Karpik v Carnival plc
Karpik v Carnival plc [2023] HCA 39
A Canadian passenger booked a Ruby Princess cruise in Canada on terms that barred class actions and chose Californian courts. Can Australia’s unfair contract terms law reach a contract made overseas?
What happened?
On 8 March 2020 the passenger ship Ruby Princess left Sydney with about 2,600 passengers on board. COVID-19 broke out during the voyage, the voyage was cut short and the ship returned to Sydney on 19 March 2020 ([1]). Ms Karpik, a passenger, brought representative proceedings in the Federal Court under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) against Carnival plc and Princess Cruise Lines Limited (together “Princess”), claiming in tort and under the Australian Consumer Law ([2]).
Princess applied for a stay of the claims of Mr Ho, a Canadian passenger identified as the representative of a subgroup of 696 passengers whose contracts incorporated the “US Terms and Conditions”. Those terms contained a choice of law clause applying the general maritime law of the United States, an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the United States District Courts for the Central District of California in Los Angeles, and a class action waiver clause ([3]). Mr Ho lived in Calgary and booked through a travel agent in Canada in September 2018 without being given the terms.
He first saw them in about July 2019, when he logged into Princess’s Cruise Personalizer webpage and clicked “Proceed” without reading them ([11]-[12]). Princess relied on the class action waiver clause in support of its stay application, and Ms Karpik answered that s 23 of the ACL, on unfair contract terms, applied to Mr Ho’s contract and made the clause void ([4]).
The primary judge refused the stay, principally because he held that the US terms were not incorporated into Mr Ho’s contract ([7]). A majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Allsop CJ and Derrington J, Rares J dissenting) allowed Princess’s appeal and stayed Mr Ho’s claims ([8]). The appeal to the High Court raised four questions: whether s 23 applied to a contract made outside Australia; if so, whether the class action waiver clause was void as unfair; whether the clause was otherwise unenforceable under Pt IVA; and whether there were strong reasons not to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause ([6]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed with costs. The Court set aside paragraphs 2(b), 3 and 4 of the Full Court’s orders of 2 September 2022 and ordered Princess to pay Ms Karpik’s costs of the appeal ([71]). The stay of Mr Ho’s claims granted by the Full Court was set aside and, on re-exercising the discretion, a stay was refused ([9], [70]).
The Court gave one set of joint reasons, of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ ([1]-[71]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint reasons treated the first question as one of statutory construction ([18]). The common law presumption against extraterritoriality, they said, is “an interpretive principle only” and does not stand ahead of the question whether the statute addresses its own territorial reach ([19]). “[T]he starting point is always the interpretation of local laws” ([21]), and determining whether the text, context or subject matter of the statute supplies the territorial connection comes before the presumption, not after it ([22]). Princess’s submissions that a court must first apply choice of law rules to find the governing law before construing a forum statute, or that a local statute cannot apply to a contract governed by foreign law unless it demands application irrespective of that law, were rejected as contrary to decisions of the High Court and of intermediate courts ([20]-[21]).
The intermediate decisions cited included the Full Federal Court in Valve Corporation v ACCC and the primary judgment in that litigation ([21], footnote 13). Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd was not authority for a general rule of that kind, because it concerned a particular provision of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) that chose the proper law as its connecting factor ([23]).
On the text, s 5(1)(c) and (g) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) extends the ACL, other than Pt 5-3, “to the engaging in conduct outside Australia” by bodies corporate incorporated or carrying on business within Australia ([36], [38]). “Engaging in conduct” includes “the making of, or the giving effect to a provision of, a contract” ([38]). Princess carried on business in Australia, selling and marketing cruises, and it was not disputed that it engaged in conduct outside Australia ([42]). The making of Mr Ho’s contract outside Australia was sufficient as the conduct that triggered s 23 ([42]). Section 23 was not a generally worded provision that needed a “statutory hinge”, because s 5(1) was intended to operate with it and defined its boundaries ([43]). With the connection identified by s 5(1), there was no basis for seeking a further territorial connection by implication or by presumption ([44]-[45]).
The Court rejected the limits that were put to it. Princess relied on the absence from Pt 2-3 of anything like s 67, which applies Div 1 of Pt 3-2 where the proper law of the contract would be the law of any part of Australia but for a term of the contract providing otherwise. The joint reasons described s 67 as applying Pt 3-2 “by reference to the proper law of the contract but, importantly, with an anti-avoidance objective”, and said that the omission of an equivalent from Pt 2-3 was “not a basis for construing Pt 2-3 as only applying where the proper law of the contract is Australian law” ([46]-[47]).
Princess’s construction would also let parties contract out of Pt 2-3 by including a foreign choice of law clause in a contract of adhesion ([47]). The Court also rejected limits that the contract be entered into while the company was carrying on business in Australia, that the term must affect the acquisition of goods or services by a consumer in Australia ([48]), and both formulations of a performance limitation: Ms Karpik’s alternative that the services be performed wholly or partly in Australia, and Princess’s that the contract not be performed predominantly outside Australia ([49]). The argument that these results were absurd was overstated ([50]).
