Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18; (1999) 198 CLR 380
A couple’s company paid them large dividends around the time it was being sued for copyright infringement, and a second company they controlled began trading under its name. Could a court freeze the assets of non-parties?
What happened?
Mr and Mrs Cardile were the only shareholders of Eagle Homes Pty Ltd, a house-building company, and controlled it ([2]). In October 1993 LED Builders Pty Ltd sued Eagle Homes in the Federal Court for infringement of copyright in building plans, and sued again in December 1994 ([2]). In 1995 Ultra Modern Developments Pty Ltd, another company the Cardiles controlled, was incorporated and became the registered proprietor of the business name “Eagle Homes”, which Eagle Homes had registered on the same day. Ultra Modern went on to build houses on new plans under that name, while Eagle Homes continued with older plans ([3]). Eagle Homes declared a dividend of $400,000 in favour of the Cardiles, credited to their loan accounts, and in 1996 a further dividend of $800,000, of which $658,977.12 was actually paid to them or applied for their benefit ([2], [4]).
In July 1996 Davies J gave judgment for LED in the infringement proceedings, and LED elected an account of profits, so that the amount Eagle Homes owed remained to be quantified ([5]). LED then sought orders restraining Ultra Modern and the Cardiles, who were not parties to those proceedings, from dealing with their assets. Emmett J drew the inference that the dividends had been prompted by a desire to remove assets that would otherwise be available to satisfy a judgment for LED, but declined the orders ([6]-[9]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Beaumont, Branson and Tamberlin JJ) allowed LED’s appeal and remitted the matter, and on remission Emmett J made orders restraining Ultra Modern and the Cardiles from disposing of or dealing with their money, property or other assets, subject to listed exceptions and on LED’s undertaking as to damages ([10]-[14]).
What did the Court decide?
Five Justices sat. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ gave joint reasons, and Kirby J gave separate reasons. The question was whether an order identified as a Mareva order may be granted against a third party to the proceedings, in circumstances in which that party has not been shown to have an interest in the assets of the potential judgment debtor ([1]).
The Court allowed the appeal and set aside order 4 of the Full Court’s orders of 22 August 1997 and each order 1 of Emmett J’s orders of 22 and 26 August 1997. It replaced the Full Court’s costs order with an order that each party bear its own costs of the appeal to that court, suspended those orders for 14 days, and remitted the matter to a judge of the Federal Court to make orders, on LED’s application and on provision of the necessary undertakings, in or to the effect of the form set out in the joint reasons ([74]-[75]). There was no order for costs in the High Court ([77]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Non-parties. The joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ held that a court’s power to protect the integrity of its processes extends, in a proper case, to asset preservation orders against persons who are not parties to the principal litigation ([25]). They said that the term “injunction” is an inappropriate identification of the area of legal discourse within which the Mareva order belongs, that the order is better seen as a development of the court’s powers to protect its processes, and that references to “Mareva orders” should be preferred to “injunctions” ([25], [40], [42]).
If relief is available against non-parties, the focus must be the administration of justice ([42]). They accepted the appellants’ negative proposition that there is no basis for an order against a non-party that is not answerable or liable in some way to a party, or that does not hold, control or have the capacity to dispose of the property of a party ([45]).
They held that the appellants’ broader proposition, that relief against a third party should be limited to cases in which the third party holds or is about to hold or dissipate property beneficially owned by the defendant, was too narrowly expressed, while saying that it will be a rare case in which relief is granted if that situation does not exist ([54]). The principle they stated is that such an order may (the joint reasons emphasised the word “may”), assuming the other relevant criteria and discretionary factors, be appropriate where the third party holds, is using, or has exercised or is exercising a power of disposition over, or is otherwise in possession of, assets of the judgment debtor or potential judgment debtor, or where some process ultimately enforceable by the courts is or may be available to the judgment creditor under which the third party may be obliged to disgorge property or otherwise contribute to the funds or property of the judgment debtor to help satisfy the judgment ([57]).
Caution and discretion. The joint reasons said that an order of this kind requires “a high degree of caution”: it operates in personam and does not deprive the person restrained of title or possession, but in a practical sense operates as a very tight “negative pledge” over property to which the contempt sanction is attached ([50]). They agreed with the tenor of the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s description of such an order as “a drastic remedy which should not be granted lightly” ([51]).
The matters to weigh include the difficulties of quantifying and recovering damages under the undertaking ([52]), whether the applicant has proceeded diligently and expeditiously, whether a money judgment has been recovered, and whether other proceedings are available against the third party and, if so, why they have not been taken ([53]). The order should in general be supported by an undertaking as to damages ([43]). A court granting interlocutory relief should generally grant the minimum relief necessary to do justice between the parties and should specify the circumstances in which the order will cease to operate, and consideration should have been given to an undertaking to commence the proceedings that would finally determine the third party’s rights ([70]).
