Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2013

Consumer And Competition LawUnconscionable Conduct

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90

A caller offers an elderly woman a free check of her vacuum cleaner. A visit later she has bought a new machine she had said she would not buy. Where in that sequence does a court look for unconscionable conduct?

What happened?

Lux Distributors Pty Ltd sold vacuum cleaners by sending salesmen to people’s homes. Using its customer database or the telephone directory, a staff member would telephone a householder with a script saying that someone would be in the area the next day giving free maintenance checks on vacuum cleaners, and asking what time suited ([25]). At first instance the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC) sued over sales to five elderly women, sought declarations, penalties and other relief, and relied on s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). The primary judge dismissed the proceedings, and the appeal concerned three of the women ([1]).

Mrs Oxley, aged 82, accepted a visit in February 2010 in Maryborough, Queensland. The salesman carried out a brief inspection and a demonstration of a new Lux machine, said hers was not cleaning properly, and she gave him a cheque for $1,999 with a trade-in ([53]-[55]). Mrs May, aged 93, lived in Forest Hill, Victoria ([19]), and was visited in September 2010. The sales process lasted over an hour, and she agreed to buy after the price was reduced by $600 to $2,050 ([45]-[47]).

Mrs Baird, aged 89, was visited in July 2011. She had told the caller that she was not going to buy a new machine. The salesman did not say he was there to sell one, spent about an hour and a half in her home, and she signed the contract ([32]-[35], [40]). Each later regretted the purchase and the sale was undone or the money refunded ([38], [49], [58]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court of the Federal Court (Allsop CJ, Jacobson and Gordon JJ) gave joint reasons. It allowed the ACCC’s appeal and set aside orders 1 and 2 of the orders of 8 February 2013. It declared that Lux’s conduct towards Mrs Oxley and Mrs May was unconscionable in contravention of s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act and that its conduct towards Mrs Baird was unconscionable in contravention of s 21 of the ACL. The ACCC’s application for relief was otherwise remitted for hearing by a judge of the Court, and Lux was ordered to pay the ACCC’s costs ([74]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Full Court said that the task of the Court is the evaluation of the facts by reference to a normative standard of conscience ([23]). That standard is permeated with accepted and acceptable community values, which in the dealing with consumers in this case were honesty and fairness ([23]). Legislation may illuminate and develop those values, and State direct-selling legislation directed to fairness is a fact to be taken into account that helps the Court appreciate the content of fairness without constricting it ([23]). “Unconscionability” means something not done in good conscience. Notions of moral tainting are relevant so long as one recognises that it is conduct against conscience, by reference to the norms of society, that is in question, and in a context of consumer protection aimed at honest and fair conduct free of deception, notions of justice and fairness are central, as are vulnerability, advantage and honesty ([41]).

On the facts, the Court held that the sale to each woman was unconscionable ([74]). In each case the opportunity to sell through extended demonstration in the home was obtained by a deceptive ruse, the offer of a free maintenance check, and the representative then used a practised selling technique to prevail upon an elderly householder ([26]-[27], [42], [44], [52], [60]). The Court treated that conduct as compounded by contraventions of direct selling provisions: s 74 of the ACL for Mrs Baird, ss 62B and 62E of the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) for Mrs May, and s 62(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) for Mrs Oxley ([44], [51], [59], [68]-[70]).

The Court found error in the primary judge’s approach ([62]). He focused on individual acts and interactions and gave little weight to the fact that the opportunity was gained by deception ([63]), and failed to weigh how the deception deprived each woman of a meaningful opportunity to decline entry ([66]). He wrongly assessed the relative bargaining strengths ([67]). He failed to give weight to contraventions of provisions intended to ensure fairness in selling, and the Court said that assessing their causal effect was a speculative inquiry that did not diminish their importance ([68]-[70]). He gave too much weight to the cooling-off periods in the contracts ([72]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Allsop CJ, Jacobson and Gordon JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [23] (opens in a new tab), [41] (opens in a new tab)

The Court stated the standard by which it evaluated the facts and then applied it to reach its conclusion that the conduct towards each woman was unconscionable, so the statement was necessary to the result. It is a statement of the standard for these provisions, made without analysis of the earlier cases ([41]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Allsop CJ, Jacobson and Gordon JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [42]–[44] (opens in a new tab), [52] (opens in a new tab), [60] (opens in a new tab), [63]–[72] (opens in a new tab), [74] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the Court’s findings that the conduct towards each woman was unconscionable and its reasons for holding that the primary judge’s contrary evaluation involved error. They are the ground on which the appeal was allowed and the declarations made.

Why does this case matter?

An unconscionable-conduct problem often turns on how the facts are weighed, and a judge can decide each part of a sale looks unremarkable. This case is a worked example of an appeal court reversing an evaluative conclusion on that kind of ground, and it is a source of fact patterns an examiner can adapt.

Exam and application relevance

Start by identifying which prohibition applies to the conduct and when it occurred. Match the provision to the date of the conduct: the Court used the Trade Practices Act provision for the 2010 sales and the ACL for the July 2011 sale, in the form that then applied ([4], [6], [7]). The ACL now covers acquisition as well as supply in s 21(1), and the matters a court may have regard to are in s 22, so cite the current provisions for a current problem.

Then set out the facts in the order the Court did: how the seller gained entry, what was said about the purpose of the visit, what the seller did in the home and for how long, and which direct selling provisions were breached. Lux is a Full Court decision. In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2019] HCA 18 Gageler J, in separate reasons, described the approach in Lux as the correct perspective on materially identical provisions ([87]). The Justices in Kobelt gave differing reasons on the statutory standard, so avoid saying that the High Court as a whole adopted Lux.

Check your understanding

1. Which three customers were involved in the appeal, and which provision applied to each?

2. What did the telephone call offer, and what did the Court say about the representatives’ intention to carry out the maintenance check ([27], [65])?

3. List two of the errors the Court found in the primary judge’s approach at [62]-[72] and the paragraph in which each appears.

4. What did the Court do with the ACCC’s claim for penalties and other relief?