Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd
Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 13
A publisher with most of a market stops supplying a former distributor because it does not want that distributor competing with its other distributors. Did the publisher ‘take advantage’ of its market power?
Superseded by legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), from 6 November 2017
The statutory test this case applied has been replaced. Section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) was repealed and substituted by the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Act 2017 (Cth) (No 87 of 2017), Sch 1, which the Act’s commencement table records as commencing on 6 November 2017. Section 46(1) now provides that “A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not engage in conduct that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in” that market or certain other markets in which the corporation or a related body corporate supplies or acquires goods or services. There is no longer an element of taking advantage of the power, and no proscribed purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring competitive conduct; effect or likely effect on competition is enough. Melway therefore explains how the former test was applied and no longer states the test.
What happened?
Melway Publishing Pty Ltd published a street directory for Melbourne and its metropolitan area. The respondent, Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (trading as Auto Fashions Australia), was a wholesaler of motor vehicle parts and accessories. It unsuccessfully sought supplies of the directory from Melway, and said that Melway had contravened s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ([1]).
Section 46(1) provided that a corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market “shall not take advantage of that power” for certain purposes, including “(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other market” ([6]). Merkel J found that Melway held between 80 and 90 per cent of the retail market for Melbourne street directories, that barriers to entry were substantial, and that “Melway” had become a generic term for street directories ([10]). Melway distributed only through selected wholesalers, each assigned a defined segment of the retail market, with little competition between wholesalers ([11]-[12]).
The respondent had been appointed wholesale distributor for the automotive parts segment in 1986. In 1994 Melway preferred a company controlled by a former principal of the respondent, Mr Nagel, and decided to appoint it sole distributor to retailers of automotive parts; notice terminating the respondent’s appointment was given in February 1995 to take effect on 30 June 1995 ([14]). The respondent then said it wanted wholesale supplies of between 30,000 and 50,000 directories a year, for existing customers and new ones. Melway responded that it did not propose to have further business dealings with the respondent ([14]).
Merkel J found that Melway refused supply because it did not want the respondent to compete for customers with its appointed distributors in their allocated segments ([22]). He upheld the claim under s 46(1)(c) and granted an injunction ([3], [59]). A majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ, Heerey J dissenting) dismissed Melway’s appeal ([2], [5], [62]). All members of the Full Court agreed that the refusal was for the proscribed purpose, and by the time of the High Court the findings that Melway had a substantial degree of power in the relevant market and that the market had been correctly identified were not challenged ([3], [5]). The dispute was whether Melway had taken advantage of its power ([39]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders of the Full Court and of Merkel J were set aside and the respondent’s application was dismissed, with the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs at first instance and in the Full Court ([71]).
Two sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ ([1]-[71]) and the reasons of Kirby J ([72]-[123]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint reasons began from Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, which held that the expression “take advantage of” “does not mean anything materially different from ‘use’, and does not require conduct which is predatory or morally blameworthy”; nothing in argument or in these reasons called that into question ([26]). What section 46 requires, they said, is “not merely the co-existence of market power, conduct, and proscribed purpose, but a connection such that the firm whose conduct is in question can be said to be taking advantage of its power” ([44]).
They examined how Queensland Wire had tested that connection. Mason CJ and Wilson J asked how BHP would have behaved in a competitive market ([46]). Deane J reasoned from the purpose to the conclusion ([27]-[28]). Four of the five members of the Court used a hypothetical question about how the firm would be likely to behave if it lacked market power ([50]). The joint reasons said ([51]):
“Dawson J’s conclusion that BHP’s refusal to supply QWI with Y-bar was made possible only by the absence of competitive conditions does not exclude the possibility that, in a given case, it may be proper to conclude that a firm is taking advantage of market power where it does something that is materially facilitated by the existence of the power, even though it may not have been absolutely impossible without the power.”
To that extent they accepted the ACCC’s submission that s 46 would be contravened if the market power made it easier for the corporation to act for the proscribed purpose than otherwise would be the case ([51]), but that was not the case made below, and the findings of fact necessary to support it had not been sought or made ([69]).
The hypothetical question rests on unstated assumptions about the competitive market. The joint reasons said that “An absence of a substantial degree of market power does not mean the presence of an economist’s theoretical model of perfect competition. It only requires a sufficient level of competition to deny a substantial degree of power to any competitor in the market” ([52]). In some cases “a process of inference, based upon economic analysis, may be unnecessary. Direct observation may lead to the correct conclusion” ([53]). And “It is one thing to compare what it has done with what it might be thought it would do if it lacked that power. It is a different thing to compare what it has done with what it would do in circumstances that are completely divorced from the reality of the market” ([58]).
Applying that, they found the reasoning of Merkel J and the majority in the Full Court, which asked whether Melway would have been compelled to supply the respondent in a competitive environment ([54]-[56]), flawed. It assumed that the 30,000 to 50,000 directories would be sales lost to Melway if it operated in a competitive market, when the respondent was primarily seeking to take business from existing distributors; it did not address what wholesale arrangements would exist in a competitive market, in which a manufacturer does not necessarily increase sales by supplying everyone who asks; and it was too narrow, since the refusal was only a manifestation of Melway’s wholesale distribution system, and it was that system whose restriction of competition at the wholesale level had to be tested ([57]; see also [15]-[21]).
