Peters v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 1998

Criminal Law And ProcedureOffences Against Property

Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493

A solicitor was convicted after the judge told the jury to ask whether he must have realised honest people would regard his conduct as dishonest. Was that the right test?

Affirmed by Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16

In Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16, a single joint judgment of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ described Toohey and Gaudron JJ’s holding in Peters at [18]: to decide whether an act is dishonest in the ordinary sense the state of mind said to make it dishonest is identified first and the conduct is then assessed against the standards of ordinary, decent people, and Toohey and Gaudron JJ’s rejection of the Ghosh requirement that the person also realised the act was dishonest by those standards ([57]-[58]). The Court added that the ordinary meaning of dishonesty had been unanimously endorsed in Macleod and that it requires a focus on the person’s state of mind ([58]).

Qualified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 22 February 2010

Since 22 February 2010, s 4B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) has defined dishonest for the whole Act as dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to those standards, and has made dishonesty a matter for the trier of fact. That definition includes the second step that Toohey and Gaudron JJ rejected in Peters as a requirement of the general law. So for an offence in that Act that turns on dishonesty, begin with s 4B. Peters remains the High Court’s reasoning on the ordinary meaning of dishonesty where no statutory definition applies.

What happened?

A solicitor was tried in Victoria for conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth, and acquitted of a separate conspiracy charge. He denied joining any fraud agreement, saying he only acted as solicitor. The trial judge directed the jury using the Ghosh test for dishonesty. His appeal failed in Victoria’s Court of Appeal, then went to the High Court. Was that direction correct?

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed. Five Justices sat and gave three sets of reasons: Toohey and Gaudron JJ jointly ([1]-[38]); McHugh J, with whom Gummow J agreed ([39]-[93]); and Kirby J ([94]-[146]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Toohey and Gaudron JJ said judges should identify the knowledge, belief or intent said to make an act dishonest. The jury then decides if the accused had that state of mind, and whether that made the act dishonest. If the test is ordinary notions of dishonesty, it is enough to ask what ordinary, decent people would think.

They rejected the Ghosh direction, saying it wrongly separates the accused’s knowledge from the dishonesty question.

McHugh J held dishonesty is not an element of conspiracy to defraud; the judge decides if alleged facts show dishonest means. Kirby J treated dishonesty as an element, judged by the accused’s actual belief. Because the Court was split, Kirby J joined Toohey and Gaudron JJ’s view to produce a majority holding.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Toohey and Gaudron JJ

Read judgment: [19] (opens in a new tab), [35]–[37] (opens in a new tab)

Rejecting the Ghosh direction was part of the reasoning used to dispose of the complaint about the trial directions. On the issues actually raised, the jury had adequately been directed about the sham transactions and intended prejudice to the Commissioner; requiring it also to find that Peters knew his conduct was dishonest by ordinary standards gave him an unwarranted forensic advantage. That explains why the erroneous direction caused no miscarriage of justice and the appeal failed.

Classification unresolved · Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Kirby J concurring on the point of difference

Read judgment: [18] (opens in a new tab), [29] (opens in a new tab), [34] (opens in a new tab), [145] (opens in a new tab)

The general direction at [18] must be distinguished from the ground on which these facts were resolved. In discussing a borderline dispute about characterising the agreed means as dishonest, Toohey and Gaudron JJ favoured leaving that question to the jury, but expressly said at [29] that these issues need not be pursued in this case. Kirby J nevertheless withdrew his competing opinions and concurred on the point of difference to procure a holding. This gives the guidance special authority, while making an unqualified description of every part of it as reasoning necessary to dismiss this appeal misleading.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J, with Gummow J agreeing

Read judgment: [83]–[87] (opens in a new tab), [91] (opens in a new tab), [93] (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J concurred in dismissing the appeal by a distinct route: dishonesty was not a separate element of this conspiracy offence, and the judge determined whether the alleged facts constituted dishonest means, leaving proof of those facts to the jury. Requiring the additional Ghosh findings therefore favoured Peters. Gummow J adopted McHugh J’s reasons at [93]. Their agreement in the result did not adopt the joint reasons’ position on who decides a borderline characterisation.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [137]–[140] (opens in a new tab), [141]–[146] (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J initially reasoned that the jury should focus on Peters’ actual beliefs and that the objective Ghosh criterion was erroneous. On that approach he would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, rather than applying the proviso. These were reasons for a dissenting result, but he expressly withdrew his opinions at [145] and finally concurred in the joint reasons on their point of difference with McHugh and Gummow JJ, accepting dismissal at [146]. His preferred subjective test must therefore not be presented as the Court’s adopted test or as a final dissent in the orders.

Why does this case matter?

The appeal failed although the direction at trial included a step that favoured the appellant. Toohey and Gaudron JJ and McHugh J each said that it gave him a forensic advantage to which he was not entitled ([37], [87], [91]), so a departure from the preferred direction did not by itself lead to a new trial.

Check your understanding

Whose reasons contain the [18] direction? Why did Kirby J concur?

What did Toohey and Gaudron JJ say about Ghosh?

Who decides, per McHugh J?

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.