Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 40
A company sends investors false letters and demands an unjustified deposit from rival property managers to force a switch, yet no investor’s vulnerability is proven. Is that unconscionable under s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law?
What happened?
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) sued Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (QHG) and Ms Howe, its sole director and secretary, alleging misleading representations in contravention of ss 18(1), 29(1)(l) and 29(1)(m) of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) and unconscionable conduct in contravention of s 21 ([6]). QHG arranged investments in properties that qualified for incentives under the National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS), and it was an Approved Participant in that scheme, which meant that investors depended on it to lodge compliance statements and receive their incentives ([12], [14]). From 2017 its management devised the Roll Up Plan, aimed at pressuring investors to move property management to managers approved by QHG ([13], [14]).
The parties agreed the facts for the penalty hearing. Between February 2017 and July 2018, QHG sent rounds of misleading correspondence to at least 450 investors, with increasing pressure. It imposed accreditation guidelines that required property managers not approved by QHG to pay a $10,000 security deposit, which had no commercial justification, and it did not disclose its commercial associations with the approved managers. It then issued default notices to investors who had not switched. The management of at least 260 properties moved to a QHG-approved manager ([14]). The parties also agreed that the conduct was unconscionable and that Ms Howe was knowingly concerned in it ([7], [15]).
The primary judge made declarations about the misleading conduct and imposed penalties of $700,000 on QHG and $50,000 on Ms Howe, but refused to declare that the conduct was unconscionable ([8]-[9]). He read the High Court’s reasons in Kobelt as requiring exploitation of some vulnerability or disadvantage of the people to whom the conduct was directed, and found that the investors had not been shown to be vulnerable ([19]-[29]; the primary judge’s own paragraphs [32] and [35] are quoted at [27]). The ACCC appealed only against the failure to make that declaration. QHG and Ms Howe did not take part, and counsel appeared as contradictors at the Court’s request ([10]-[11]).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ) gave joint reasons. It allowed the appeal. It declared that, between February 2017 and July 2018, QHG engaged in an unconscionable system of conduct in contravention of s 21 of the ACL by devising the Roll Up Plan and implementing it in a planned, deliberate and sustained way, and it amended the earlier order so that Ms Howe was a person knowingly concerned in QHG’s contraventions as declared (orders 1-3; [97]-[98]). No other variation of the orders was made ([99]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Full Court held that exploitation of or predation upon some vulnerability or disadvantage of people will often be a feature of unconscionable conduct under s 21, but “is not a necessary feature of the conception or a necessary essence in the embodied meaning of the statutory phrase” ([4]). It rejected the view that Kobelt required otherwise. It read Kiefel CJ and Bell J’s observations as directed to the appeal as ASIC ran it and not as a statement of general principle ([43]-[50]), and found no requirement of pre-existing disadvantage, disability or vulnerability in the reasons of Gageler J, Nettle and Gordon JJ or Edelman J ([61]-[62], [72]-[73], [77]). It concluded that neither a majority of the High Court nor any Justice other than Keane J required it ([78]), and it recognised that its own view is directly contrary to Keane J’s ([86]).
On construction, s 21(4)(a), which provides that the section is not limited by the unwritten law, was alone enough to deny that special disadvantage in the equitable sense is essential ([83]). A lesser pre-existing vulnerability or disadvantage was not essential either, because the matters in s 22 are available but not necessary, and implying such a requirement was unjustified and contrary to the text ([84]-[85]). Predation on vulnerability does not exhaust what is against conscience ([91]). The task is to evaluate whether the conduct is a sufficient departure from the norms of acceptable commercial behaviour to be against or offend conscience, and unconscionable conduct is not limited to the worst kind ([92]).
The primary judge did not decide that special disadvantage in the equitable sense is necessary, but he did hold that exploitation of some vulnerability, disability or disadvantage was a necessary aspect of unconscionability under s 21, and that was an error ([93]). Ground 1A of the appeal was upheld ([94]).
Applying that approach to the agreed facts, the Court held that QHG’s conduct was unconscionable ([95]-[96]). It was against conscience not because QHG took advantage of a vulnerability, disability or disadvantage of the investors, but because it systematically misused its superior bargaining position by dishonestly misleading its counterparties and pressuring them with unjustified and unnecessary commercial requirements, in a way that reflected a dishonest lack of good faith in undermining bargains previously reached, in order to extract surreptitious and undisclosed financial benefits ([96]). The Court said the conduct was referable to considerations in s 22(1)(a), (b), (d) and (l) ([96]). It added that it would not preclude argument in an appropriate case that a shorter declaration highlighting the key features of the conduct might better serve the Court’s power to make declarations in this area ([97]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [43]–[50] (opens in a new tab), [61]–[62] (opens in a new tab), [72]–[73] (opens in a new tab), [77]–[79] (opens in a new tab), [83]–[94] (opens in a new tab)
The primary judge considered himself bound by Kobelt to treat exploitation of vulnerability as necessary ([5]). The Full Court’s reading of the five High Court judgments, its construction of ss 21 and 22, and its conclusion that the primary judge erred are the ground on which ground 1A was upheld and the appeal allowed.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [95]–[98] (opens in a new tab)
The Court applied its conclusion on ground 1A to the agreed facts and held the conduct unconscionable, which is why the declaration was made and order 5 amended.
Why does this case matter?
Kobelt produced differing reasons from the High Court, and the primary judge in this case and the Full Court read them differently. This decision is the Full Court’s account of what those reasons did and did not decide, on facts about commercial counterparties and not individual consumers. It is the decision to read with Kobelt when a problem about s 21 gives little information about the personal circumstances of the people on the receiving end of the conduct.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the prohibition first. Section 20 refers to the unwritten law and s 21 is a separate statutory prohibition, so say which one the facts engage. For s 21, set out the conduct and then use the matters in s 22(1) as a checklist against the facts: the relative bargaining positions, conditions imposed that were not reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests, pressure or unfair tactics, failure to disclose, and good faith.
Quantum Housing is a Full Court decision, and Kobelt is a decision of the High Court in which the Justices gave differing reasons, so attribute each view to the court and Justices who expressed it. The Full Court’s references to s 21(4)(a) and (b) and to s 22(1)(a), (b), (d) and (l) correspond to the provisions with the same numbers and lettering in the current text, so cite the current provisions for a current problem.
Check your understanding
1. Who appealed to the Full Court, against what part of the primary judge’s orders, and why did counsel appear as contradictors ([10]-[11])?
2. Describe two features of how the Roll Up Plan was carried out, with the paragraph where the agreed characteristics are set out ([14]).
3. How did the primary judge read Kobelt, and what did he say about the investors’ circumstances ([19]-[22], [27])?
4. At [78], whose reasons in Kobelt does the Full Court exclude from its rejection of the proposition that Kobelt required pre-existing vulnerability, and what does it say at [86] about that Justice’s view?
5. What declaration did the Full Court make, and what amendment did it make to the order concerning Ms Howe ([97]-[98])?