the person’s state of mind, and that the state of mind must be identified before it is assessed against the standards of ordinary, decent people to determine whether it involves dishonesty ([58]).
What happened?
Robert Macleod was a director of Trainex Pty Ltd and, on the evidence, its only shareholder ([7]). Through Trainex and related companies he promoted a film production scheme to several thousand investors, whose money was to be held on trust for film production ([6], [8]). Of the funds raised, about $718,000 was applied to film production and more than $2 million to his own use, including a home unit in Queensland ([9]).
He was tried in the District Court of New South Wales before a judge and jury and convicted of 18 of 25 counts, five of them under s 173 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which made it an offence for a director, officer or member of a body corporate to fraudulently take or apply its property for his own use or benefit, or for any purpose other than the company’s ([2]-[3]). The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal against those five convictions ([4]). In the High Court he argued that the company had consented through its sole shareholder, that the jury was not properly directed on dishonesty, and that it was not properly directed on his claim of right ([17]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed. Five Justices sat and gave three sets of reasons: Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ jointly ([1]-[56]); McHugh J ([57]-[108]); and Callinan J ([109]-[140]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
On consent: Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that the self-interested consent of a sole shareholder, given in furtherance of a crime committed against the company, cannot be said to represent the consent of the company, so it was no answer to the charges ([30]). McHugh J and Callinan J reached the same conclusion on the separate legal personality of the company ([74]-[76], [93], [127]-[131]).
On dishonesty: the joint reasons held that fraudulently in s 173 is interchangeable with dishonestly ([34]), and adopted the reasoning in Peters v The Queen. The judge identifies the knowledge, belief or intent said to make the conduct dishonest, the jury decides whether the accused had it and, if so, whether on that account the act was dishonest by the standards of ordinary, decent people, and there is no requirement that the accused must have realised that the acts were dishonest by those standards ([35]-[38], [46], [55]). McHugh J stated the directions in three steps ([99]-[101]), and Callinan J applied the same passage and said that an explanation of what dishonesty involves will rarely need elaboration to a jury ([130]).
On claim of right: the joint reasons said that a claim of right is a manifestation of the general principle that any honestly held belief, whether reasonable or not, inconsistent with the intent that is an element of the crime affords a defence. It must be a claim to an entitlement under the civil law, and it must be made honestly ([39]-[42]). It functions to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s overall burden of proving that the taking or application was fraudulent ([44]). They adopted the statement that the evidential burden of a claim of right is on the accused and the persuasive burden is on the prosecution to rebut it ([39]). They held that a direction about a subjective criterion for a claim of right was neither necessary nor appropriate in the case ([46], [51]), and McHugh J agreed ([107]).
The case predates s 4B of the Crimes Act and does not interpret the current provisions of any State.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [30] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
This is the joint majority’s answer to the consent ground, which sought to have the convictions quashed. Rejecting the attribution of the shareholder’s self-interested consent to the company was necessary to reject that ground under former s 173. The ratio concerns consent given in furtherance of a crime against the company; it does not deny that a shareholder can ever authorise a company transaction.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [38] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [46] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [55] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
The joint majority adopted the Peters approach to dishonesty for former s 173 and applied it to uphold the jury directions. This was necessary to reject the asserted misdirection and dismiss the appeal, rather than an incidental account of Peters. The quoted formulation originated with Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Peters; its express adoption and application here make it part of the joint majority’s reasoning. Paragraph 46 rejects a requirement that the accused recognise his conduct as dishonest by ordinary standards. This ratio does not construe the later statutory definition in s 4B.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [39] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [41]–[42] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [44]–[46] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
These passages supply the joint majority’s reasons for rejecting the claim-of-right direction ground. They adopt the civil-entitlement and honest-belief principles from Walden and the burden formulation from Glanville Williams, then explain how the asserted belief bears on proof of fraudulent application under former s 173. That reasoning supports the conclusion that the directions given were sufficient and an additional subjective direction was neither necessary nor appropriate on these facts. It is ratio on that ground, not a general abolition of claim of right or of the need to consider an honestly held belief.
Why does this case matter?
Students often reach for the owner’s consent as a defence, borrowing from English and Victorian theft cases. The joint reasons warned that applying statements from authorities on other statutory or common law offences invites error and said that s 173 is to be construed by reference to its own terms, scope and purpose ([33]).
Exam and application relevance
Start with the offence charged and the date of the conduct. Macleod concerns s 173 as it stood when the offences were charged, and for later conduct in New South Wales the starting points are ss 4B and 192E of the Crimes Act. In another State, begin with that State’s offence and its own provision on dishonesty or claim of right.
If a claim of right is raised, ask what mens rea the offence requires, because the joint reasons said that the directions about a claim of right must reflect the elements of the offence charged and the nature of the mens rea required ([45]).
Check your understanding
1. Why did the joint reasons hold that the sole shareholder’s consent was no answer to the charges under s 173?
2. Which judgment did the joint reasons adopt for the direction on dishonesty, and what did they say about whether the accused must have realised that his acts were dishonest?
3. Where a claim of right is raised, on whom did the joint reasons place the evidential burden and the persuasive burden?