Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2004

Intellectual Property And Technology LawCopyright

Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 14; (2004) 218 CLR 273

A comedy show replayed clips of between eight and 42 seconds from a rival network’s programmes. Is that enough to infringe copyright in a television broadcast, and what exactly is the broadcast that was copied?

What happened?

Ten broadcast a weekly programme called The Panel, which in 15 episodes in 1999 and 2000 included 20 extracts from programmes Nine had broadcast earlier ([3]). Each extract had been put on an individual video tape before use ([3]), and the extracts ran from eight to 42 seconds ([4]). Nine sued Ten for infringement of its copyright in television broadcasts ([3]). The issues turned on the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) as it stood before the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) commenced on 4 March 2001 ([1]).

Conti J held that Ten had not taken the whole or a substantial part of any of Nine’s broadcasts ([7]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Sundberg, Finkelstein and Hely JJ) reversed that and held that each visual image capable of being observed as a separate image on a television screen, with its accompanying sounds, is “a television broadcast” in which copyright subsists ([7]-[8]). Ten appealed to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the Full Court’s orders of 19 July 2002, and remitted the matter to the Full Court to determine the remaining issues in the appeal to that Court ([79]-[80]). McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[80]). Kirby J ([81]-[106]) and Callinan J ([107]-[156]) each gave separate reasons and would have dismissed the appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Substantial part. McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the requirement that an infringer who takes less than the whole must take at least a substantial part “plays a well-established and central part in copyright law” and that questions of quality, which could include “the potency of particular images or sounds, or both, in a broadcast”, arise as well as quantity, for copyrights in subject-matter other than works and for copyrights in original works ([47]). The question of the taking of a substantial part is separate from fair dealing and may not be by-passed by going directly to the fair dealing defences ([21]).

Section 25(4) treats a cinematograph film or photograph of “any of the visual images” in a broadcast as a film of the broadcast, but does not displace s 14(1), so whether what was taken is a substantial part of the broadcast is still to be decided ([59], [61], [65]). Kirby J and Callinan J, dissenting on the construction of “a television broadcast”, also spoke of quality: Kirby J said that a substantial part of a television broadcast “will not necessarily represent a segment of long duration” ([100]), and Callinan J accepted that substantiality may in some circumstances require consideration of “the quality, importance, relevance and duration of part of a work” but held that a very brief segment can still infringe ([151]).

What “a television broadcast” is. McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that the Full Court had “fixed upon the medium of transmission, not the message conveyed by its use” ([39]). The interest the legislation protects is “the cost and skill in assembling or preparing and transmitting programmes to the public” ([70]), so the broadcast is the programme and not each image with its sounds ([69]-[70]). Their Honours said there can be “no absolute precision”, but that the programmes Nine identified in its pleading answered the description because they were put out “as discrete periods of broadcasting identified and promoted by a title” ([75]).

Television advertisements were accepted as discrete broadcasts ([76]). Their Honours reserved the question whether a segment of a programme may be the broadcast against which substantiality is measured for “a particular case where the point arises”, and added that a news broadcast’s segments, items or stories do not necessarily each become “a television broadcast” ([77]).

Dissents. Kirby J would have upheld the Full Court’s reasoning, which he found compelling, because the language of the Act left no scope for another approach ([83]-[88], [90]). Callinan J would also have dismissed the appeal: “programme” is not a word in the Act, and the definitions in the Act do not confine a broadcast to a programme ([132], [146]-[150]).

What the Court did not decide. The majority did not decide whether any of the 20 extracts was a substantial part of a Nine broadcast. That issue was remitted ([79]-[80]). The fair dealing defences were not in issue in the High Court ([7]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [47] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [59] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [61] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

The majority rejected the Full Court’s construction because it deprived substantiality of its proper operation. Their reasoning required s 14(1) to remain applicable despite s 25(4), with substantiality involving quality as well as quantity. This supported allowing the appeal and remitting the substantiality issues; it did not determine whether any particular clip was substantial.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [100] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J dissented in the result. His explanation that brief but powerful images may be substantial rejected duration alone as decisive, but formed part of his different approach to the protected broadcast and did not adopt the majority’s construction of s 25(4).

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [151] (PDF p 63) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. He accepted that quality and importance may matter, but considered the statutory provisions to disclose a contrary intention to the general operation of s 14. His qualified acceptance of qualitative assessment therefore does not amount to joining the majority’s ground of decision.

Proposition 2

Ratio · McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [75] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)

Identifying Nine’s pleaded programmes as the relevant broadcasts was necessary to reject the Full Court’s single-image approach and restore the substantiality inquiry on remittal. The holding concerns those discrete, titled broadcasts; the majority expressly disclaimed absolute precision for every possible broadcast.

Classification unresolved · McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [77] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)

The majority expressly reserved whether a programme segment could itself supply the broadcast used for measurement in another case. This limits the programme-based holding: neither an invariable whole-programme rule nor a rule treating every news item as a separate broadcast was decided.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [150] (PDF p 63) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. He treated the statutory definition of television broadcast as controlling and rejected importing a programme concept from other legislation or industry practice. That route conflicts with the majority’s identification of Nine’s programmes as the relevant broadcasts.

Why does this case matter?

A problem that sets a short clip against a long programme is the usual setting for this case. It concerns copyright in a broadcast, which the Court treated as separate from copyright in the works that a broadcast may contain ([31]-[32]).

Exam and application relevance

Identify the broadcast in which copyright is claimed before comparing the excerpt with it; the Court’s discussion of how to identify it is at [66]-[77].

Attribute each point to the reasons it comes from: the joint reasons and each of the two separate sets of reasons are different views of the same Act.

Check the current form of ss 14, 25(4), 87 and 91 against your question; the Court applied the earlier text.

Check your understanding

1. Which provision did McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ say that the Full Court had treated as controlling the meaning of “a television broadcast”, and what did they say about its relationship to s 14(1) ([45], [61])?

2. According to the joint reasons at [39], what had the Full Court fixed upon, and what, on their Honours’ view, had it not?

3. Which two Justices dissented, and what did each say about quality in the context of substantiality ([100], [151])?

4. At [77] their Honours reserved a question for another case. What was it, and why can it not be taken to have been decided in this case?

5. Why did the Court remit the matter to the Full Court instead of deciding whether the extracts were a substantial part ([79]-[80])?