Specific performance and special value
How the High Court treated specific performance of a contract for a chattel of special value in Dougan v Ley, and how courts answer the objections of supervision and mutuality.
Learning outcomes
- Explain why the adequacy of damages is the foundation of specific performance, and why land and chattels of special value are treated differently from goods available on the market.
- Identify the factors that made the taxi-cab and its licence a proper subject of specific performance in Dougan v Ley.
- Answer the objections of supervision and mutuality, and describe a conditional decree.
Specific performance is an order that a party actually perform a contract, rather than pay money for not having done so. A central question for a student is whether damages would be an adequate response, because Dixon J described the inadequacy of damages as the foundation of the remedy. This article uses the High Court’s decision in Dougan v Ley, an appeal from New South Wales, to show how that question is answered for an item that is not land, and how a court deals with the practical objections of supervision and mutuality. It states general equitable principles and states no statute or court rule.
The foundation: damages that fall short
In Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142 the High Court dismissed an appeal against a decree that an oral agreement to sell a taxi-cab, together with its registration and licence, be specifically performed.1 The price was £1,850, of which the buyers had paid a deposit of £10. The bench was Rich, Starke, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ. Rich J and Williams J each gave separate reasons, Dixon J gave the fullest account of the doctrine, McTiernan J agreed with Dixon J, and Starke J agreed with the reasons of the trial judge, Roper J.
Dixon J described the received doctrine as one whose foundation is that damages at law would not give the party the compensation to which he or she is entitled, meaning that damages would not put the party in a situation as beneficial as if the agreement were specifically performed. For goods or securities that can be obtained on the market, his Honour said damages at law leave the disappointed buyer or seller as well placed as delivery would, because the party can go into the market. Williams J likewise said that a court of equity will not decree specific performance where damages afford an adequate remedy, as is the position for most personal property that is readily purchased.
Land, and chattels of special value
Dixon J noted that a contract for the sale of land has always been considered a proper subject of specific performance, and that the remedy is available to a vendor against a defaulting purchaser as well as the reverse. For other property, the question was in what circumstances equity treats the buyer as entitled to the specific thing.
The members of the Court who stated the position in their own words agreed on the category. Rich J referred to a chattel of exceptional or peculiar value to the purchaser, and Williams J to chattels that are unique or have for some other reason a special or peculiar value. Dixon J gave examples from the older cases, including articles of unusual beauty, rarity and distinction, and railway shares limited in number that could not be obtained on the share market, and he distinguished shares dealt in largely on the market.
Why the taxi-cab qualified
The contract was not a simple sale of a chattel. Dixon J found that it was in substance a transfer of a valuable privilege annexed to the vehicle, a special right transferable only with it and numerically restricted. He relied on the following facts, which this article treats as the factors the Court weighed rather than a test the Court stated:
- The legislation had limited the number of vehicles that could be registered and licensed as taxi-cabs.
- The greater part of the price appeared to represent the registration and licence rather than the vehicle.
- The chattel and the licence were essential to the buyers’ calling.
Rich J added that registration and licence transformed the vehicle into a chattel of special value to the purchaser as a money-making machine, and Williams J described the contract as a composite one for a chattel adapted to a particular business together with the licence without which that business could not be carried on.
Two further points helped the buyers. First, it did not matter that the buyers bought another taxi-cab. Dixon J said that was not an election to take a substitute at the seller’s expense in damages, and Williams J said a later purchase of similar property could no more affect the buyers’ right than buying a comparable block of land next to the one contracted for. Secondly, it did not matter that other licensed cabs remained available to buy, in Williams J’s reasons.
Supervision, mutuality and the form of the order
The seller argued that the court would have to supervise performance and that the contract lacked mutuality. Rich and Dixon JJ answered that the order did not require continued supervision: the buyers’ part was to join in the application, sign the usual documents and put before the Commissioner the material needed to satisfy him of their fitness and of their use and control of the vehicle, and the court did not purport to control the Commissioner’s discretion. Rich J said that, if approval was refused, the obligation was at an end. Dixon J said the conditional form of decree accorded with settled practice in Australia where performance needs the consent, approval or other sanction of a public authority.
Dixon J described the decree Roper J had made: the seller was to do what was necessary to enable the application to be presented, and if it was granted the buyers were to pay the balance and the seller was to deliver the taxi-cab. Williams J found no want of mutuality when the contract was made, and added that the better opinion was that, even if there had been, a contract can be specifically performed if it has become mutually enforceable by the date the suit is brought.
Applying this in a problem question
- State the contract and the performance sought, and say whether the subject matter is land, a unique or specially valuable item, or something obtainable on the market.
- For a chattel, ask why damages would not put the claimant in as good a position, and look at scarcity, how much of the price is attributable to the special feature, and how essential the item is to the claimant’s purpose.
- Say whether the claimant’s purchase of a substitute is relevant, and use Dougan v Ley to explain why it does not by itself defeat the claim.
- Ask whether the order would need continuing supervision, or whether it requires specific, identifiable steps.
- If a third party’s consent is needed, consider a conditional order in the form Dixon J described.
- Then address the discretionary matters in Equitable relief, such as delay, hardship and the claimant’s own conduct, which this article does not develop.
Self-check
- Have I asked whether damages are adequate, as the foundation of the remedy?
- Have I said what made the taxi-cab special, using the factors from the judgments rather than the label “unique”?
- Have I treated my list of factors as a framing, and not as a test the High Court laid down?
- Have I dealt with supervision and mutuality as separate objections?
Where the authority sits
Dougan v Ley is a High Court decision on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales; it binds lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. It dates from 1946, and the sources cited here do not establish any later decision or any statute on the specific enforcement of contracts for goods. Rich J observed that the English sale of goods provision on specific performance was not in force in New South Wales when that case was decided, so check whether current sale of goods legislation in the relevant jurisdiction bears on a claim for goods. For the wider equitable framework see Equitable remedies, and for the limits on equitable intervention see Equity: jurisdiction, intervention and limits.