Section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law: the statutory standard in practice
How a claim under section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law is built: the text and its qualifications, the section 22 matters, the High Court’s divided reasons in Kobelt, the Full Court’s application in Lux, and the remedies.
Learning outcomes
- Choose between s 20 and s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law for a dealing in goods or services, and state the qualifications in s 21(2) to (4).
- Organise the facts of a dealing under the matters in s 22(1) or s 22(2), weighing factors that point in each direction.
- Explain how the High Court Justices differed on the statutory standard of unconscionability in Kobelt, and apply the reasoning in Lux to a sales scenario.
- Identify who may seek a penalty, injunction, damages or compensation orders for a contravention, and what each remedy requires.
Section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), prohibits unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services.1 The prior question in any problem is which prohibition is in play, and then what standard of “unconscionable” the court is applying. The overview of statutory unconscionable conduct compares the statute with equity. This article follows a s 21 claim from its text and the matters in s 22, through the High Court’s divided reasons in Kobelt, the Full Court’s reading of them in Quantum Housing and its application of the section in Lux, to the remedies. It states the Commonwealth text; how the ACL applies as a law of the Commonwealth and of the participating States and Territories is explained in the consumer law framework.2
The text of the prohibition
Section 21(1) provides that a person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person, or their acquisition or possible acquisition from a person, “engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable”. The defendant may be on either side of the dealing, as supplier or as acquirer; the prohibition is not confined to consumers; and it turns on the whole of the circumstances rather than a single threshold requirement.
Section 20(1) prohibits conduct that is unconscionable “within the meaning of the unwritten law from time to time”, and s 20(2) provides that s 20 does not apply to conduct prohibited by s 21. So conduct that s 21 prohibits is a s 21 matter; s 20, which adopts the unwritten law and so draws on the equitable cases directly, is the route for conduct in trade or commerce that s 21 does not prohibit.1 The Commonwealth application of the ACL does not extend, apart from three listed sets of provisions that do not include Part 2-2, to financial services or financial products (Competition and Consumer Act, s 131A(1)); the ASIC Act has its own counterpart, s 12CB, under which Kobelt was decided.2 The equitable doctrine is explained in unconscionable dealing in equity and in proof and exploitation.
Three further provisions qualify s 21:
- Section 21(2): the section does not apply to conduct engaged in “only because” the person institutes legal proceedings, or refers a dispute to arbitration, about the supply or acquisition.
- Section 21(3): the court must not have regard to circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the alleged contravention, and may have regard to conduct or circumstances before the section commenced.
- Section 21(4): Parliament intends that the section is not limited by the unwritten law, that it can apply to a system of conduct or pattern of behaviour whether or not a particular individual is identified as disadvantaged, and that a court’s consideration of a contract may include its terms and how it is carried out, not only its formation.
The matters in section 22
Section 22 lists matters the court “may have regard to”, without limiting the matters it may consider. Section 22(1) is written for a defendant who is the supplier and s 22(2) mirrors it for a defendant who is the acquirer, so first see which side the defendant occupied. Each list has twelve paragraphs, (a) to (l). This article groups them as a study aid; the statute does not:
- Bargaining position and alternatives: relative bargaining strength, and where else the other party could have dealt, and at what price ((a), (e)).
- Terms and the contract: conditions not reasonably necessary to protect the defendant’s legitimate interests ((b)); willingness to negotiate, the terms, performance and later conduct ((j)); and any unilateral right to vary a term ((k)).
- Understanding, pressure and disclosure: whether the other party could understand the documents ((c)); undue influence, pressure or unfair tactics ((d)); and unreasonable failure to disclose intended conduct and risks that would not be apparent ((i)).
- Consistency, codes and good faith: consistency with the defendant’s conduct towards like parties ((f)); industry codes, including one the other party reasonably believed would be followed ((g), (h)); and good faith on both sides ((l)).
A factor can point either way: absence of pressure counts for a defendant, and a court weighs the factors together rather than counting them.
The standard: how the High Court divided in Kobelt
ASIC v Kobelt was decided under s 12CB of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), the financial-services counterpart of s 21, and not under the ACL.3 Its prohibition (“in all the circumstances, unconscionable”), its list of matters in s 12CC and its provision on systems of conduct follow the same pattern as ss 21 and 22, and Gageler J treated s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 21 of the ACL as “materially identical” to s 12CB. A storekeeper in a remote community in northern South Australia supplied “book-up” credit to Anangu customers, typically holding their debit cards and PINs and withdrawing their wages or welfare payments when credited. ASIC pleaded a system case; the primary judge found it unconscionable and the Full Court of the Federal Court set that aside. By four Justices to three, the High Court dismissed ASIC’s appeal. The reasons differ:
- Kiefel CJ and Bell J treated “unconscionable” as bearing its ordinary meaning, so that the question is whether conduct objectively answers the description of being against conscience. They recalled that earlier High Court decisions had said unconscionable conduct requires special disadvantage and unconscientious taking advantage of it, and held the appeal was determined by “the absence of unconscientious advantage obtained by Mr Kobelt”.
- Gageler J held that the section prescribes a normative standard of conduct, administered in the totality of the circumstances; that equity’s word signifies the gravity required, which a court may not dilute into “equity-lite”; and that the target is conduct “so far outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to warrant condemnation as conduct that is offensive to conscience”.
