Asset preservation orders against third parties
When the High Court will allow an asset preservation (Mareva) order against someone who is not a party to the proceedings, and the discretionary cautions that apply, from Cardile v LED Builders.
Learning outcomes
- State when an asset preservation order may be made against a non-party under the joint reasons in Cardile v LED Builders, and why relief will be rare.
- Weigh diligence, available proceedings and the undertaking as to damages before seeking or resisting such an order.
- Frame an order narrowly, with the assets, the amount and the exceptions stated.
An injunction ordinarily restrains a wrongdoer from doing something that infringes the applicant’s rights. A Mareva order, also called an asset preservation order in the High Court’s reasons, is different: it restrains a person from dealing with assets so that they remain available to satisfy a later judgment. The prior question is therefore who the order is directed at. Against a party to the proceedings the question is whether the court’s process is at risk of being frustrated; against a non-party the High Court said the focus is the administration of justice, and the test is narrower. This article states the common-law approach from one High Court decision on a Federal Court application, and cites no statute or court rule.
The case and the problem
In Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 the respondent, LED, had succeeded in copyright infringement proceedings in the Federal Court against Eagle Homes Pty Ltd.1 It had obtained declaratory and injunctive relief, and had elected an account of profits, so the money liability of Eagle Homes was not yet quantified. Mr and Mrs Cardile were the only shareholders of Eagle Homes and controlled it. The primary judge inferred that dividends Eagle Homes paid to them had been prompted by a desire to remove assets that would otherwise be available to meet a judgment for LED. A second company they controlled, Ultra Modern Developments Pty Ltd, had begun building houses under the business name “Eagle Homes”.
LED asked for orders restraining Ultra Modern and the Cardiles, who were not parties to the infringement actions, from disposing of their assets. Emmett J refused. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed LED’s appeal and remitted the matter, and Emmett J then made wide orders restraining Ultra Modern and the Cardiles from dealing with their assets. The High Court allowed the appeal and sent the matter back for narrower orders.
The test for a non-party
The joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ said that references to “Mareva orders” should be preferred to “injunctions”, to avoid confusion about the doctrinal basis, and that for non-parties the focus is the administration of justice. They accepted a negative proposition: there is no basis for an order against a non-party who is not answerable or liable in some way to a party, and who is not holding, controlling or able to dispose of a party’s property.
They then stated when an order against a non-party may be appropriate, assuming the other relevant criteria and discretionary factors are met. Two circumstances were identified, and the Court emphasised “may”:
- The third party holds, is using, or has exercised or is exercising a power of disposition over, or is otherwise in possession of, assets of the judgment debtor or potential judgment debtor, including claims and expectancies.
- Some process ultimately enforceable by the courts is or may be available to the judgment creditor, as a consequence of a judgment against the debtor, under which the third party may be obliged to give up property or contribute to the debtor’s funds, whether by appointment of a liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or otherwise.
The Court added that it will be a rare case in which relief is granted if the third party does not hold, or is not about to hold or dissipate, property beneficially owned by the defendant. LED relied on earlier decisions about third parties whose affairs were mixed up with the debtor’s. The joint reasons distinguished them as not mere cases of mixing or intermingling, because the evidence in those cases showed deliberate blurring and attempted transfer of property rights.
Caution and discretion
The joint reasons treated the order as one requiring a high degree of caution. It operates against the person, not as an attachment of the property, and does not deprive the person of title or possession. In a practical sense, however, it works as a very tight negative pledge over property with the contempt sanction behind it. They agreed with a New South Wales description of it as a drastic remedy that should not be granted lightly.
They listed matters to weigh: whether the applicant has acted diligently and expeditiously, whether a money judgment has been recovered, whether other proceedings are available against the third party and, if so, why they have not been taken, and the difficulties of quantifying and recovering damages under the undertaking if the order proves unjustified. They said that, where proceedings are available against the third party and have not been taken, it is difficult to conceive of cases where an undertaking to commence them would not be required. The order should, in general, be supported by an undertaking as to damages, and a court granting interlocutory relief should generally grant the minimum relief necessary to do justice between the parties and say when the order ceases to operate.
How the Court applied it
Ultra Modern was entitled to dispose of assets it owned or had lawfully acquired, and the item of Eagle Homes’ property that could safely be said to have been made available to it was the business name, with possibly some goodwill attached to it. For the Cardiles, the Court found a prima facie case that the dividends were a non-commercial payment made to limit the funds available to meet a judgment, and a reasonably arguable case that the dividends were an alienation of property within s 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), as the judgment describes that provision. The Court also considered that a liquidator of Eagle Homes would probably be entitled to pursue the funds.
The orders the Court said should be made on remitter were narrow: Ultra Modern was restrained from dealing with the business name, and each of the Cardiles from dealing with assets up to a stated sum of just over $1.05 million, subject to listed exceptions such as legal expenses and ordinary living expenses. The Court described the relief as interlocutory. Kirby J gave separate reasons and concurred in the form of orders.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify whether the person to be restrained is a party. If a non-party, say that the High Court treated the focus as the administration of justice.
- Ask whether the person holds, uses or can dispose of the debtor’s assets, or whether a recovery process such as a liquidator’s claim could oblige them to give up property.
- Do not assume that control of a company, or shared affairs, is enough; the Court distinguished cases of mere mixing from cases of deliberate blurring and transfer of property on the evidence.
- Weigh diligence, whether judgment has been recovered, available proceedings and the undertaking as to damages.
- Frame the order narrowly, stating the assets, the amount and the exceptions.
Self-check
- Have I said that the Court’s test is permissive (“may”), and that relief will be rare where the third party does not hold, or is not about to hold or dissipate, the defendant’s property?
- Have I attributed the test to the joint reasons, and not to Kirby J?
Where the authority sits
Cardile is a High Court decision on appeal from the Federal Court; it binds lower Australian courts and the High Court can reconsider it. The joint reasons said that s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Federal Court to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as it thinks appropriate, though it is not authority for an injunction where there is otherwise no case for one. No statute or rule is cited directly here, and no later decision is cited. For the general framework of interim relief see Equitable relief and Interlocutory process; for execution against a judgment debtor see Enforcing a money judgment.