Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1989

Consumer And Competition LawAnti Competitive Conduct

Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177

BHP made the steel bar everyone needed to make star pickets, and would not sell it to anyone in Australia. Hard competition, or misuse of market power?

Superseded by legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

The “take advantage” element this case construed was removed from s 46 in 2017, and with it the counterfactual as the statutory test. Section 46(1) now reads: “A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not engage in conduct that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in” that market or certain related markets. Three changes matter. There is no longer a “take advantage” element to satisfy. The proscribed purposes directed at competitors -- damaging a competitor, preventing entry, deterring competitive conduct -- are gone, replaced by substantially lessening competition. And effect, or likely effect, is now enough; purpose need not be proved. Queensland Wire remains the authority on what the old test meant, and its market-definition reasoning retains its force, but the counterfactual is no longer the question the section asks.

Qualified by Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 13

Even under the former s 46, the High Court loosened the “made possible by” reading. In Melway, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ said that Dawson J’s conclusion here “does not exclude the possibility that, in a given case, it may be proper to conclude that a firm is taking advantage of market power where it does something that is materially facilitated by the existence of the power, even though it may not have been absolutely impossible without the power” ([51]). They treated the counterfactual as a way of drawing an inference, not as the test itself: “In some cases, a process of inference, based upon economic analysis, may be unnecessary. Direct observation may lead to the correct conclusion” ([53]). Where the counterfactual is used, the hypothetical market must be realistic. “An absence of a substantial degree of market power does not mean the presence of an economist’s theoretical model of perfect competition” ([52]), and it is a different thing to compare what a firm has done “with what it would do in circumstances that are completely divorced from the reality of the market” ([58]). Kirby J dissented. This refines how the former test was applied. Since 2017 the section no longer asks whether a firm took advantage of its power, so Melway, like this case, now explains the old law.

What happened?

BHP manufactured Y-bar, the steel input from which star picket fence posts are made. It was the only Australian producer, and Y-bar was the one product of its rolling mills that it did not offer for general sale in Australia — it had exported some, but domestically it kept the Y-bar for its own star pickets, in a market where it was the sole domestic supplier. Queensland Wire wanted to make star pickets and needed Y-bar. BHP effectively refused to supply it, eventually offering it only at a price that made competition impossible.

Queensland Wire sued under s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) as it then stood. Pincus J dismissed the claim, holding that “take advantage” required something “reprehensible” or “predatory or unfair”; the Full Court dismissed the appeal on the different ground that because Y-bar had never been sold there was no market for it.

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed.

Mason CJ and Wilson J held that “[i]n effectively refusing to supply Y-bar to the appellant, BHP is taking advantage of its substantial market power” ([28]). They also upheld Pincus J’s finding that BHP had refused for the purpose of preventing Queensland Wire’s entry into the star picket market, a finding supported by BHP’s failure to offer any legitimate reason and by the fact that Y-bar was the only product of its rolling mills it withheld; the more informative market, they observed, was the market for rural fencing products ([29]-[30]). “The appellant has made out each element of its claim against BHP” ([30]). The matter was remitted to the Federal Court to determine Queensland Wire’s relief.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Under the former s 46, “take advantage” of market power asked whether the conduct was made possible by that power — whether the firm could, in a commercial sense, have behaved the same way in a competitive market. It imported no requirement of hostile intent or “reprehensible” conduct. Taking advantage was necessary but not sufficient: the section separately required one of the proscribed purposes in s 46(1)(a), (b) or (c).

Why does this case matter?

Because of how much of it survives the rewriting of the section, and that part is about markets. The Full Court had dismissed the case on the footing that there was no market for Y-bar at all, because none had ever been sold domestically. The High Court’s answer separates two things a student is prone to run together: the market in which BHP held its power — steel and steel products — and the market into which that power was extended. Mason CJ and Wilson J observed that the star picket market, on which the trial judge had focused, “is not the most informative one”, and pointed instead to rural fencing products, where the advantages of being the only full-range supplier actually lay ([30]). Whatever the statutory test, picking the wrong market ends the analysis before it starts.

It is also a reminder that competition law protects competition rather than competitors. That a rival was shut out of business proved nothing by itself, and an answer that begins and ends with the harm to the plaintiff has not engaged with the section at all.

Exam and application relevance

Check which provision governs before you do anything else. Section 46 was rewritten in 2017: “take advantage” is gone, and with it the counterfactual as the statutory question. Conduct now contravenes if a corporation with substantial market power engages in conduct with the purpose, or the effect or likely effect, of substantially lessening competition in a relevant market. Do not run a Queensland Wire counterfactual against the current section.

Where the former provision applies — historical conduct, or an examiner asking about the old test — work through each element of the old section in turn and give each its own evidence: on these facts, BHP’s control of Y-bar supply, its effective refusal to sell, and the finding about why it refused. Be ready to explain why Pincus J’s dismissal of the claim did not stand.

Either way, define the market first, and do not assume the obvious one is the right one.

Check your understanding

A competitor is driven out of business by a firm with substantial market power. Under the current s 46, what must be shown before that is a contravention?