- Keane J agreed the appeal be dismissed because it was not established that the storekeeper exploited his customers’ vulnerability to extract advantage.
- Nettle and Gordon JJ, and Edelman J, dissented and would have held the system unconscionable.3
That Kobelt gives no single majority statement of the standard is a summary of the divided reasons, not a holding. The Full Court of the Federal Court addressed the difference in ACCC v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd, where the primary judge had read Kobelt as requiring exploitation of some vulnerability or disadvantage. The Full Court (Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ, joint reasons) held that was an error: exploitation of vulnerability “will often be a feature” of unconscionable conduct under s 21 but is not a necessary feature. It read the Justices in Kobelt other than Keane J as not requiring a pre-existing vulnerability, said that s 21(4)(a) alone denies that special disadvantage in the equitable sense is essential, and acknowledged its view is contrary to Keane J’s. It added that unconscionable conduct “is not limited to the worst kind”, while still requiring an evaluation of whether the conduct sufficiently departs from acceptable commercial norms to offend conscience. A company that systematically misused its bargaining position by dishonestly misleading counterparties and pressuring them with unjustified requirements was held unconscionable on agreed facts, with no particular vulnerability proved.4 A Full Court decision does not bind the High Court or State courts, and this article does not say the High Court has resolved the difference, because no later High Court decision on s 21 is cited here.
Applying the section: Lux
ACCC v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd is a Full Court decision, so it does not bind the High Court or State courts; Gageler J in Kobelt treated its normative-standard perspective as correct.5 Sales staff telephoned elderly women offering a free vacuum cleaner maintenance check, which the Court called a deceptive ruse to gain entry to their homes, and then sold them new machines after extended in-home demonstrations. Mrs Baird, aged 89, was the s 21 case; the other two arose under its predecessor, s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act. The primary judge dismissed the claims; the Full Court found the conduct unconscionable.
The reasoning shows the kind of facts that carry weight. The Court applied a “normative standard of conscience” permeated with community values, here honesty and fairness in dealing with consumers, and said “Notions of justice and fairness are central, as are vulnerability, advantage and honesty”. It treated the deceptive entry as the launching pad for what followed, as giving the seller a position of strength in the home, and as compounded, for Mrs Baird, by a contravention of the ACL provision requiring the salesperson to state the purpose of the visit. It did not accept that the women’s ability to look after themselves answered the case. The Court applied s 21 as it then stood, with five listed matters in s 21(2); the same five now appear as s 22(1)(a) to (e), within a longer list.
System cases and remedies
Kobelt was a system case: ASIC pleaded the supply of book-up credit to 117 customers as a system of conduct. Lux was run on the conduct towards each customer. Section 21(4)(b) means a claim can rest on a pattern without identifying an individual, and the question remains whether the conduct is unconscionable.
The remedies are in Part 5-2 of the ACL. Section 224(1)(a)(i) allows a pecuniary penalty for a contravention of a provision of Part 2-2, which includes ss 20 and 21. For a body corporate the maximum for each act or omission is the greater of the amounts in s 224(3A): $100,000,000; three times the benefit obtained, where its value can be determined; and, where it cannot, 30 per cent of adjusted turnover during the breach turnover period. For others it is $2,500,000. Those are the amounts in the compilation read. Section 310 applies amendments made by item 6 of Schedule 1 to the Treasury Laws Amendment (Doubling Penalties for ACCC Enforcement) Act 2026 (Cth) to acts or omissions on or after the commencement of that Schedule, and that Act commenced on 28 March 2026; earlier conduct attracts earlier amounts, which this article does not state. Any person may seek an injunction (s 232). A person who suffers loss because of a contravention of Chapter 2 may sue for damages within six years after the cause of action accrued (s 236). A court may make compensation orders on the application of an injured person, or of the regulator on behalf of and with the written consent of injured persons (s 237), including orders declaring a contract void in whole or part, varying it, refusing to enforce it or ordering a refund (s 243).6
Applying this in a problem question
- Decide the provision. If the facts concern the supply or acquisition of goods or services, check s 21 first, noting that s 131A takes financial services and financial products out of the Commonwealth ACL. Consider s 20, with the equitable test, for conduct that s 21 does not prohibit.
- Identify who supplied and who acquired, whether the conduct was in trade or commerce, and whether s 21(2) (conduct engaged in only because of proceedings or arbitration) or s 21(3) (foreseeability) limits the claim.
- Work through the s 22 list for the defendant’s side, s 22(1) or s 22(2), noting factors that cut each way, the contract terms and how the contract was carried out.
- State the standard: conduct judged against community standards of conscience, of real gravity, as the Justices differed in Kobelt. Say whether the defendant exploited the other party’s position, which is often how the departure is shown, and that the Full Court in Quantum Housing holds that, under s 21, exploitation of vulnerability is not a necessary feature, in contrast to Keane J.
- Say whether the facts show a single dealing or a system or pattern of conduct under s 21(4)(b).
- Identify who can claim and which remedy fits: penalty, injunction, damages, or compensation orders including voiding or varying the contract.
Self-check
- Have I stated which side of the supply the defendant was on before using s 22(1) or (2)?
- Have I kept Kobelt, which concerns the ASIC Act, separate from the text of the ACL?
- Have I said whether the point on exploitation of vulnerability is Keane J’s view or the Full Court’s in Quantum Housing?