The real question was whether, without its market power, Melway could have maintained its distribution system, or at least the part that gave distributors exclusive rights in specified segments, and they preferred the reasoning of Heerey J, who observed that Melway had adopted its segmented system before it secured its dominant position and had no reason to be unwilling or unable to continue it in a competitive market ([61]-[62]).
The respondent’s primary argument in the High Court was that where a corporation with a substantial degree of market power refuses supply, it is neither necessary nor relevant to ask whether it would have refused if it lacked that power, because the power to grant or refuse supply is the power to control the market ([63]-[64]). The joint reasons held that this was contrary to the reasoning of four of the five members of the Court in Queensland Wire and begged the question ([66]-[67]).
Market power means “capacity to behave in a certain way ... persistently, free from the constraints of competition”, and while freedom from competitive constraint might make it possible or easier to refuse supply, in which case the refusal would be a taking advantage, “it does not follow that because a firm in fact enjoys freedom from competitive constraint, and in fact refuses to supply a particular person, there is a relevant connection between the freedom and the refusal” ([67]). The creation and maintenance of the distribution system at a time when Melway lacked substantial market power showed that its maintenance, when it had that power, “was not necessarily an exercise of that power” ([68]).
On purpose, the joint reasons left undisturbed the concurrent finding that the refusal was for the proscribed purpose, though not inevitable ([36]-[37]), and said that the adoption of a distribution system involving vertical restraints did not necessarily manifest an anti-competitive purpose of the kind in s 46, because the purpose may be pro-competitive or restriction of competition may be no part, or no substantial part, of the manufacturer’s purpose ([38]). Section 46 “aims to promote competition, not the private interests of particular persons or corporations” ([17]), and an intention to give a particular distributor exclusivity “may constitute a very insecure basis for concluding that there had been a taking advantage of market power” ([31]).
Kirby J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal ([123]). He accepted the respondent’s primary submission, that if a supplier enjoys a substantial degree of market power the grant or refusal of supply is necessarily taking advantage of it, and read Queensland Wire as deciding only that “take advantage of” means “use” ([109]-[111]). In the alternative he held that it was open to the judges of the Federal Court to infer that, acting rationally and but for its power, Melway could not have refused the respondent’s offer to buy 30,000 to 50,000 directories ([112]-[113]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [44] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [52]–[53] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [57]–[58] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [63]–[68] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state that s 46 requires a connection between the power and the conduct ([44]), how the counterfactual is to be understood ([52]-[53]), why the reasoning of Merkel J and the majority in the Full Court failed ([57]-[58]) and why the respondent’s primary submission, that a refusal by a firm with substantial power is necessarily a taking advantage, was rejected ([63]-[68]). They are the reasoning on which the appeal was allowed.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [51] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
The statement that Dawson J’s conclusion in Queensland Wire does not exclude a finding of taking advantage where conduct is materially facilitated by the power is expressed as a possibility (‘in a given case’), and the joint reasons say at [69] that the case so put was not made below and the necessary findings were not sought or made. The appeal was not decided on that footing.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [109]–[111] (PDF p 45) (opens in a new tab), [112]–[113] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab), [123] (PDF p 51) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal on the respondent’s primary submission, read Queensland Wire as deciding only that take advantage of means use, and held in the alternative that the hypothetical question was open to the Federal Court to answer as it did. This is a dissent and is not the law stated by the Court.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [57]–[58] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [61]–[62] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [68] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs explain why the reasoning of Merkel J and the majority in the Full Court could not stand: the question had to be asked of the distribution system as a whole and answered by asking whether it could have been maintained without the market power. They are necessary to allowing the appeal.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [17]–[20] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [31] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [38] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
These are general observations about the purpose of s 46, interbrand and intrabrand competition, and the weight to be given to an intention to confer exclusivity. They frame the application of the section but the finding of proscribed purpose was left undisturbed, so they were not necessary to the ground of decision.
Why does this case matter?
Students who learn Queensland Wire as a single test tend to apply it without asking what the comparison with a competitive market is for. This is the case an examiner uses to test whether you can say what is compared with what, and what evidence a plaintiff would need to bring.
It is also the High Court decision a problem on refusal to supply or exclusive distribution by a firm with market power is built on under the former section.
Exam and application relevance
State that the decision applies the former s 46 and its “take advantage of” element, say that the element has since been replaced, and then use the case for what it shows about the relationship between a firm’s power and its conduct rather than as the current test. Identify the conduct under challenge (a single refusal, or the system of which it is a part), the market power, the proscribed purpose and the connection, and attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons it is.
The decision does not decide how the current s 46 applies to a refusal to supply or a distribution system, which turns on the words of the section as it now stands, including its reference to purpose or effect.
Check your understanding
1. What did the joint reasons say Dawson J’s conclusion in Queensland Wire did not exclude, and what did they say about the ACCC’s submission on that point ([51], [69])?
2. What did the joint reasons say about the comparison with a competitive market, and what must the hypothetical market not be assumed to be ([52], [58])?
3. Why did the joint reasons say the reasoning of Merkel J and the majority of the Full Court could not stand ([57], [61]-[62])?
4. What was the respondent’s primary submission in the High Court, and how did the joint reasons deal with it ([63]-[68])?
5. What did Kirby J say about the respondent’s primary submission and about the alternative approach ([109]-[113])?