Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt

High Court of Australia · 2019

Consumer And Competition LawUnconscionable Conduct

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt (2019) 267 CLR 1; [2019] HCA 18

A storekeeper controlled customer bank cards under a book-up credit system. Why did judges applying the same statutory prohibition reach different conclusions?

Clarified by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 40

Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ read Kiefel CJ and Bell J’s observations in light of ASIC’s case as pleaded ([43]-[50]). They rejected a reading of Kobelt as requiring pre-existing vulnerability or disadvantage in every statutory unconscionability case, noting that Keane J’s view in Kobelt was to the contrary ([78], [86]). Under s 21 of the ACL, neither equitable special disadvantage nor exploitation of some pre-existing vulnerability is essential ([93]). This is a Full Court explanation of statutory scope, not a reversal of the High Court’s result in Kobelt.

What happened?

Mr Kobelt operated a general store in Mintabie, South Australia. Almost all of his customers were Anangu people from remote communities. Under his book-up credit arrangements, customers provided bank cards and PINs. Mr Kobelt or family members withdrew all or nearly all available funds when wages or Centrelink payments arrived, with arrangements for reducing debt and obtaining further goods ([1], [20]-[23]).

ASIC challenged the system under s 12CB of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), which concerns unconscionable conduct in connection with financial services. The primary judge found the book-up system unconscionable and imposed a $100,000 penalty ([10]). The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed Mr Kobelt’s appeal in part and set aside those orders ([11]), and ASIC appealed to the High Court by special leave ([13]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed ASIC’s appeal with costs, four Justices to three. Kiefel CJ and Bell J gave joint reasons; Gageler J and Keane J each concurred separately. Nettle and Gordon JJ dissented jointly. Edelman J also dissented, agreeing with their conclusions and orders while adding his own reasons ([80], [112], [115], [265], [268] and the order).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The statute applied was s 12CB of the ASIC Act, rather than s 21 of the ACL. The statutory prohibition addresses conduct that is unconscionable in all the circumstances and is expressly not limited by the unwritten law of unconscionability ([5]). In stating the normative standard, Gageler J followed the Full Federal Court’s approach in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd, which concerned what he called “materially identical provisions” (s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 21 of the ACL) ([87] and footnote 73).

Kiefel CJ and Bell J understood unconscionable conduct as conduct objectively against conscience. On ASIC’s case, they found the absence of unconscientious advantage determinative. They expressly noted that the case as run did not provide an occasion to reconsider whether statutory unconscionability required special disadvantage and taking advantage of it. Their discussion should be read with that reservation ([14]-[19], [48], [75]-[79]).

Gageler J articulated the statutory normative standard separately. He stressed the gravity of a conclusion that conduct offends conscience, while rejecting terminology that might suggest conscious wrongdoing was required. Conduct of the requisite gravity, he said, need not be found only in a fact-pattern of exploiting a special disadvantage, but the statute does not authorise an “equity-lite” version of unconscionability ([89]-[91]). His evaluation of the evidence did not establish a contravention ([87]-[92], [110]-[112]). Keane J separately concluded that ASIC had not established exploitation of socio-economic vulnerability to extract financial advantage ([115]). In his view the word “unconscionable” in s 12CB itself requires an element of exploitation, imports the moral obloquy associated with victimisation of the vulnerable, and s 12CB(4)(b) does not remove calculated taking advantage as an essential characteristic ([118]-[121]).

The dissent evaluated the arrangement differently. Nettle and Gordon JJ considered that willingness to participate and perceived benefits did not cure the exploitation they identified in the system’s particular terms. They also stressed that book-up itself was not necessarily unconscionable: their objection concerned this system ([262]-[265]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Kiefel CJ and Bell J (joint reasons; two of the four Justices dismissing the appeal)

Read judgment: [19] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [75]–[79] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

Absence of unconscientious advantage obtained by Mr Kobelt from the supply of credit determines their conclusion on ASIC’s case ([19], [75]-[79]). This is the reasoning of two of the four Justices who dismissed the appeal; Gageler J and Keane J gave separate reasons.

Classification unresolved · Kiefel CJ and Bell J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [48] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

Paragraph [48] reserves a question rather than deciding it: because ASIC ran its case on special disadvantage and unconscientious advantage, the appeal did not provide the occasion to consider whether statutory unconscionability still requires either. It is neither necessary reasoning nor obiter in the usual sense, and it is not a formulation attributed to the other Justices.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J (concurring in dismissal, separate reasons)

Read judgment: [87]–[92] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J explains the statutory normative standard, including the gravity of the evaluation and his rejection of language that could suggest conscious wrongdoing. He applies that approach and dismisses the appeal at [111]-[112]. His formulation is attributed to him rather than described as a joint four-Justice test.

Separate reasoning · Keane J (concurring in dismissal, separate reasons)

Read judgment: [115] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab), [118]–[121] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab), [124]–[125] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab)

Keane J agrees that the appeal should be dismissed and adopts parts of the joint reasons, but states his own reasons ([113]-[114]). He treats exploitation, with the moral obloquy of victimisation, as essential to unconscionability under s 12CB ([118]-[121]), and holds that ASIC did not show the book-up system exploited customers’ vulnerability for pecuniary advantage ([115], [124]-[125]). His requirement is attributed to him, not to the Court.

Separate reasoning · Nettle and Gordon JJ (joint dissent), with Edelman J agreeing at [268] and adding his own reasons

Read judgment: [262]–[265] (PDF p 86) (opens in a new tab)

The joint dissent explains why customer willingness and asserted benefits did not answer its criticism of this system’s terms and the advantage taken. It treats the particular system as unconscionable and would allow the appeal. This is a dissenting evaluation, not the Court’s holding or a condemnation of every form of book-up credit.

Why does this case matter?

Kobelt is useful when assessing how much a contested decision supports a proposed statutory threshold.

Exam and application relevance

Before citing Kobelt for a proposed threshold, identify which Justices’ reasons support it and what issue those reasons actually resolved, and attribute it to those Justices rather than to the Court. Apply the matters listed in s 12CC ([6]) to the facts of the problem, and read Quantum Housing [2021] FCAFC 40 before relying on Kobelt for a general threshold requirement.

Check your understanding

1. What was decisive for Kiefel CJ and Bell J on the case ASIC presented?

2. How did the dissent evaluate customer choice and the credit terms?

3. According to Keane J, what element must be present before conduct is unconscionable under s 12CB? ([118]-[121])