Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2012

Intellectual Property And Technology LawCopyright

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16

An internet provider received weekly notices listing IP addresses said to be sharing films over BitTorrent, and it cancelled none of its customers’ accounts. Did that inactivity make it a secondary infringer?

What happened?

The 34 appellants own or exclusively license copyright in thousands of films and television programs, and iiNet is an Australian internet service provider (ISP) ([2]). In 2008 and 2009 it had about 490,000 customers ([35]). Some customers used the BitTorrent file sharing system to make the appellants’ films available online ([4], [21]). iiNet’s customer agreement prohibited use of the service to infringe another person’s rights and let iiNet cancel, suspend or restrict the service in specified circumstances (cll 4.2 and 14.2, [27]).

From 2 July 2008 until August 2009 the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft sent iiNet a notice, and then a notice every week, alleging infringement by its customers and attaching spreadsheets of the IP addresses involved ([30]-[31], [34]). iiNet did not suspend or terminate any customer account in response to the notices ([35]). By mid-2008 more than half of the usage of iiNet’s services by volume was BitTorrent file sharing, and it was common knowledge that the system was used for infringing activities, although not solely for them ([38]). The appellants did not sue the customers. They sued iiNet alone, and only for authorising its customers’ infringements ([55]-[56]). The primary judge, Cowdroy J, and then the Full Court of the Federal Court (Emmett and Nicholas JJ; Jagot J dissenting) ruled against the appellants ([1], [40], [81]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs ([80], [151]). French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[80]) and Gummow and Hayne JJ gave separate joint reasons ([81]-[151]). Both sets of reasons led to that order ([80], [147]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The statutory inquiry. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said that resort to dictionary synonyms for “authorise” may have been necessary in the past, but that “attention is now directed in the first place to s 101(1A)”, which “is intended to inform the drawing of an inference of authorisation by reference to the facts and circumstances there identified, and recourse must be had to it” ([68]). They said that an alleged authoriser “must have a power to prevent the primary infringements” ([69]), and that the questions the section raises are largely questions of fact from which the ultimate inference is drawn ([63]).

Gummow and Hayne JJ reached the same place by their own route. They said s 101(1A) takes an act of primary infringement and asks whether a person authorised it, and that the matters to be taken into account “include, but are not confined to, the matters identified in pars (a), (b) and (c)” ([135]). They also said that the expression “sanction, approve, countenance” should not be reduced to one element, “countenance”, given its broadest dictionary meaning ([125]), and that an ISP is not taken to have authorised an infringement of a film “merely because” it provided facilities (s 112E, [136]).

Applying it to iiNet. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that iiNet had no direct technical power to prevent a customer using BitTorrent to make a film available ([65]), and only an indirect power, by ending the contract ([70]). The notices, “as and when they were served”, gave iiNet no reasonable basis for sending warnings that threatened suspension or termination, so its inactivity gave rise to no inference of authorisation ([78]). They rejected the appellants’ case because it “assumes obligations on the part of an ISP which the Copyright Act does not impose” ([77]).

Gummow and Hayne JJ held that the appellants’ four key matters, taken together, did not establish authorisation: the progression from the evidence to indifference to countenancing to authorisation “is too long a march” ([142]-[143]). iiNet had power to control the infringements only “in an attenuated sense”, and it was not unreasonable for it not to act on the incomplete allegations in the notices without further investigation ([146]).

What the Court did not decide. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ found it unnecessary to consider iiNet’s notice of contention ([80]). Gummow and Hayne JJ found it unnecessary to consider two further matters: iiNet’s reliance on Pt 13 Div 2 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), a contention it did not press in oral argument, and the safe harbour provisions in Pt V Div 2AA of the Copyright Act, on which it did not rely in the High Court ([148]-[149]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ

Read judgment: [68]–[69] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

The majority needed to reject the appellants’ reliance on countenancing as sufficient authorisation. Their statutory approach required the section 101(1A) inquiry, including power to prevent infringement, and supplied the legal basis for assessing iiNet’s limited power and its response to the notices. These are reasons necessary to their dismissal of the authorisation claim.

Separate reasoning · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [135]–[136] (PDF p 50) (opens in a new tab)

Gummow and Hayne JJ concurred in dismissing the appeal through separate joint reasons. They framed the inquiry around each act of primary infringement, the non-exhaustive statutory matters and section 112E’s qualification for mere provision of facilities. This framework leads into their assessment of iiNet’s relationship with subscribers and capacity to prevent infringement; concurrence in the orders does not make every part of their route the majority’s reasoning.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ

Read judgment: [77]–[78] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the majority’s decisive application of section 101(1A): iiNet had only indirect power through termination, and the notices as served supplied no reasonable basis for warnings threatening suspension or termination. Those circumstances prevented an inference of authorisation from inactivity and required rejection of the claim. The reasoning concerns these powers and notices, rather than a general immunity for internet service providers.

Separate reasoning · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [143] (PDF p 51) (opens in a new tab), [146] (PDF p 52) (opens in a new tab)

Gummow and Hayne JJ concurred in the dismissal. Their separate route rejected the proposed progression from inactivity to indifference, countenancing and authorisation. The attenuated control and incomplete allegations made iiNet’s refusal to investigate and act reasonable on these facts. These were grounds for their conclusion, rather than incidental observations, but remain attributable to their separate joint reasons.

Why does this case matter?

This is the case an examiner expects when a problem asks whether an intermediary such as an internet service provider is liable for what its customers do with its service. Students often build the answer on what the intermediary knew and on its ability to cut a customer off. Both were in front of the Court here, so the case shows what an answer on authorisation has to go on to address.

Exam and application relevance

Where the alleged authoriser is an intermediary, the Justices’ treatment of its technical and contractual position, and of the information it received, is at [65]-[78] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) and [137]-[146] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Compare your facts with those paragraphs rather than with the outcome alone.

Attribute each point to the reasons it comes from. The decision rests on the facts that iiNet had no involvement in the BitTorrent system and was not a host of infringing material ([65]), and on notices of the kind described at [30]-[34]; where a defendant was involved in the infringing activity in a way iiNet was not, the analysis has to be done on those facts.

Check your understanding

1. According to French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [68], what is the first place to which attention is directed when asking whether a person authorised an infringement, and what is the status of a dictionary synonym such as “countenance”?

2. Which Justices said that the matters in s 101(1A) “include, but are not confined to” paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), and at which paragraph?

3. What power to prevent its customers’ infringements did iiNet lack, and what power did it have, according to French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [65] and [70]?

4. What did the appellants’ notices fail to give iiNet according to [78], and what followed from that?

5. Whose words are “too long a march”, and which progression do they describe?