Application. The joint reasons held that Ultra Modern had not been shown to own, hold or have a power of disposition over any property of Eagle Homes, save perhaps the business name “Eagle Homes”, so the order restraining its dealings with all its assets was an error in principle ([24], [62]). Relief against it should be directed to the use of the business name and restrain dispositions of the goodwill attached to it ([59]-[63]). As to Mr and Mrs Cardile, there was a prima facie case that the payment of the dividends to them was a non-commercial exercise done with a view to limiting the funds available to meet a judgment ([64]) and a reasonably arguable case that s 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) applied to the dividends ([68]).
On another basis, Eagle Homes appeared on its balance sheet to have insufficient funds to meet the likely judgment debt after the dividends, so that a liquidator acting on behalf of all creditors would be entitled to pursue and recover them ([69]). The restraint should be limited, and the Court reduced its amount to the $1,058,977.12 that the Cardiles were shown to have received ([71]-[72]).
Kirby J. Kirby J concurred in the orders proposed by the joint reasons, except that he would have ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the appeal to the High Court and left undisturbed the Full Court’s costs order in their favour ([137]). He would have dismissed the appellants’ original grounds, which asserted that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to make orders of this kind against non-parties where LED had no cause of action against them or the debtor had no proprietary interest in the property ([125], [128]).
He rejected as too broadly stated any universal rule that such orders may not be made against non-parties absent a subsisting cause of action or a proprietary or beneficial interest ([120]). He said that the applicant must show, in addition to the ordinary conditions for relief in the nature of an injunction, a danger that the non-party will dispose of relevant assets and that the affairs of the debtor and the non-party are closely intermingled and the creditor has a vested or accrued cause of action against the non-party or may otherwise become entitled to have recourse to it ([121]). He agreed to the enlargement of the appeal to the orders made on remitter and concurred in the form of the substituted orders ([135]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [25] (opens in a new tab), [40]–[45] (opens in a new tab), [54]–[58] (opens in a new tab)
The ground of appeal was that the Federal Court could not make an asset preservation order against these non-parties. [25] and [40]-[45] locate the power in the court’s capacity to protect its processes and accept the negative proposition; [54]-[58] reject the appellants’ narrower proposition and state the principle. These paragraphs are the reasoning for the answer to that ground. Four of the five Justices wrote them.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J (concurring in the orders, other than as to costs)
Read judgment: [118]–[121] (opens in a new tab), [135]–[137] (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J reached the same disposition of the appeal by his own route: he would have dismissed the original jurisdictional grounds, rejected categorical rules, and stated his own conditions for relief against a non-party at [121]. He concurs in the substituted orders; the joint reasons did not adopt his statement of conditions.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [50]–[53] (opens in a new tab), [59]–[72] (opens in a new tab)
[50]-[53] state the caution and the discretionary considerations and [59]-[72] apply them to Ultra Modern and to Mr and Mrs Cardile, concluding that the Full Court erred in principle and in the extent of the relief. They are the reasoning for the orders.
Proposition 3
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [120]–[121] (opens in a new tab), [135]–[137] (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J’s conditions at [121] and his refusal at [120] to accept a categorical rule are his own and are not the joint reasons’. He concurs in the orders other than as to costs.
Why does this case matter?
Students who meet an application to freeze a stranger’s assets often ask only whether the stranger has done something wrong, or whether the court has power in principle. An examiner looks for an answer that asks what the applicant must show about the non-party’s connection to the debtor’s assets, and then how far the court should go, because the order itself is one that can damage a third party who has not been found to owe anything.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where an applicant seeks to restrain a non-party from dealing with assets, identify who is or may become the judgment debtor, and what connection the non-party has with that person’s assets or funds. Identify the source of the court’s power and the court in which relief is sought. Then address the discretionary considerations and the scope and duration of any order.
Say whose reasoning you rely on, the joint reasons or Kirby J’s separate reasons. The decision concerned the Federal Court’s power under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ([26]) and its own facts, and the joint reasons spoke of what “may” be appropriate rather than of what must follow.
Check your understanding
1. Why did the joint reasons prefer references to “Mareva orders” to “injunctions” ([25], [42])?
2. What negative proposition did the joint reasons accept, and what did they say about the appellants’ wider proposition ([45], [54])?
3. Why was the order restraining Ultra Modern’s dealings with all its assets an error in principle, and what relief did the joint reasons say should be directed at it ([24], [62]-[63])?
4. What did Kirby J say about a universal rule requiring a subsisting cause of action or a proprietary interest, and how did his orders differ from the joint reasons ([120], [137])?