On the second question, the joint reasons held the class action waiver clause (cl 15(C)) void under s 23 because it was an unfair term under s 24(1). Section 24(1) asks whether the term would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations, whether it is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party advantaged, and whether it would cause detriment if applied or relied on ([27]). The court must take account of the transparency of the term and the contract as a whole, and transparency is not an independent inquiry ([28], [32]).
The clause caused a significant imbalance because it operated as one of several constraints on the passenger and none on the carrier, and because it discouraged or prevented passengers from vindicating their rights where individual claims were uneconomical ([53]-[54]). Section 24(4) presumes that a term of a consumer contract is not reasonably necessary to protect the advantaged party’s legitimate interests unless that party proves otherwise ([30], [55]). Princess identified its interest as avoiding the pressure of aggregated claims, but there was no legitimate interest in preventing a person from vindicating rights where the cost of doing so individually may be uneconomical, and whether the clause was reasonably necessary was not explained or the subject of evidence ([56]).
The clause would deny Mr Ho the benefits of Pt IVA, which was a detriment ([57]), and it was not presented clearly or readily available to him ([58]). Each element of s 24(1) was satisfied ([59]).
The clause was not separately unenforceable under Pt IVA, which accommodates steps by which a person removes himself or herself from the regime, including settling before an action by contracting out of the right to participate in a class action ([61]-[64]). It was no longer disputed that the exclusive jurisdiction clause was valid and not an unfair term ([65]). Absent strong countervailing reasons, proceedings are stayed in the face of such a clause ([66]). Here the reasons were strong: the class action waiver clause was unfair and void, so Princess could not rely on it and Mr Ho had a juridical advantage in remaining in the Federal Court class action; and enforcement would fracture the litigation ([68]-[69]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [18]–[23] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [36]–[45] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the ground of decision on reach: the question is one of construction of the forum statute, with the interpretive presumption subordinate to it ([18]-[22]); Akai is not authority for a general choice-of-law rule ([23]); and s 5(1)(c) and (g) of the Competition and Consumer Act, read with the definition of engaging in conduct, extend s 23 to the making of Mr Ho’s contract without a further territorial connection ([36]-[45]). They are necessary to the conclusion that s 23 applied.
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [46]–[49] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs reject the limitations put forward on the reach of s 23: Princess’s submissions that the proper law of the contract must be Australian, that the contract must be made while the company carried on business in Australia and that the term must affect acquisition in Australia, and the formulations of the performance limitation advanced by Ms Karpik (performance wholly or partly in Australia) and by Princess (not performed predominantly outside Australia). They are necessary to the conclusion that no further territorial connection was required. The description of s 67 at [46] is part of the answer to the proper law submission.
Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [50] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
The Court describes the ‘absurd and capricious results’ argument as overstated and records the Commonwealth’s acceptance that a respondent could seek a stay of a proceeding with no connection beyond s 23’s extraterritorial operation on the ground that the court is an inappropriate forum. That observation answers a hypothetical raised by Princess and was not necessary to decide this appeal.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [53]–[59] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs apply each element of s 24(1) to the class action waiver clause and hold that each was satisfied ([53]-[59]). They are necessary to the orders, because the unfairness of the class action waiver clause is what supported refusing the stay.
Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [61]–[64] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
The Court held that the class action waiver clause was not void or unenforceable by reason of Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act, because Pt IVA accommodates steps by which a person removes himself or herself from the regime, including contracting out of the right to participate in a class action ([63]-[64]). Ms Karpik succeeded on the unfairness ground, so this answer to an argument she lost was not necessary to the orders, although it is the Court’s reasoned answer to an issue the parties argued.
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [66]–[70] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)
The Court re-exercised the discretion whether to stay Mr Ho’s claims, finding strong reasons not to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause: the class action waiver clause was unfair and void, Mr Ho had a juridical advantage in remaining in the class action, and enforcement would fracture the litigation ([68]-[69]). This is the ground of the order refusing the stay.
Why does this case matter?
Students often meet a foreign choice-of-law clause or foreign-court clause in a consumer contract and stop there, or treat what the Act says about the reach of one set of provisions as telling them the reach of another. Karpik is where an examiner expects the move from the contract to the text of the statute, and where the contrast between the unfair terms provisions and the consumer guarantees is tested.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the ACL provision relied on and ask which provision of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) or the ACL addresses its territorial reach. Ask who the contracting corporation is, where it carries on business, and what conduct, including the making of the contract, is said to engage the provision. Then ask separately whether the term is unfair under s 24 and who bears the onus on each element.
Karpik concerned Pt 2-3 and not the consumer guarantees in Pt 3-2. Its references to s 67 are the Court’s contrast, drawn to answer a submission about Pt 2-3 ([46]-[47]), so check the text of any other provision before applying what was said about s 23. The decision turned on a class action waiver in a contract of adhesion and does not state the fairness of other terms.
Check your understanding
1. Why did the joint reasons reject the submission that a court must first apply choice of law rules before construing a forum statute ([19]-[23])?
2. Which provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) did the Court read with s 23, and what did it identify as the conduct that engaged s 23 in Mr Ho’s case ([36]-[42])?
3. What did the joint reasons say about the absence from Pt 2-3 of anything equivalent to s 67, and how did they describe the effect of s 67 ([46]-[47])?
4. On each element of s 24(1), what did the Court say about who bore the onus and why the class action waiver clause met the element ([29]-[32], [53]-[59])?