Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564
A state commission published a report recommending that a gaming-machine group be kept out of the industry, without hearing from it. The report had no legal effect. What remedy could the group get?
What happened?
In 1990 the Deputy Premier of Queensland, as chairman of a Cabinet sub-committee, sought the advice of the Chairman of the Criminal Justice Commission on areas of likely difficulty in introducing poker machines. The Commission delivered its Report on Gaming Machine Concerns and Regulations on 1 June 1990 to the chairman of the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and the responsible Minister (joint reasons; Brennan J). The report ascribed conduct to the appellants, Leonard Hastings Ainsworth and Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd, which manufactured and supplied gaming machines, and recommended that the group “not be permitted to participate in the gaming machine industry in Queensland” (joint reasons).
The appellants were not told of the Commission’s interest in them or of the matters put against them, and had no opportunity to answer (joint reasons). The report received wide publicity and came to their notice. They sought certiorari and mandamus in the Supreme Court of Queensland. On the return of an order nisi the Full Court (McPherson, Lee and Mackenzie JJ) discharged it, holding that the Act attracted no duty of fairness, that the general law gave none because the report did not affect any right, interest or legitimate expectation of the appellants, and that in any case relief, including a declaration sought in argument, should be refused (joint reasons).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal. Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ gave joint reasons, and Brennan J gave separate reasons agreeing with the order proposed in the joint judgment. The Court set aside the Full Court’s order, made the declaration set out in its orders about the Commission’s Report on Gaming Machine Concerns and Regulations, discharged the order nisi for certiorari and mandamus, and ordered the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs.
Both sets of reasons held that the appellants were entitled to procedural fairness before the Commission reported adversely on them.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
The writs. The joint reasons held that mandamus was misconceived: the Commission was under no duty to investigate the appellants, and was bound to report only if it “thinks it appropriate to do so”. They also declined to make an order constraining the Commission’s freedom to decide not to pursue the matter when a declaration would sufficiently protect the appellants. Certiorari was unavailable because the report “has, of itself, no legal effect and carries no legal consequences, whether direct or indirect”.
The joint reasons distinguished a report that operates as a precondition or a bar to a course of action, or as a step in a process capable of altering rights, interests or liabilities, which may be quashed. Brennan J agreed that there was nothing to quash and that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy, observing that the Act did not impose a duty to produce a report on the subject of gaming machines.
The declaration. The joint reasons then said: “It does not follow that, because mandamus and certiorari are inapplicable, the appellants must leave this Court without remedy.” The report had the practical effect of blackening the appellants’ reputations, and a declaration that the Commission had failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness was appropriate; it “may redress some of the harm done”. Brennan J said that where an official entity publishes a report damaging a person’s reputation without hearing that person, the person is prima facie entitled to a declaration that the report was produced in breach of the duty to observe natural justice, and that “The declaration cannot assert that the report was in fact erroneous for the court is not concerned with the merits of the report”.
The limits of declaratory relief. The joint reasons said that superior courts have inherent power to grant declaratory relief, a discretionary power that it is “neither possible nor desirable to fetter” by rules. It is confined by the boundaries of judicial power, so “declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions”. The person seeking relief must have “a real interest”, and relief will not be granted if the question “is purely hypothetical”, if relief is claimed for circumstances that have not occurred and might never happen, or if “the Court’s declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties”.
The joint reasons found no mere hypothetical question: there had been a controversy about the Commission’s duty of fairness at all stages, and the report had already had practical consequences for the appellants’ reputations that “may extend well into the future”. Brennan J took Viscount Dunedin’s requirements of a real question, a real interest and a proper contradictor, and said that those elements appeared in the case.
Why does this case matter?
Procedural fairness problems are usually answered in two steps: whether a duty was owed, and what relief follows. Students tend to run the steps together or to stop once the duty is found. This case is useful for the second step.
Exam and application relevance
Where a public body has reported adversely on someone without hearing them, address breach and remedy separately. For each remedy that might be sought, ask what it is for and whether the report in your problem gives it anything to act on. Then compare the report’s legal role and practical consequences with those in Ainsworth, and say how far the analogy runs.
Check your understanding
1. Why did certiorari not lie to quash the Commission’s report, and how did the joint reasons distinguish a report that could be quashed?
2. What did the joint reasons say about the appellants’ position when mandamus and certiorari were both unavailable?
3. What did Brennan J say that a declaration of this kind cannot assert, and why?
4. Which facts did the joint reasons rely on to show that the claim for a declaration was not a hypothetical question?