Declarations: a real controversy and a discretion
How Australian courts decide whether to make a declaration: the need for a real controversy, a real interest and a proper contradictor, and the discretion, drawn from Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission and Forster v Jododex.
Learning outcomes
- State the limits on declaratory relief: a real legal controversy, a real interest and a proper contradictor, not an abstract or hypothetical question.
- Explain why a declaration was an appropriate remedy in Ainsworth even though certiorari and mandamus were unavailable.
- Apply the discretion to make a declaration where other proceedings or other remedies exist, using Forster v Jododex.
A declaration states what the parties’ legal rights or obligations are, without ordering anyone to pay or to act. Before asking whether a declaration should be made, a student must ask whether there is a genuine legal controversy for the court to resolve, because a court’s declaratory power is wide but is limited by the nature of judicial power and by a discretion. This article draws on two High Court decisions, one from Queensland and one from New South Wales, to state the common-law approach in Australian courts. It does not read the statutes and court rules that confer or regulate declaratory power in particular courts, which differ by jurisdiction and must be checked.
What a declaration is for
In Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, the Criminal Justice Commission of Queensland had reported on gaming machine regulation and recommended that the Ainsworth group of companies not be allowed to take part in the industry in Queensland.1 The appellants were never told of the Commission’s interest in them or given a chance to answer what was said. They sought certiorari and mandamus. The joint judgment of Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that mandamus was misconceived, because the Commission was under no duty to investigate and report as claimed, and that certiorari was unavailable because the report had no legal effect. The appellants were not left without a remedy: although the report had no legal effect, it had the practical effect of blackening their reputations.
The Court declared that, in reporting adversely to the appellants, the Commission failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness. The order is a useful model of a declaration’s work. It commands nothing, and does not say the report was wrong. Brennan J, agreeing with the orders in separate reasons, said that such a declaration cannot assert that the report was in fact erroneous, because the court is not concerned with the merits of the report.
The limits: a controversy, not a question in the air
The joint judgment in Ainsworth said that superior courts have inherent power to grant declaratory relief, a discretionary power which it is neither possible nor desirable to fetter by rules about its exercise. The power is, however, confined by the boundaries of judicial power. Declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions.
The joint judgment collected the usual signs that a declaration is unavailable:
- The person seeking relief lacks a real interest.
- The question is purely hypothetical, or concerns circumstances that have not occurred and might never happen.
- The court’s declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties.
Brennan J stated the same idea through a formulation of Viscount Dunedin that Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd had also relied on: the question must be real and not theoretical, the person raising it must have a real interest in raising it, and there must be a proper contradictor, meaning someone presently existing who has a true interest in opposing the declaration.
In Ainsworth the joint judgment found no mere hypothetical question: there had been a controversy about the Commission’s duty of fairness, the report had already had practical consequences for the appellants’ reputations, and those consequences might extend into the future.
A wide jurisdiction and a discretion that is not mechanical
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 concerned a company that held an exploration licence under New South Wales mining legislation and sought a declaration in the equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that the licence had been validly renewed.2 A warden’s inquiry on a rival’s applications to enter the land was pending, and the declaration would settle a point on which those applications turned.
Gibbs J, whose reasons on this subject Stephen J and Mason J adopted and with whom Walsh J agreed on jurisdiction, made three points. First, the jurisdiction to make a declaration is very wide, and a statute is not read as excluding it without clear words. Secondly, the discretion should not be fettered by rules, but the Dunedin requirements should in general be satisfied before it is exercised in favour of a declaration, and beyond that little guidance can be given. Thirdly, a plaintiff should not necessarily be refused one form of relief because another is available in the same court: here a declaration would be quicker and simpler than prohibition.
Gibbs J also dealt with the difficulty of intervening while proceedings are pending before another body. There were obvious reasons for hesitation, but the questions were pure questions of construction of a statute and an instrument that a court would appropriately decide, they were difficult, and rights of considerable value depended on them. Weighing those considerations, it could not be said that the primary judge’s decision to make a declaration was an improper exercise of discretion. The High Court dismissed the appeal. Gibbs J would have allowed it on a separate question about the date of the renewal, so his reasons are those of a Justice who differed on the outcome, but Stephen and Mason JJ agreed with him on the declaration issues, and Walsh J on jurisdiction.
Remedy and consequence
A declaration does not compel payment or conduct, so a successful claimant may need coercive relief later. What the order offers is an authoritative answer on which the parties can act, and, as Ainsworth shows, some redress where the harm is to reputation or standing and no right can be enforced by writ.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the legal right or duty in dispute and state the declaration sought, in terms precise enough to resolve a legal issue.
- Test it against the controversy requirements: a real question, a real interest and a proper contradictor.
- Ask whether the question is hypothetical, or whether a declaration would have foreseeable consequences for the parties.
- Consider other proceedings or other available remedies, remembering that another remedy does not by itself bar a declaration.
- State which court’s power is invoked and check the statute or rules that apply there.
- If the facts involve a decision-maker that failed to give a hearing, ask what the order would add where no writ will lie.
Self-check
- Have I identified a real controversy, rather than describing a general interest in being told the law?
- Have I said that the Dunedin requirements are general guidance and not a complete rule?
- Have I stated what Ainsworth and Forster each decided, with the right court and the right bench?
- Have I said that the statutes and rules governing declarations in the relevant court are not covered here?
Where the authority sits
Both decisions are High Court decisions, which bind lower Australian courts and which the High Court can reconsider. Ainsworth arose on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland and Forster from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Later developments are not established by the sources cited here, and the scope of declaratory power in a particular court may turn on a statute that is not covered here, so a student should check both. For the wider group of equitable orders, see Equitable relief.